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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last three decades of the twentieth century witnessed waves of financial de-
regulation throughout the globe. Widespread financial liberalisation took place
at the domestic and international level in both advanced and developing eco-
nomies. Several countries lifted restrictions on competition in banking through
the elimination of interest rate regulations and the permission for foreign banks
or non–bank organisations to enter domestic banking markets. Bond and stock
markets opened up, too. Nowadays, investors can diversify their portfolios in-
ternationally by trading bonds and shares of companies from different parts of
the world. Moreover, financial globalisation has been further promoted by the
extensive liberalisation of capital accounts, which led to an enormous increase in
cross–border asset holdings.
But being more liberal does not mean that today’s financial markets are free
from imperfections. Financial deregulation can eliminate some sorts of distor-
tions, but leaves other imperfections unaffected. Such frictions, in turn, can have
an important impact on the behaviour of economic agents and therefore lead to
different macroeconomic outcomes as compared to a frictionless world. Indeed, a
large body of academic literature has examined the link between financial frictions
and real economic activity. This thesis adds to this field of research and studies
the macroeconomic implications of certain frictions in national and international
financial markets. In particular, Chapter 2 analyses the effects of financial liberal-
isation on the US economy, while Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the role of frictions
in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs).
1
Numerous theoretical contributions show that finance matters for the real
economy.1 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) were
one of the first who tried to incorporate financial frictions in macroeconomic
models. In their frameworks, entrepreneurs borrow from households who do
not observe the outcome of entrepreneurs’ investment projects unless they pay
a verification cost. This costly state verification (CSV) implies that investment
depends positively on entrepreneurs’ net worth. If a negative shock occurs, net
worth declines, which leads to less investment. The associated fall in capital and
output feeds back in a further drop in entrepreneurial net worth and investment
in the subsequent period. As a result, the financial friction increases the persistence
of the temporary shock. However, the upward shift in capital supply raises the
price of capital, which mitigates the additional fall in investment. This effect is
different from the propagation of shocks in Bernanke et al. (1999). Their model
features non–linear capital adjustment costs which actually implies a fall in the
price of capital after a negative shock. Hence, financial frictions do not only
increase the persistence of shocks but also generate amplification effects. Bernanke
et al. (1999) call this the financial accelerator. A similar mechanism is at present in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Their model does not feature CSV but introduces a
collateral constraint for entrepreneurs. Negative shocks cause a fall in output and
asset prices which tightens the borrowing constraint and therefore reinforces the
propagation of the initial shock.
Another class of models analyses the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks
on the consumption and savings behaviour of individuals. If markets are com-
plete, i.e. a full set of state–contingent Arrow–Debreu securities is available for
trade, agents can fully hedge against consumption fluctuations across all possible
states of nature. Under incomplete markets, households can engage in perfect
consumption smoothing over time and consume the annuity value of discounted
lifetime wealth, if there is no uncertainty and the interest rate equals the agent’s
time preference rate. This outcome is the famous permanent income hypothesis
(PIH) originated by Friedman (1957). Yet the PIH does not generally hold in
1See Brunnermeier et al. (2013) for an excellent overview over financial frictions in macroeco-
nomic models.
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a world with uncertainty unless we make the strong assumption of quadratic
preferences. Indeed, an influential paper by Aiyagari (1994) shows how under
incomplete markets the interplay of uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks,
prudence, and borrowing constraints creates a precautionary savings motive. That
is, market imperfections create an incentive for self–insurance, which leads to an
inefficiently high level of aggregate capital in equilibrium.
More recently, Mendoza et al. (2009) have considered a two–economy extension
of the Aiyagari (1994) framework to analyse the phenomenon of global external
imbalances. They argue that the observed current account imbalances are the
result of financial integration across countries that differ in the degree of financial
development. Financial contracts can be better enforced in countries with more
developed financial markets, such that these countries save less and accumulate
more foreign liabilities. Indeed, this provides one possible explanation for why
capital flows uphill, i.e. why countries with higher growth rates do not attract
foreign capital. Caballero et al. (2008) suggest a different solution to this capital
allocation puzzle (see Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)). Fast growing emerging mar-
kets are unable to generate enough financial assets in order to meet the domestic
demand for securities. This excess demand is satisfied by countries with more
sophisticated financial markets, such that capital actually flows from poor to rich
economies.
Turning to the empirical literature on the macroeconomic implications of fin-
ancial frictions, several studies suggest that deeper and well–functioning financial
markets have beneficial effects on the economy as a whole. A prominent article
by King and Levine (1993) employs cross–country regressions and shows that a
higher level of financial development leads to higher growth of per capita income.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide further support for the growth–finance nexus.
Using industry–level data for a large cross–section of countries, they find that
industries that depend more on external finance grow at a lower rate in countries
with low financial development. In an important contribution, Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) study the impact of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions in
the United States on economic growth. Until the late 1970s, a multitude of state
and federal laws prohibited banks from branching freely within and across state
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borders. During the 1980s, however, more and more states lifted these restrictions
on intra– and interstate banking. The result of this gradual deregulation process
was an integrated national banking market as we know it today. In fact, Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) show that the intrastate banking reform led to a significant
increase in per capita income and output growth.
The paper by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) was the beginning of a range of
empirical studies that examined the impact of US intra– and interstate banking
deregulation on the real and financial economy. For instance, Black and Stra-
han (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), and Kerr and Nanda (2009) find that
the regime change spurred investment in new firm start–ups and led to an in-
crease in the overall number of firms. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) also show that
the average size of non–financial firms declined following the banking reform.
What is more, Morgan et al. (2004) provide evidence that bank market integration
reduced macroeconomic volatility within states. Demyanyk et al. (2007) show
that interstate income risk sharing improved after banking deregulation. In ad-
dition, Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) find that intrastate banking
liberalisation led to a decline in the pro–cyclicality of consumption risk sharing.
In light of this extensive empirical research, it is surprising that theoretical
work on this issue has been very limited. For that reason, Chapter 2 of my
thesis, “Macroeconomic Implications of US Banking Liberalisation”, addresses
the macroeconomic repercussions of US banking deregulation from a theoretical
perspective. I develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model,
which features two forms of financial frictions. On the one hand, I follow Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and assume that the amount entrepreneurs can borrow from
banks is subject to a collateral constraint. On the other hand, I build on Gerali
et al. (2010) and introduce credit frictions by assuming that banks supply loans
under monopolistic competition. Banks operate as traditional financial interme-
diaries. They transfer funds from private households to entrepreneurs in the
economy. Prior to deregulation, banks exploit their market power and charge a
high mark–up on loan interest rates. Financial liberalisation leads to more vigor-
ous competition among banks, which effectively ameliorates credit market access
of entrepreneurs.
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To my knowledge, Stebunovs (2008) and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010) are
the only studies that analyse US banking deregulation within a theoretical macro
framework. My work is closely related to these two articles. In particular, the way
how companies enter and exit the market in my model is borrowed from their pa-
pers. Nevertheless, the focus and approach of my analysis is somewhat different
from theirs. In my setup, entrepreneurs are investors who fund the creation of
firm start–ups. Yet in the models of Ghironi and Stebunovs banks own the firms
in the economy after they have financed their establishment. That said, banks
act more like venture capitalists rather than financial intermediaries. Moreover,
Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010) consider a two–country DSGE model to study the
domestic and international repercussions of interstate branching deregulation.
They point out that bank market integration might have contributed to the per-
sistent current account deficits in the US. In this vein, their study complements
the aforementioned literature on global external imbalances.
The goal of my paper is to contribute to bridging the gap between my theor-
etical framework and the vast empirical literature on US banking deregulation.
To gauge the empirical performance of the model, I apply a state–specific calib-
ration. I simulate the model and construct artificial panel data, which are then
used to reproduce various regression exercises implemented in previous studies.
As a matter of fact, the model succeeds in both qualitatively and quantitatively
replicating several empirical findings. In particular, bank market integration is
associated with (i) an increase in investment in new firms, (ii) a decline in average
firm size, (iii) an erosion of the bank capital ratio, (iv) a reduction of state business
cycle volatility, and (v) improved consumption risk sharing of entrepreneurs.
Chapters 3 and 4 of my thesis investigate the role of frictions for explaining
macroeconomic dynamics in emerging markets. Many researchers have docu-
mented that EMEs exhibit certain business cycle patterns that are different from
those in advanced countries. Four stylised facts about macroeconomic dynam-
ics in EMEs are widely agreed upon: (i) business cycle fluctuations in EMEs are
more severe than in developed economies; (ii) there is an excess volatility of con-
sumption relative to income; (iii) net exports and current accounts are strongly
countercyclical; and (iv) capital inflows are exposed to so–called “sudden stops”.
5
Understanding these empirical regularities has been at the centre of recent re-
search on macroeconomic fluctuations. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) address these
issues in a small open economy (SOE) model with working capital and country
risk spreads on the interest rate. They point out that the model matches Argen-
tine business cycles reasonably well if country spreads are induced by domestic
fundamentals. In particular, it is able to generate high macroeconomic volatil-
ity, countercyclical net exports and a negative correlation between interest rates
and GDP. A prominent contribution by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) analyses a
stochastic growth model featuring transitory and permanent productivity shocks.
They estimate their model for Mexico and Canada, representing emerging and
advanced economies in their analysis. They show that macroeconomic dynamics
in Mexico (Canada) are mainly driven by trend (transitory) shocks. This finding
provoked Aguiar and Gopinath to state their famous hypothesis that “the cycle is
the trend” in emerging markets.
Recently, several studies have challenged the results of Aguiar and Gopinath.
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) introduce financial frictions in form of a debt–elastic
interest rate in a real business cycle (RBC) framework and estimate the model
for Argentina. They find that Argentine business cycles are mainly determined
by transitory disturbances, whereas trend shocks play a rather negligible role.
Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013) also highlight the importance of financial frictions
in understanding macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. They demonstrate that it
is crucial to augment the SOE framework with certain financial market imperfec-
tions in order to generate empirically plausible business cycles patterns. The line
of reasoning in Boz et al. (2011) is a different one. These authors set up a frame-
work in which agents learn to distinguish between trend and transitory shocks.
Accordingly, advanced and emerging economies exhibit distinct business cycle
phenomena because the latter are characterised by more severe informational
frictions.
Chapter 3, entitled “Business Cycles in Emerging Markets: the Role of Li-
ability Dollarisation and Valuation Effects”, contributes to this strand of the
literature. It is based on joint work with Peter Rosenkranz. The purpose of our
paper is to investigate the importance of certain credit market imperfections in
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different EMEs. To this end, we develop a DSGE model of a small open economy
with differentiated home and foreign goods as well as endogenous exchange
rate movements. As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), total factor productivity
(TFP) contains both a transitory and permanent component. We also build on
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and introduce a debt–elastic interest rate as a reduced
form financial market imperfection. Furthermore, our model features the phe-
nomenon of liability dollarisation, which can be interpreted as a specific type of
financial frictions in EMEs. In this vein, we account for the fact that emerging
markets traditionally have had difficulties in borrowing in domestic currency on
international capital markets (see Reinhart et al. (2003b), Eichengreen and Haus-
mann (2005), and Lane and Shambaugh (2010)).
The characteristic of liability dollarisation introduces valuation effects in our
model. Valuation effects refer to changes in the net foreign asset position that
do not arise from the current account but are due to fluctuations in exchange
rates and asset prices. The size of these price effects in external balance sheets
has been increasing over the last two decades. This observation has attracted
great academic attention in recent years. Important contributions in this area of
research are Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), Gourinchas and Rey (2007b), Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and Gourinchas et al. (2010). These studies suggest that
valuation effects do not only have a non–negligible impact on the dynamics of
a country’s net foreign asset position but can also play an important role for the
propagation of shocks across countries.
We estimate our model using Bayesian techniques for a number of EMEs (Mex-
ico, South Africa, and Turkey) and developed economies (Canada, Sweden, and
Switzerland). Therefore, we do not perform a case study but control for potential
heterogeneity across countries. Contrary to previous studies in this strand of the
literature, we include a (vector–)autoregressive measurement error component
to capture off–model dynamics. Regarding business cycles in emerging markets,
our main findings are that (i) even though we incorporate financial frictions in
the framework, trend shocks are the main determinant of macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, (ii) accounting for liability dollarisation ameliorates the model fit, and
(iii) valuation effects on average stabilise changes in the net foreign asset position.
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Chapter 4 of my thesis, “Current Account Dynamics in Emerging Markets:
Is the Cycle really the Trend?”, is the output of a joint project with Mathias
Hoffmann. The aim of this chapter is to shed more light on the determinants
of macroeconomic dynamics in a large number of EMEs. In particular, we ex-
amine the sources behind the strong countercyclicality of the current account in
these countries. As already mentioned, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) explain this
phenomenon by arguing that EMEs are particularly prone to permanent shocks.
By contrast, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013) suggest
that it is not permanent shocks but transitory disturbances in combination with
financial frictions that determine business cycle patterns in these countries. As a
result, the quantitative–theoretical RBC literature on emerging markets provides
contradicting evidence with respect to the hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend”.
We use a different approach to examine whether the cycle is really the trend.
Our analysis builds on the empirical literature on the intertemporal approach
of the current account and employs a structural time series model. In particu-
lar, we estimate a structural Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) for a large
cross–section of EMEs. For this purpose, we follow Hoffmann (2001a, 2013) and
Kano (2008) and develop an identification scheme to identify permanent, global
transitory, and country–specific transitory shocks. Before we take our method to
the empirical data, we apply it to model generated time series and show that it
does a strikingly good job in tracking the true underlying shocks.
Our empirical analysis suggests that there is no common explanation for the
countercyclicality of the current account in EMEs. In only half of the countries, the
countercyclicality of the current account indeed results from permanent shocks,
whereas transitory shocks account for this phenomenon in the other half of the
countries. Interestingly, our results are consistent with the findings of Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010): permanent shocks drive the
negative correlation between the current account and income in Mexico, but
transitory disturbances explain the countercyclicality of the current account in
Argentina. We show that different degrees of domestic and international frictions
across emerging markets might provide an explanation for this observation.
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Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Implications of US
Banking Liberalisation
2.1 Introduction
Is financial liberalisation a bane or boon for the real economy? Well, it depends.
For more than a century, much research has been conducted on the relationship
between finance and economic activity. In a pioneer contribution, Schumpeter
(1912) highlights the essential role of financial intermediaries in promoting in-
novations and economic prosperity. Well–performing banking systems mobilise
funds and allow an allocation of resources to places where they yield highest re-
turns. In this sense, free banking is beneficial as it enhances efficiency and thereby
fosters economic growth. On the other hand, the recent financial crisis of 2008
demonstrated how bad real economic activity can suffer if liberal financial sys-
tems tend to malfunction. This painful experience has reignited the still ongoing
debate on how we should reform bank regulation in order to address financial
stability.
This paper investigates an episode of financial liberalisation in the United
States that provides support for Schumpeter’s ideology. I develop a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with credit market frictions that
helps to understand various macroeconomic repercussions of the relaxation of
intra– and interstate banking limitations through the 1980s and 1990s.
Prior to the 1970s, a multitude of state and federal laws restricted US banks
in the geographical coverage of their activities. Most state legislatures designed
laws that prevented state banks from opening up branches in different counties
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within state borders. Some states even barred branching altogether and merely
permitted unit banks. Furthermore, the McFadden Act of 1927 limited national
banks to operate in one state only, and the Banking Act of 1933 required national
banks to comply with the branching regulations set by the state where they were
headquartered. As an attempt to circumvent the legal restrictions on interstate
banking, some financial institutions created a Multi–Bank Holding Company
(MBHC), which is a corporation that owns several individual banks in different
locations. But the Douglas Amendment to the federal Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 virtually prohibited MBHCs from acquiring or establishing out–of–state
banks.
These barriers to bank entry and expansion effectively curbed competition
in local markets and allowed banks to operate in a quasi–monopolistic fashion.
Regulatory change only began in the late 1970s, when more and more states
began to lift these legal impediments. The gradual removal of geographical
restrictions on banking over time is visualised in Figure 2.1, which shows the
cumulative number of states that allowed inter– and intrastate banking. As
is evident from the diagram, before 1978 only a few states permitted statewide
branching, whereas interstate banking was forbidden throughout the country. But
the 1980s witnessed a wave of both intra– and interstate banking deregulation
across states. A milestone in the deregulation process was the passage of the
Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994, which
repealed the restrictions on interstate banking and branching. The transition to
full intra– and interstate banking in the United States was eventually completed
by the late 1990s.1 This regime change triggered a consolidation in the US banking
industry (see Berger et al. (1995)), which was associated with improved access to
financial services for customers and more vigorous competition among banks (see
Stiroh and Strahan (2003)).
Several empirical studies have shown that the annulment of geographical
bank entry restrictions had a considerable impact on both the financial and non–
financial economy. For instance, an influential paper by Jayaratne and Strahan
1See Kane (1996) for a detailed discussion of the IBBEA. Calomiris (2000) and Barth et al. (2010)
provide comprehensive overviews on the history of the intra– and interstate banking deregulation
in the United States.
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Figure 2.1: Transition to Full Intra– and Interstate Banking
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(1996) provides evidence that intrastate branching deregulation accelerated eco-
nomic growth. Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), and Kerr
and Nanda (2009) show that the regulatory change also led to an increase in firm
creation and a reduction of the average size of non–financial firms (see Cetorelli
and Strahan (2006)). Moreover, banking deregulation was associated with a de-
crease in state business cycle volatility (see Morgan et al. (2004)), a tightening of
the income distribution (see Beck et al. (2010)), an improvement of income risk
sharing (see Demyanyk et al. (2007)), as well as a decline in the pro–cyclicality
of consumption risk sharing (see Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011)).
Regarding the impact on the financial industry, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find
that bank market integration lowered the interest rate on loans, whereas there was
no significant change in bank profitability or deposit interest rates. More recent
works demonstrate that bank capital ratios fell (see Hanson et al. (2011)) and bank
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loan commitments increased (see Park (2012)) after the reform.
Despite the vast empirical literature on the real effects of US banking dereg-
ulation, this issue has been clearly under–studied from a theoretical viewpoint.
To this end, I develop a dynamic general equilibrium framework featuring endo-
genous firm entry and imperfect competition in banking to shed light on several
empirical observations in a coherent framework. Banks play a central role in
the model. They act as traditional financial intermediaries, transferring funds
from savers to investors in the economy. To be more precise, banks finance the
provision of loans to entrepreneurs through sight deposits collected from private
households and bank equity accumulated through retained earnings. Entrepren-
eurs are investors who own profitable capital good producing firms and invest in
new firm start–ups.
The model embeds two types of financial frictions. First, as in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), I assume that entrepreneurs face a borrowing limit. That is, they
can only pledge part of their expected future income for collateral purposes.
Second, I build on Gerali et al. (2010) and let banks operate under monopolistic
competition in the credit market. Prior to deregulation, financial intermediaries
exploit their market power and charge a high premium on their loan interest rates.
This financial market imperfection effectively creates a barrier to external finance
for entrepreneurs. Banking deregulation is then simply simulated as a one–time
permanent increase in competition among banks. As a result, the decline in the
market power of banks directly translates into lower loan interest rates, which
improves investors’ access to credit.
A major challenge of my analysis is to link my theoretical model to the re-
lated empirical literature. Researchers have exploited the fact that states relaxed
their geographical restrictions on bank entry at different points in time to study
the effects of deregulation through panel regressions. To assess the empirical
performance of the model, I reproduce various regression exercises of previous
studies based on model generated panel data. For that purpose, I calibrate the
model for each individual US state in order to account for potential heterogeneity
across states.
Indeed, my model succeeds in both qualitatively and quantitatively replicating
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several empirical findings. Consistent with Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli
and Strahan (2006), and Kerr and Nanda (2009), deregulation leads to an increase
in firm creation. After the reform, investors can borrow on softer terms, which
induces them to finance more firm start–ups. This rise in the number of producers
in the economy reduces the relative size of an individual firm. According to
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), this is exactly what happened in the US after the
annulment of intra– and interstate branching restrictions.
Furthermore, concurrent with the findings of Morgan et al. (2004), bank market
integration is associated with a decline in the state–level volatility of output and
personal income of private households and entrepreneurs. In fact, featuring
different stochastic exogenous shocks on technology, the collateral value pledged
by entrepreneurs, and bank competition, the model generally predicts ambiguous
effects of deregulation on macroeconomic variability. Deregulation dampens
the responses following disturbances to productivity and bank competition, but
exaggerates the effects of a shock to the collateral value. Overall, the model
suggests a stabilisation of the business cycle after the reform, because the mitigated
effects of productivity and competition shocks outweigh the amplified reaction to
changes in the collateral value.
Finally, the regime switch improves consumption risk sharing of entrepren-
eurs, but does not affect insurance of private households. Prior to deregulation,
credit is expensive and collateral constraints are tight so that business owners
have difficulties in buffering consumption against fluctuations in their portfolio
income. Financial liberalisation improves their access to banking services, which
allows them to better hedge consumption against income shocks. This result to
some extent mirrors the findings of Demyanyk et al. (2007) who show that income
insurance increased markedly after the transition to interstate banking. They
point out that the effect is more pronounced in states where small businesses are
more important, which emphasises the crucial role of bank finance especially for
small firms. In contrast, Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) report that
there is no impact at all on average consumption risk sharing.
My work is closely related to Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010) who analyse
the domestic and international ramifications of interstate banking deregulation
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using a two–country DSGE framework. They show how bank market integration
may have contributed to the growing external imbalances and persistent real
exchange rate appreciation in the US during the 1980s and 1990s. I follow their
approach in formalising product market entry and exit in my model. That is, the
creation of new firms is subject to sunk setup costs and existing producers face an
exogenous business closure shock. A crucial difference between their setup and
the one presented in this article is the way how the financial sector is modelled.
In Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010), banks can basically be interpreted as venture
capitalists who own the stock of firms in the economy. In contrast, my paper
explicitly distinguishes between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs. This
separation disentangles market power of banks from competition in the product
market and allows to examine the impact of financial liberalisation on different
agents, i.e. workers and capitalists. Finally, my work also relates to a burgeoning
literature that tries to incorporate fully fledged banking sectors in dynamic macro
models. Important contributions in that area have been made by Adrian and Shin
(2010), Gerali et al. (2010), Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010),
and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces
the theoretical framework. Section 2.3 outlines the state–specific calibration of the
model. In Section 2.4, I discuss steady state effects and transition dynamics of
banking deregulation. Section 2.5 scrutinises the empirical performance of the
model by reproducing various econometric exercises of previous studies. A few
concluding remarks appear in Section 2.6.
2.2 Model Environment
This section introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model, which will be later
used to investigate the macroeconomic repercussions of US banking liberalisa-
tion.2 I use a closed economy setup describing individual US federal states.
Figure 2.2 outlines the structure of the model. The theoretical economy com-
2A detailed formal description of the model environment including all derivations is presented
in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.2: Structure of the Model Economy
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prises five types of agents. There is a unit mass of identical, infinitely lived private
households, who work, consume and save. The producing economy consists of a
representative final good producer and a continuum of profitable intermediate good
firms. These intermediate good firms are owned by entrepreneurs, who finance the
establishment of new firm start–ups. We can think of entrepreneurs as small busi-
ness owners who – as opposed to big enterprises – cannot obtain funds through
national securities markets. Hence, their only source of external funding are loans
supplied by a continuum of banks.
The financial system is characterised by substantial credit market frictions.
Prior to deregulation, competition in the financial industry is curtailed, which
enables banks to charge high interest rates on their loans. Expensive credit deters
entrepreneurs from borrowing in order to fund investment in new firms. Finan-
cial liberalisation results in a more competitive loan market, such that business
owners’ access to external finance improves.
Although the model abstracts from interstate trade and capital flows, it features
both state–specific and country–wide exogenous productivity shocks. Also, there
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is no money in the model, such that all variables are expressed in real terms, i.e.
in units of the homogeneous final good.
2.2.1 Private Households
There is a representative private household with a unit mass of identical, atom-
istic, infinitely lived members. The expected lifetime utility of the representative
household is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cHt , 1 − lt),
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set
available at date zero, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and cHt is the
household’s consumption at time t. For convenience, total time endowment in
each period is normalised to one and the agent devotes a fraction of lt to work
and 1 − lt to leisure activities.
Household’s preferences are characterised by a standard Cobb–Douglas Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) period utility function of the form
u(cHt , 1 − lt) =
[
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
]1−γ
1 − γ ,
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) measures the importance of consumption relative to leisure in
determining the agent’s instantaneous utility andγ ≥ 1 is a parameter that governs
the risk attitude of the private household.
As in Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010), the representative agent has access to
two different types of financial securities. On the one hand, it can hold risk–
free bank deposits, while on the other hand, it can buy stocks in a risky mutual
fund of banks. Each period t, the household enters with dt deposit holdings and
purchases dt+1 new deposits. Bank deposits have a maturity of one period. To
keep matters simple, I assume that there is no default risk of banks. That is, at
time t, the household always receives back the full amount of its deposits dt plus
a risk–free return rt, where rt denotes the interest rate between time t − 1 and t,
known with certainty at date t − 1. Furthermore, the agent holds xt shares in the
mutual fund and buys xt+1 new shares. The mutual fund consists of a continuum
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of all banks in the economy. At time t, each individual bank ι pays out part of its
profits as dividends at(ι) to the fund’s shareholders. Accordingly, total dividend
payments amount to
∫
ι
at(ι)dι. Since shareholders are entitled to receive dividend
payments in the future, the price of one stock in the fund must be equal to the
value of claims to all banks’ future dividends. Let νt(ι) denote the price of such
a claim to bank ι. This implies that the price of a share in the fund has to be∫
ι
νt(ι)dι. As a result, the overall payoff of a stock is the sum of the share price and
dividends, i.e.
∫
ι
(at(ι) + νt(ι))dι. Finally, the household also earns labour income
wtlt from supplying lt units of labour, where wt denotes the real wage rate.
In sum, the representative household generates income from work, the re-
demption of deposits plus accrued interest, dividends, and the liquidation of the
current stock portfolio. Household expenses are given by the sum of consumption
and the purchase of new deposits and shares. The period budget constraint of the
representative agent can therefore be written as
dt+1 + xt+1
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι + cHt ≤ (1 + rt)dt + xt
∫
ι
(at(ι) + νt(ι))dι + wtlt. (2.1)
The household takes prices as given and seeks to maximise expected lifetime
utility by choosing cHt , lt, dt+1, and xt+1, subject to the period budget constraint (2.1),
given d0 and x0. The solution to the household’s optimisation problem yields:
(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
= β(1 + rt+1)Et

(
(cHt+1)
ξ(1 − lt+1)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt+1
 , (2.2)
νt = βEt
( (cHt+1)ξ(1 − lt+1)1−ξ(cHt )ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ cHt
cHt+1
(at+1 + νt+1)
 , (2.3)
wt =
1 − ξ
ξ
cHt
1 − lt , (2.4)
where νt ≡
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι and at ≡
∫
ι
at(ι)dι.
Equation (2.2) represents the intertemporal Euler equation with respect to bank
deposits. Condition (2.3) is a version of the Lucas (1978) consumption–based asset
pricing formula. It states that the share price of the mutual fund must be equal
to its expected discounted future payoff, where mt,t+1 ≡ β
(
(cHt+1)
ξ(1−lt+1)1−ξ
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
cHt+1
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denotes the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor (SDF) between period
t and t + 1. Finally, equation (2.4) describes the intratemporal labour–leisure
trade–off.
An optimal contingent plan for consumption, work, deposit and share hold-
ings is described by sequences {cHt }∞t=0, {lt}∞t=0, {dt+1}∞t=0, and {xt+1}∞t=0, satisfying the
first–order conditions (2.2)–(2.4), the budget constraint (2.1), as well as the trans-
versality conditions for deposits and shares given by
lim
T→∞Et
T−1∏
k=1
dt+T
1 + rt+k
 = 0 and limT→∞Et [mt,t+Tνt+T] = 0,
respectively, where mt,t+T = βT
(
(cHt+T)
ξ(1−lt+T)1−ξ
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
cHt+T
is the T period SDF.
2.2.2 Firms
Final Good Producers
The final good is manufactured in a perfect competitive industry. A final good
producer employs differentiated intermediate or capital good varieties to produce
the homogeneous final good. At time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , there is a continuum of capital
good inputs of measure nt available. Technology is described by a standard Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function
of the form
yt =
(∫ nt
0
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ dω
) φ
φ−1
,
where yt is the output amount of the final good, kt(ω) denotes the input quantity
of capital good component ω ∈ [0,nt], and φ > 1 represents the constant elasticity
of substitution between different input varieties.
Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply that the market size is
indeterminate which allows to consider a representative firm. Since the produ-
cer has to purchase intermediate goods in each period, the representative firm’s
objective can be described by solving a series of static, one–period profit maxim-
isation problems. Accordingly, the representative producer chooses differentiated
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intermediate good inputs to maximise profits:
max
kt(ω)
(∫ nt
0
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ dω
) φ
φ−1
−
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)kt(ω)dω, ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where pt(ω) is the price for variety ω.
First–order conditions with respect to each specific capital good input ω are
given by
pt(ω) =
(
yt
kt(ω)
) 1
φ
, ∀ ω ∈ [0,nt]. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) states the common optimality condition under perfect competition.
The marginal product of each intermediate good input must be equal to its price.
Intermediate Good Producers
At date t, each capital good producer ω hires lt(ω) labour units to produce a
differentiated variety. The production function is identical for all firms and takes
the simple form of
kt(ω) = ztlt(ω),
where zt denotes exogenous labour–augmenting technology. I assume that the
productivity process zt contains both a state–specific component zs,t and a country–
wide component zc,t, such that zt = zs,tzc,t.
Because intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes in the production techno-
logy of the final good sector, capital good firms act in a monopolistic competitive
fashion. The objective of an individual capital good firm ω is to set the price
pt(ω) in order to maximise profits subject to the demand for its variety by the
representative final good producer determined by equation (2.5):
max
pt(ω)
piFt (ω) =pt(ω)kt(ω) − wtzt kt(ω), ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
subject to (2.5).
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The first–order condition for this problem is given by
pt(ω) = pt =
φ
(φ − 1)
wt
zt
. (2.6)
Condition (2.6) indicates that the price of an intermediate good is simply determ-
ined by a constant mark–up of φφ−1 over marginal costs
wt
zt
. This premium as well
as marginal costs are common to all capital good producers, such that all firms
choose the same price–quantity combination, i.e. pt(ω) = pt and kt(ω) = kt. As a
consequence, the production function in the final good sector simplifies to
yt = n
φ
φ−1
t kt, (2.7)
and condition (2.5) can be rewritten as
pt =
( yt
kt
) 1
φ
. (2.8)
Finally, profit of a capital good firm is given by
piFt =
1
φ
yt
nt
. (2.9)
2.2.3 Entrepreneurs
The economy is inhabited by a discrete number µE > 1 of risk–averse entrepren-
eurs or investors. They own the stock of intermediate good producers in the
economy and therefore receive all profits generated in that sector. In addition to
their firm portfolio income, entrepreneurs can finance consumption of the final
good and investment in new firm start–ups through loans provided by banks. In
fact, I assume that bank loans are the only source of external finance for investors.
In that sense, we can interpret entrepreneurs as small business owners who do
not have access to funding through corporate bond or equity markets.
The expected lifetime utility of entrepreneur j is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtEuE(c
E
t ( j)),
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where βE ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and cEt ( j) denotes entrepreneur
j’s consumption at date t. Preferences are identical among all investors and given
by a standard power utility function
uE(cEt ( j)) =
(cEt ( j))
1−γE
1 − γE ,
where γE ≥ 1 represents the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion or
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
At each time t, entrepreneur j holds a portfolio of nt( j) capital good firms
and funds the foundation of ne,t( j) new firms. Firm entry and exit is analogue to
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bilbiie et al. (2011), and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010).
The establishment of new enterprises is costly. Before a firm enters the market
and starts to produce, the investor has to finance an exogenous sunk setup cost.
For the sake of simplicity, this entry cost is assumed to be fix and amounts to one
unit of the homogeneous final good.3
A firm entrant in period t is only able to start production in period t + 1. This
induces a one period time–to–build lag in the economy. As shown in Section 2.2.2,
production in the intermediate good sector does not incur fixed costs. This implies
that an operating firm produces in every period until it is forced to shut down
and exits the market. In particular, I assume that firm exit occurs exogenously.
With independent probability δ ∈ (0, 1), an incumbent producer will be hit by
the close–down shock and vanishes at the end of every period.4 The fact that
only existing producers face the exit shock implies that a firm established during
period t will operate at least in period t + 1 before it is subject to potential closure.
As a result, the number of firms in entrepreneur j’s portfolio evolves according to
3As Ghironi and Melitz (2005) point out, we can think of an individual firm as a production line
for a specific variety. In this respect, the theoretical model does not distinguish between product
innovations that are introduced by new or existing producers.
4The reason why I assume an exogenous exit shock, independent of the state of the economy or
firm characteristics, is twofold. First, endogenous business closure would substantially complicate
the model. Second, empirical evidence suggests that the product and business destruction rate
in the US has been invariant over the business cycle. For instance, Broda and Weinstein (2010)
find that product creation is strongly procyclical, whereas the destruction of good varieties does
not respond heavily to cyclical movements. In addition, Lee and Mukoyama (2008) show that
although entry of manufacturing plants in the US is procyclical, exit rates are not substantially
different across booms and recessions.
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the following law of motion:
nt+1( j) = ne,t( j) + (1 − δ)nt( j). (2.10)
Hence, the dynamic equation for the overall number of capital good producers in
the economy can then be written as
nt+1 = ne,t + (1 − δ)nt, (2.11)
where nt =
∑µE
j=1 nt( j) and ne,t =
∑µE
j=1 ne,t( j).
Changes in the firm portfolio are costly. In particular, variations in the number
of enterprises involve a quadratic adjustment cost of χ2
(
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
)2
nt( j), where χ > 0
is a constant weighting parameter. The underlying cost function exhibits an
increasing marginal cost of portfolio expansion or, symmetrically, shrinking. This
specification captures the idea that a more rapid change in the stock of firms results
in a more than proportional rise in adjustment costs. Moreover, due to economies
of scale, costs are declining in portfolio size. That is, entrepreneurs who own a
large number of companies might have more expertise and are therefore more
efficient in running their business.
Entrepreneurs have access to external finance through the credit market. They
can agree on one–period loan contracts with banks. At each date t, an investor is
able borrow bt+1( j) from banks and must reimburse its past obligations bt( j) plus
interest rbt . The interest rate r
b
t determines the price of a loan between period t − 1
and t and is known at date t − 1. However, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
entrepreneurs face a borrowing limit. The loan capacity of an investor today
depends on both expectations about returns of tomorrow’s firm portfolio as well
as current portfolio size. In particular, the gross loan repayment in period t + 1
cannot exceed a certain time–varying fraction of expected future income:
(1 + rbt+1)bt+1( j) ≤ κtnt( j)Et
[
nt+1( j)piFt+1
]
. (2.12)
Expression κtnt( j) in equation (2.12) defines the debt–to–income (DTI) ratio
and determines how much future income an investor can pledge as collateral for
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its debt obligation.5 I assume that the borrowing limit is increasing in today’s
size of the portfolio nt( j), such that a larger stock of firms improves an investor’s
access to credit.6 Besides, the DTI ratio is a function of an exogenous random
variable κt, affecting the quality of future earnings for collateral purposes. In the
deterministic steady state, condition (2.12) is assumed to hold with equality.
I follow Iacoviello (2005) and assume that entrepreneurs are less patient than
private households, meaning that β > βE. This assumption is necessary as it avoids
a pure self–financing behaviour of investors and assures that there is financial
intermediation in equilibrium. Since entrepreneurs are impatient, they do not
accumulate enough resources through postponing consumption and investment
into the future but demand loans from banks, while private households hold sight
deposits.
The objective of entrepreneur j is to choose cEt ( j), bt+1( j), nt+1( j), and ne,t( j) in
order to maximise expected lifetime utility, subject to the period budget constraint
cEt ( j) + ne,t( j) + (1 + r
b
t )bt( j) +
χ
2
(
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
)2
nt( j) ≤ nt( j)piFt + bt+1( j), (2.13)
the evolution of firm number (2.10), and the borrowing constraint (2.12), taking
b0 and n0 as given.
Two first–order conditions of this optimisation problem are non–standard and
deserve special attention. First, let us consider the optimality condition with
5There is no default risk in the model, since investors always repay their loans. However,
the collateral constraint introduces the importance of an entrepreneur’s quality in a reduced
form. Imagine, if a borrower does not repay its loans, the DTI ratio determines the fraction of
entrepreneurial income banks can still appropriate (see Iacoviello (2005)). Thus, the DTI ratio can
be interpreted as a measure of banks’ willingness to accept firm profits as loan securities.
6Imagine that there is an informal credit rating mechanism at work. Banks know the current
number of firms owned by a potential borrower. They consider entrepreneurs with large firm
portfolios to be notably safe. For this reason, these investors receive better credit ratings and find
it easier to obtain loans from banks.
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respect to nt+1( j), which represents the intertemporal investment Euler equation:
qt( j) = βEEt

(cEt+1)
−γE

piFt+1 + nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
Profit Destruction Externality
+
χ
2
(
ne,t+1( j)
nt+1( j)
)2

+ (1 − δ)qt+1( j)

+ µt( j)Et

κtnt( j)

piFt+1 + nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
Profit Destruction Externality


+ βEEt
[
µt+1( j)κt+1nt+2( j)piFt+2
]
︸                                                                                                 ︷︷                                                                                                 ︸
Borrowing Constraint Externality
,
where µt( j) denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the borrowing constraint and qt( j)
is the shadow price of a firm.
This condition states that the value of an additional firm qt( j) has to be equal
to the expected discounted sum of the increase in total profits received from
the portfolio, the contribution to lower adjustment costs, and the future shadow
price of the firm, plus the value of the improvement of today’s and tomorrow’s
borrowing conditions. The assumption of a discrete number of entrepreneurs
implies that the portfolio decision of entrepreneur j affects the total number of
enterprises in the economy and thereby individual firm profits. An increase in the
number of producers in the intermediate good sector, ceteris paribus, reduces the
market share of a single firm and consequently diminishes its profits. Ghironi and
Stebunovs (2010) call this effect the profit destruction externality (PDE) of portfolio
expansion. The investment Euler equation also incorporates the internalisation
of a positive borrowing constraint externatlity (BCE). Investors take into account
that a higher nt+1( j) lifts the borrowing limit today and in the next period.
The first–order condition with respect to new firm start–ups ne,t( j) forms an
entry condition:
qt( j) = (cEt ( j))
−γE
[
1 + χ
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
]
.
Optimality requires that the value of an additional firm given by qt( j) is equal to
the present value of the marginal cost of firm creation.7
7Proceeding as in Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010), the number of entrants ne,t( j) is strictly positive
in every period, implying that the entry condition always holds with equality. I keep the mag-
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I impose symmetry across entrepreneurs, such that optimality conditions sim-
plify to8
(cEt )
−γE = βE(1 + rbt+1)Et
[
(cEt+1)
−γE
]
+ µt(1 + rbt+1), (2.14)
qt = βEEt
[
(cEt+1)
−γE
( (
1 − 1
µE
)
piFt+1 +
χ
2
(ne,t+1
nt+1
)2 )
+ (1 − δ)qt+1
]
+µtκtnt
(
1 − 1
µE
)
Et
[
piFt+1
]
+ βEEt
[
µt+1κt+1nt+2piFt+2
]
,
(2.15)
qt = (cEt )
−γE
(
1 + χ
ne,t
nt
)
, (2.16)
and
µt
(
κtntEt
[
nt+1piFt+1
]
− (1 + rbt+1)bt+1
)
= 0. (2.17)
Conditions (2.14) and (2.15) are the intertemporal consumption and investment
Euler equations, respectively. Equation (2.16) is the firm entry condition and
equation (2.17) represents a complementary slackness condition for the borrowing
limit.
Entrepreneurs choose contingent optimal plans {cEt }∞t=0, {bt+1}∞t=0, {nt+1}∞t=0, and
{ne,t}∞t=0, which conform to the optimality conditions (2.14)–(2.17), the resource
constraint (2.13), and the transversality condition limT→∞ Et
[∏T−1
k=1
bt+T
1+rbt+k
]
= 0.
2.2.4 Banks
Financial intermediation in the economy is conducted by a continuum of banks of
measure one. Banks have two sources to finance lending to entrepreneurs. On the
one hand, they raise funds through collecting deposits from private households.
On the other hand, they accumulate bank capital through retained earnings.
The market for deposits is perfectly competitive and banks take the deposit
interest rate rt+1 as given. In contrast, financial frictions in the loan market allow
banks to benefit from market power in performing their lending activities. I follow
Gerali et al. (2010) and assume that financial intermediaries act under monopolistic
competition in the credit market. Banks supply differentiated varieties of loans
nitude of exogenous shocks in the economy small enough in order to ensure positive investment
at all points in time.
8In a symmetric equilibrium, all entrepreneurs make identical decisions, such that cEt ( j) = c
E
t ,
bt( j) = 1µE bt, nt( j) =
1
µE
nt, ne,t( j) = 1µE ne,t, qt( j) = qt, and µt( j) = µt.
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to investors, which are aggregated according to a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES
aggregator. Thus, total demand for bank loans is given by
bt+1 =
(∫
ι
bt+1(ι)
t−1
t dι
) t
t−1
,
where bt+1(ι) denotes a specific loan component supplied by bank ι ∈ [0, 1], and t >
1 is an exogenous stochastic variable that determines the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated loans. The elasticity of substitution is a crucial variable in
my analysis as it measures the degree of credit market competition in the economy.
In particular, a higher value of t indicates that individual bank loans are more
easily substitutable, which implies more fierce competition among banks.
Investors behave optimally and demand a mix of differentiated loans in order
to minimise their debt obligations. Let rbt+1(ι) denote the interest rate on loans
supplied by bank ι. Cost minimisation of borrowers implies that bank ι faces a
loan demand of
bt+1(ι) =
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1, (2.18)
where rbt+1 =
[∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)
1−tdι
] 1
1−t determines the average rate charged by banks in
the market.
At each date t, banks have to satisfy their balance sheet identity
bt(ι) = kBt (ι) + dt(ι). (2.19)
This accounting identity requires that outstanding bank loans (assets) bt(ι) are
funded by the sum of bank capital (equity) kBt (ι) and sight deposits (liabilities)
dt(ι).
Banks cannot raise capital by issuing new shares in the mutual fund. However,
they are able to set their dividend policy in order to increase equity. During period
t, bank ι obtains fresh capital through retained earnings piBt (ι) − at(ι), where piBt (ι)
denotes bank profits. In addition, it takes into account that the administration
or management of equity involves costs equal to a constant fraction δB ∈ (0, 1) of
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capital. Consequently, the law of motion of bank equity is
kBt+1(ι) = (1 − δB)kBt (ι) + piBt (ι) − at(ι). (2.20)
Financial intermediation is subject to non–interest transaction costs. For in-
stance, we can think of expenses inherent with the acquisition of information
about potential creditors or service fees associated with deposit–taking activities.
Operating costs are governed by a function Θt(ι), which is increasing and concave
in both newly issued loans bt+1(ι) and deposits that are due in the next period
dt+1(ι).9
Several contributions to the empirical banking literature suggest that there
are non–negligible scale economies in the banking industry.10 Large financial
institutions are able to provide their services in a more efficient way and at lower
expenses than their smaller rivals. In general, we can imagine that big banking or-
ganisations might benefit from improved diversification of risks (see Hughes et al.
(2001)), an elaborated branch network (see Berger et al. (1993)), or, at these days,
an ultimate bailout insurance because of ”too–big–to–fail”. Thus, I assume that
transaction costs Θt(ι) are a decreasing function of current bank size, determined
by total assets bt(ι).
In light of these considerations, I specify intermediation costs as
Θt(ι) = θ0
(
1
bt(ι)
bt+1(ι)
kBt+1(ι)
)θ1
, (2.21)
where θ0 > 0 defines the weight assigned to operating expenses, and θ1 ∈ (0, 1) is
a parameter governing the curvature of the cost function.
Financial intermediaries are owned by the stockholders of the mutual fund,
i.e. private households. Therefore, the objective of a typical bank is to maximise
shareholder value. In particular, at each date t, bank ι sets the interest rate on its
9This assumption implies that the more funds a bank transfers from savers to investors in the
economy the more costs it has to bear. However, the marginal increase in intermediation expenses
is declining. This specification is in contrast to, for instance, the model of Van den Heuvel (2008)
in which a bank’s transaction costs in are increasing but convex in loans and deposits.
10In fact, evidence on scale and scope economies in financial institutions is fairly mixed. For
a review on efficiency in financial firms see for instance Berger and Humphrey (1997) or, more
recently, Fethi and Pasiouras (2010).
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loans rbt+1(ι) and chooses bank capital k
B
t+1(ι) in order to maximise the present value
of expected future dividend payments. More concisely, the optimisation problem
can be stated as
max
rbt+1(ι), k
B
t+1(ι)
E0
∞∑
t=0
m0,tat(ι),
subject to piBt (ι) =
(
1 + rbt (ι)
)
bt(ι) + dt+1(ι) − (1 + rt) dt(ι) − bt+1(ι) −Θt(ι),
(2.18), (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21),
where m0,t = βt
(
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
(cH0 )
ξ(1−l0)1−ξ
)1−γ cH0
cHt
is the SDF between period 0 and t of risky di-
vidend payments.
Again, I focus on a symmetric equilibrium.11 The optimality condition for the
loan interest rate can be derived as
rbt+1 =
t
t − 1Et
rt+1 +
θ0θ1
bt+1

(
bt+1
btkBt+1
)θ1
(1 + rt+1)︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
Intermediation Costs
−
(
bt+2
bt+1kBt+2
)θ1
︸          ︷︷          ︸
Scale Economies

︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
Marginal Cost of Lending
. (2.22)
Imperfect competition in the credit market facilitates banks to charge a mark–up
of tt−1 over marginal cost of lending. Banks take into account that an expansion
of loan supply has two opposite effects on their operating expenses. On the one
hand, additional loan supply directly lifts intermediation costs today. This effect
is represented by the first term in parentheses on the right–hand side of equation
(2.22). On the other hand, an increase in assets, ceteris paribus, dampens transaction
costs in the next period, because of scale economies. This effect is captured by the
second expression in parentheses on the right–hand side of equation (2.22).
The first–order condition with respect to bank capital is
2 =
θ0θ1
kBt+1
(
bt+1
btkBt+1
)θ1
+
2 + rt+1 − δB
1 + rt+1︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Marginal Benefit of Bank Capital
. (2.23)
11Symmetry among banks and normalisation of the measure of banks to one imply that rbt+1(ι) =
rbt+1, bt+1(ι) = bt+1, dt+1(ι) = dt+1, k
B
t+1(ι) = k
B
t+1, and pi
B
t+1(ι) = pi
B
t+1.
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Financial intermediaries increase their capital position until the value of additional
equity is offset by its marginal cost. Funding loans through capital is costly as
it reduces today’s cash flow to shareholders. However, banks also internalise
that an expansion of the capital base allows to cut sight deposits and thereby
operating expenses (first expression on the right–hand side of equation (2.23)).
Furthermore, an increase in bank equity leads to higher capital in the next period
and consequently raises future dividend payments (second term on the right–
hand side of equation (2.23)).12
Due to the fact that banks are identical, equations (2.19) and (2.20) as well as
bank profits become
bt = kBt + dt, (2.24)
kBt+1 = (1 − δB)kBt + piBt − at, (2.25)
and
piBt =
(
1 + rbt
)
bt + dt+1 − (1 + rt) dt − bt+1 −Θt, (2.26)
respectively.
2.2.5 Exogenous Processes
The model features four exogenous stochastic variables: state–specific total factor
productivity zs,t, country–wide total factor productivity zc,t, collateral quality κt,
and the elasticity of substitution in the loan market t. All stochastic variables
follow a univariate first–order autoregressive process in logarithms:
log(zs,t+1) = (1 − ρzs) log(zs) + ρzs log(zs,t) + uzs,t+1, with |ρzs | < 1, (2.27)
log(zc,t+1) = (1 − ρzc) log(zc) + ρzc log(zc,t) + uzc,t+1, with |ρzc | < 1, (2.28)
log(κt+1) = (1 − ρκ) log(κ) + ρκ log(κt) + uκ,t+1, with |ρκ| < 1, (2.29)
log(t+1) = (1 − ρ) log() + ρ log(t) + u,t+1, with |ρ| < 1, (2.30)
12Condition (2.23) illustrates that the introduction of intermediation costs is also convenient
from an analytical point of view. The properties of the underlying cost function Θt(ι) ensure that
banks are willing to keep a positive amount of bank capital at every point in time. Intuitively,
higher bank capital means lower dividend payments. Hence, banks would never have an incentive
to finance loans through equity, if financial intermediation was free of charge.
29
where zs, zc, κ, and  denote mean values of the respective process. Error terms
uzs,t+1, uzc,t+1, uκ,t+1, and u,t+1 are independently and identically distributed draws
from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σzs , σzc , σκ, σ,
respectively.
2.2.6 General Equilibrium
To close the model, all markets have to be cleared at every date t. Equilibrium in
the market of shares in the mutual fund implies that xt = xt+1 = 1. As a result, the
budget constraint of the representative private household (2.1) simplifies to
cHt + dt+1 = (1 + rt)dt + at + wtlt. (2.31)
The budget constraints of entrepreneurs can be aggregated to
µEcEt + ne,t + (1 + r
b
t )bt +
χ
2
(ne,t
nt
)2
nt = ntpiFt + bt+1. (2.32)
Consequently, the aggregate resource constraint in the economy can be derived
as
cHt + µEc
E
t + ne,t +
χ
2
(ne,t
nt
)2
nt + Θt + kBt+1 − (1 − δB)kBt = wtlt + ntpiFt . (2.33)
The interpretation of the aggregate resource constraint is standard. Consumption
plus investment in both new firms and bank capital (left–hand side of equation
(2.33)) must be funded by wage income and dividend income from the firm
portfolio (right–hand side of equation (2.33)). Finally, final good market clearing
requires that
yt = wtlt + ntpiFt . (2.34)
According to Walras’ Law, once all markets for goods and assets are in equilibrium,
the labour market will be cleared implicitly:
lt =
1
zt
ntkt. (2.35)
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2.2.7 Model Solution
The structural model forms a system of 24 non–linear expectational difference
equations in 24 variables. This system is characterised by conditions (2.2), (2.3),
(2.4), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9), (2.11), (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.22), (2.23), (2.24),
(2.25), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28), (2.29), (2.30), (2.32), (2.33), and (2.34). The model
includes four exogenous state variables (zs,t, zc,t t, and κt), and five endogenous
state variables (rt, bt, nt, kBt , and r
b
t ). The remaining 15 variables (c
H
t , c
E
t , wt, pi
F
t , pi
B
t ,
νt, yt, qt, kt, pt, lt, ne,t, µt, dt, and at) are controls.
Since there is no closed form solution to this problem available, the solution has
to be approximated. To this end, I log–linearise the system around its deterministic
steady state and solve the resulting log–linear approximation using the modified
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology suggested by Klein (2000).
2.3 Calibration
To make the framework amenable for empirical analysis, I calibrate the model
for each US state and the District of Columbia. In particular, I choose a state–
specific calibration of β, µE, δB, θ0, and , while the remaining parameters are
pinned down at conventional values. Calibrated values are summarised in Table
2.1. Regarding the state–specific parameters, I report the average value across all
states. Parametrisation for each individual state can be found in Appendix A.
Let us first look at the parameter values which are common to all states. I
count the time unit t as years and set the subjective discount factor of investors
βE equal to 0.90. This value lies between the implied annual values selected by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Furthermore, I fix the curvature
parameters in the utility functions of private households and entrepreneurs, γ and
γE, to one.
Without loss of generality, the mean values of labour productivity zs and zc are
normalised to one. In addition, consistent with evidence from empirical micro
studies (see, for instance, Juster and Stafford (1991)), I pin down l at 0.3, implying
that private households spend roughly two thirds of their time endowment for
leisure. The elasticity of substitution in the intermediate good sector φ is set
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equal to 5. This calibration yields a 25 percent price mark–up over marginal
cost.13 According to an empirical study by Bernard et al. (2010), the annual
product destruction in the US amounts to 8.8 percent. Therefore, I choose an
exogenous business closure rate δ of 0.088. In addition, I put a fairly small weight
on investment adjustment costs and set χ = 0.028 as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2003).
The model constrains the choice of ξ, the consumption weight in the utility
of private households. This parameter does not only play a role for the model
dynamics but also features important scale effects with respect to the long–run
equilibrium. Therefore, I choose ξ = 0.3022 to approximate an entrepreneurial
debt to income ratio of 53 percent in the average state, which is close to the cor-
porate leverage ratio in the data observed by Bernanke et al. (1999). Furthermore,
I calibrate the mean value of the collateral shock variable κ at 10 to obtain a
reasonable capital to output ratio of about 2.5 in the average state. The para-
meter determining the curvature of the financial intermediation cost function θ1
is harder to specify since there are no comparable values from previous studies.
Thus, I set θ1 equal to 0.5.14
Obviously, parametrisation of the exogenous processes is not self–evident.
The calibration of the persistence of shocks is based on estimation results in
Gerali et al. (2010). They have estimated a DSGE model with similar exogenous
processes using quarterly data for the Euro area. I pin down the autoregressive
coefficients in order to obtain half lives of shocks consistent with those implied
by the median of their estimated posterior distributions. Accordingly, I set ρzs =
0.7774, ρzc = 0.7774, ρ = 0.4838, and ρκ = 0.6388. Furthermore, I follow King
and Rebelo (1999) and select a standard deviation of the productivity innovations
of 0.0072. Regarding the volatility of disturbances to bank competition and the
collateral value, I assign values to ensure that both real and financial shocks
play a non–negligible role in driving the dynamics in the model. In particular, I
choose σ equal to 0.5 and σκ equal to 0.05. This calibration implies that TFP shocks
13There is no customary value for φ in the macro literature. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) argue
that a mark–up as high as 35 percent is reasonable in models without any fixed cost, whereas
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) suggest a premium of only 20 percent.
14Admittedly, the selection of this parameter value is somewhat ad hoc. Nonetheless, robustness
checks have shown that the model’s performance is rather insensitive to the choice of θ1.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Values
General Parameters
βE discount factor entrepreneurs 0.90 κ mean of collateral shock 10
γ curvature of household utility 1 ρz,s state prod. shock persistence 0.7774
γE risk aversion of entrepreneurs 1 ρz,c country prod. shock persistence 0.7774
ξ consumption weight in utility 0.3022 ρ competition shock persistence 0.4838
δ business closure rate 0.088 ρκ collateral shock persistence 0.6388
φ subst. elasticity capital goods 5 σz,s std. dev. state prod. shocks 0.0072
χ adjustment costs 0.028 σz,c std. dev. country prod. shocks 0.0072
θ1 curvature intermediation costs 0.5 σ std. dev. of bank comp. shocks 0.5
zs mean state labour prod. 1 σκ std. dev. of collateral shocks 0.05
zc mean country labour prod. 1
State–Specific Parameters
β discount factor households 0.9684 θ0 weight for intermediation costs 1.0131e-05
(0.0095) (0.4433e-05)
µE number of entrepreneurs 1.7273  mean elasticity of loan demand 1.6062
(0.1478) (0.1962)
δB depreciation bank capital 0.0701
(0.0176)
Notes: State–specific parameter values correspond to the average across all states. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses. See Appendix A for calibrated values of each individual
state.
account for more than 50 percent of the variation of output and consumption in the
pre–deregulation era in the average state, whereas investment in new firms and
demand for bank loans are mainly driven by collateral shocks and disturbances
in bank competition.
The remaining parameters are chosen state–specifically. My calibration is
based on aggregated commercial banking data of the Historical Statistics on Bank-
ing (HSOB) available from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In
particular, I use state–level data from 1966 up to the year in which a state has lifted
its intrastate limitations on bank entry.15 The subjective discount factor β is set to
match the annual return on deposits calculated by the total interest payments on
deposits divided by total deposits. The cross–state average return on deposits is
equal to 3.26 percent implying a value for β of 0.9684. Moreover, I fix the pre–
deregulation elasticity , the weight of intermediation cost θ0, and the depreciation
rate of bank capital δB to hit four steady state targets: (i) the bank capital to asset
15I use the year in which statewide branching via mergers and acquisitions was allowed to
determine the deregulation date. These dates are taken from Demyanyk et al. (2007) and can
be found in Appendix A. Note that some states permitted in–state branching already before the
1970s. For these states I fix the year of deregulation at 1970.
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ratio k
B
b , (ii) the loan interest rate r
b, (iii) the bank return on equity pi
B
kB , as well as
(iv) the dividend payout ratio apiB . The mean capital ratio across federal states is
7.22 percent. I use the return on net loans and leases to obtain a proxy for the
loan interest rate, which is equal to 8.70 percent on average. The return on equity
(ROE) is calculated as net income divided by total equity capital. This yields a
cross–state mean ROE of 11.74 percent. Finally, I use total declared cash dividends
divided by net income to determine the fraction of disbursed bank profits, which
is equal to 40.30 percent on average. Based on this parametrisation, the number
of entrepreneurs µE can then be derived from the steady state conditions of the
investment Euler equation (2.15) and the firm entry condition (2.16).
2.4 Banking Deregulation
I now turn to the banking deregulation exercise. Prior to deregulation, geo-
graphical barriers on bank entry and expansion allowed banks to benefit from
quasi–monopoly power in their local markets. The removal of these restrictions
triggered a consolidation in the US banking industry (see Berger et al. (1995)).
Although the overall number of institutions declined, the number of branches
and offices increased remarkably. As a consequence, these regulatory changes
brought about greater availability of financial services and enhanced competition
among banks (see Stiroh and Strahan (2003)).
In the following, I simulate this regime switch as a one–time permanent in-
crease in the elasticity of substitution between differentiated loans , implying a
permanent reduction of the market power of banks.16 I pin down the size of the
liberalisation shock in order to match a long–run erosion of the bank capital ratio
by 0.8 percentage points. This choice is largely consistent with recent empirical
evidence found by Hanson et al. (2011).
16The model describes individual federal states as closed economies. Therefore, I actually do not
distinguish between intra– and interstate deregulation in the model. Deregulation leads to more
vigorous competition in the banking sector, which is simply captured by a permanent increase in
.
34
2.4.1 Steady State Effects
Let us first discuss the long–run implications of banking liberalisation. In this
subsection, I focus on the model calibrated at the average of state–specific para-
meter values, which I refer to as the average state model. Table 2.2 summarises
the steady state effects of selected variables in the average state.
An increase in the elasticity of substitution  reduces the mark–up on the
loan interest rate, such that rb falls. Lower borrowing costs permanently alleviate
business owners’ access to external finance. They have an incentive to demand
more credit from banks in order to fund a greater number of firm start–ups ne.
This additional investment in entrants is accompanied with an increase in the
total number of firms n in the economy. As there are more competitors in the
intermediate good sector, market share and thereby profits piF of each producer
shrink. In principle, larger portfolio size and lower firm profits have opposite
repercussions on total dividend income of entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, portfolio
expansion outweighs the decline in firm profits, such that overall earnings of
investors go up, which induces them to raise consumption cE.
Banks have to fund their increased loan position b. The long–run equilibrium
levels of bank equity kB and deposit interest rate r do not alter since they are
determined by constant parameters.17 As a result, the expansion of the bank
balance sheet is reflected by a one–to–one increase in sight deposits d. Likewise,
augmented competition in the credit market makes bank lending less profitable,
because banks are no longer able to charge a high premium on lending rates.
Therefore, banks’ only source of revenue dries up to a large extent, such that
profits piB plunge.
The explanation for the steady state changes of the remaining variables is fairly
obvious. The representative final good producer employs less of each capital
good k, because there is a larger measure of differentiated inputs available. Lower
demand for each variety lifts their corresponding marginal product, such that
prices go up. Since the price of capital goods is determined through a constant
17Steady state bank capital and deposit interest rate can be derived as kB =
(
θ0θ1
1−β(1−δB)
) 1
1+θ1 and
r = 1β − 1, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Long–Run Effects of Banking Deregulation
 elasticity of loan demand 31.30 q shadow price of investment –2.11
rb loan interest rate –28.28 cE entrepreneurial consumption 2.15
r deposit interest rate 0.00 piF firm profits –5.22
b loans 12.46 k intermediate good input –6.96
d deposits 13.43 p intermediate good price 1.87
kB bank capital 0.00 w wages 1.87
piB bank profits –49.28 l labour supply 0.19
ne firm entrants 7.69 cH household consumption 1.75
n firm number 7.69 y output 2.07
Notes: Percentage changes of steady state levels in the model calibrated at the average of state–
specific parameter values.
mark–up over marginal cost, the relative increase in prices p and wages w must be
equal. That said, the rise in wages induces private households to work more, such
that labour supply l goes up. In sum, the increase in labour income and interest
payments on savings predominates the drop in dividend payments, such that
private households raise their consumption cH. Finally, market clearing requires
that the increase in consumption and investment is met by higher output y.
2.4.2 Dynamic Analysis
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present selected impulse responses to the deregulation shock. I
have computed impulse responses using the model calibrated for each individual
state and the average state. The graphs plot the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of the
impulse responses across all states as well as the responses of the average state.
The vertical axis shows the percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
The horizontal axis indicates the number of years after the shock.
Transition dynamics of investment in new enterprises exhibit a hump–shaped
pattern. Entrepreneurs realise that cheaper credit allows them to expand their firm
portfolio, which will eventually lead to permanently higher income. Accordingly,
the portfolio expansion effect outweighs the profit destruction externality in the
short–run. This induces a rise in the shadow value of an additional firm and
investors have an incentive to fund new entrants. Since firm creation today is more
attractive relative to the post–deregulation equilibrium, investment overshoots for
several years after the shock.
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Figure 2.3: Selected Impulse Responses to Banking Deregulation I
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The rise in firm start–ups leads to an increase in the number of enterprises
over time. Similar to the model in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), the number of
firms plays a central role for the dynamics in the economy. The existence of
sunk entry costs, time–to–build lag, as well as adjustment costs implies that the
number of firms constitutes an endogenous state variable. That is the reason why
we do not observe an immediate jump in n but a smooth transition to its post–
deregulation equilibrium level. As more and more competitors enter the market
for intermediate goods, firm profits decline. Consequently, the dominance of the
portfolio expansion effect over the profit destruction externality fades away, and
firm value and hence investment in entrants converge to their new steady states.
Reduced monopoly power of banks pushes down the loan interest rate on
impact.18 In contrast, entrepreneurs cannot immediately adjust their demand
for credit to the post–deregulation steady state level, although external finance
18Remember that the lending rate as well as bank capital and deposit interest rate are endogen-
ous state variables. Accordingly, these variables do not react at time zero in Figure 2.4, but with a
one–period lag.
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Figure 2.4: Selected Impulse Responses to Banking Deregulation II
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has become more attractive. Interestingly, the impulse response of bank loans
resembles the smooth transition path of the number of firms. This co–movement
of loan demand and portfolio size can be attributed to the borrowing limit faced
by investors. The expansion of the firm portfolio gradually loosens the borrowing
constraint, because (i) the debt–to–income ratio increases, such that more future
income can be pledged as collateral, and (ii) total dividend earnings go up, as the
rise in the number of firms exceeds the decline in individual profits.19 Further-
more, since the borrowing limit prevents business owners from obtaining their
desired loan volume in the short–run, they are willing to cut consumption initially
19At this point it is intuitive to consider the complementary slackness condition for the borrow-
ing constraint (2.17) in log–linearised form:
κ̂t + n̂t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Increase in DTI ratio
+ n̂t+1 + Et[piFt+1]︸           ︷︷           ︸
Increase in total dividends
=
rb
1 + rb
r̂bt+1 + b̂t+1,
where hatted variables denote log–deviations from steady state. The loan interest rate falls
immediately and remains at low levels during the transition. Hence, the upgrade of the DTI ratio
and the rise in dividend earnings translate into an increase in bank loans.
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in order to mobilise additional funds for firm creation.
Private households anticipate that bank profits and dividends will be perman-
ently lower in the future. As a result, the share price of the mutual fund plummets,
which drives up its return in the short–run. No arbitrage requires that a higher
return on risky stocks is associated with a lift in the interest rate on safe bank
deposits. The increase in the deposit interest rate dominates the gradual rise in
bank loans, such that marginal benefit of bank capital diminishes on impact. Since
marginal costs remain unchanged, bank equity must fall.20 During the transition
to the new equilibrium, bank assets increase gradually, whereas the return on
deposits declines. As a consequence, the initial drop in the marginal benefit of
bank capital vanishes over time and bank equity converges back to its old steady
state. After all, the capital ratio falls due to the expansion of the bank balance
sheet.
2.4.3 Empirical Evidence
At a first glance, the predictions of the model are qualitatively concurrent with
empirical evidence on US intra– and interstate banking deregulation. Consistent
with findings in previous studies, the model suggests (i) an increase in the number
of incorporations and firm entrants (see Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and
Strahan (2006), and Kerr and Nanda (2009)), (ii) a reduction of the average size
of non–financial firms (see Cetorelli and Strahan (2006)), (iii) a fall in interest
rate spreads (see Dick (2006)), due to a decline in borrowing interest rates, while
deposit interest rates remain unchanged (see Jayaratne and Strahan (1998)), as
well as (iv) a positive effect on employment, output and personal income (see
Beck et al. (2010) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)).
The model also forecasts a strong increase in bank credit supply after deregu-
20Recall the first–order condition with respect to bank capital in equation (2.23). The log–
linearised version of this condition is
k̂Bt+1 =
θ1
1 + θ1
(
b̂t+1 − b̂t
)
− β(1 − β)
1 + θ1
1 − δB
1 − β(1 − δB) r̂t+1.
The change in bank loans
(
b̂t+1 − b̂t
)
weighted by the factor θ11+θ1 is smaller than the increase in
the interest rate r̂t+1 multiplied by the factor
β(1−β)
1+θ1
1−δB
1−β(1−δB) . Accordingly, the initial increase in the
deposit interest rate predominates the effect of higher bank loans, such that bank equity declines.
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lation. This finding is in line with a recent study by Dick and Lehnert (2010) who
argue that the removal of bank entry restrictions was followed by a considerable
expansion in bank lending. On the contrary, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find no
significant change in the volume of bank loans, whereas the quality of loan port-
folios has improved. The model implied rise in bank assets is though consistent
with Calem (1994) who documents larger average bank size in the aftermath of
the reform.
It is not surprising that financial liberalisation in the model is associated with
a sharp decline in bank profits. After all, banks in my theoretical economy are
rather stylised since they only make money through charging a mark–up on loan
interest rates, which is substantially lower after deregulation. This prediction
seems to be at odds with what we observe in the data. For instance, Jayaratne
and Strahan (1998) show that the removal of branching restrictions led to a slight
but insignificant increase in the profitability of commercial banks. Similarly, Dick
(2006) finds that the passage of the IBBEA had no impact on bank profits.21
2.5 Empirical Evaluation of the Model
The previous section provided insights on how bank market integration affects
certain economic variables. As I have shown, the model indeed succeeds in
explaining several empirical facts. However, the analysis so far leaves the question
of whether my theoretical framework can also account for the effect of banking
deregulation on macroeconomic dynamics, such as the stabilisation of business
cycle fluctuations or improved risk sharing.
In this section, I will scrutinise the empirical validity of the model in a more
elaborate manner. To do so, I apply a state–specific calibration of the model in
order to control for heterogeneity among US federal states. I simulate the model
for each state to construct model generated panel data and reproduce various
21Interestingly, bank earnings have not been strongly affected although margins on lending have
dropped significantly. This suggests that financial institutions have expanded their activities to
more profitable areas. As market power of banks has declined, traditional financial intermediation
has become less attractive. This change has induced banks to adjust their business models. Indeed,
over the last decades financial institutions have increasingly focussed on the creation and trade
of more complex financial products and switched their operations to more risky, fee–based, and
non–interest services (see Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011)).
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regression exercises implemented in previous studies. In this vein, I try to bridge
the gap between my theoretical framework on the one hand, and the empirical
approach followed by the existing literature on the other.
2.5.1 Data Generation
The prohibition of intra– and interstate banking in the US was imposed by a
multitude of different state and federal laws. As a consequence, the relaxation
of geographical barriers to bank expansion across states occurred at different
points in time. This cross–sectional and time variation in liberalisation made it
convenient for researchers to examine the effects of the banking reform through
panel regressions. On this account, I treat my theoretical framework as the data
generating process and simulate the model 500 times for each of the 50 US states
and the District of Colombia. I therefore obtain 500 panel data sets covering 51
states in the cross–section over the period from 1930 to 2010. This ensures that I
have roughly as many pre– as post–deregulation observations. For each state, I
use the model of the pre–deregulation era to generate data until the year in which
statewide branching via mergers and acquisitions was allowed. From that year
onwards, I switch to the post–deregulation economy setup.22
2.5.2 Firm Entry and Size
Let us first consider to what degree the regime switch affects investment in new
firms and the size of a producer. Of course, I have already discussed the impact of
deregulation on firm entry and firm size in Section 2.4. But to facilitate comparison
with the existing literature, I also perform a regression exercise for these variables
as it has been done by previous studies. In particular, I follow Kerr and Nanda
(2009) and implement the simple reduced–form panel regression
Ys,t = αs + αt + β ·Ds,t + s,t, for s = 1, . . . , 51, (2.36)
22Of course, it does not matter at all whether I use the year of intra– or interstate deregulation to
date the regime switch in the simulation. Here, I have chosen the year of intrastate deregulation.
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where Ys,t is the dependent variable of interest in state s and year t, and stands for
the logs of the number of firm entrants ne, the total number of firms n, or the size
of an individual firm, measured by its production volume k, respectively. αs and
αt denote dummy variables, which control for state and time fixed effects. Ds,t
is an indicator variable, which takes the value 1 from the year in which the state
deregulates and 0 otherwise, and s,t is the error term. Hence, the coefficient β
determines by how much the respective dependent variable changes, once a state
lifts its branching restrictions.
Since, I estimate equation (2.36) using each model generated panel data set, I
end up with 500 different estimation results for each specification in (2.36). Table
2.3 documents the regression output associated with the median estimate for the
β coefficient in front of the deregulation dummy. To get an idea of how disperse
the estimation results are, I also report the 10th and 90th percentile of the estimates
in brackets.
From the discussion in Section 2.4, we expect increased firm creation and
smaller firm size in the aftermath of financial liberalisation. Reassuringly, this is
indeed what Table 2.3 reveals. The estimate of the median slope coefficient on the
deregulation dummy is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. In the model
for firm entrants, the lower and upper percentiles of the β coefficient range from
4.15 percent to 11.07 percent. Results are similar if we look at the logarithm of
total firm number as dependent variable. In this specification, the 10th and 90th
percentile of the estimate is 5.55 percent and 9.46 percent, respectively.
As a matter of fact, these findings mirror the results reported by the empirical
literature. Examining data from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B), Black and Strahan
(2002) show that the removal of intra– and interstate branching restrictions led
to an increase in the number of new business incorporations per capita by 3.8
percent and 7.9 percent, respectively. Likewise, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) re-
port a rise in the number of external finance dependent manufacturing establish-
ments by 11.6 percent after the transition to state– and nationwide banking was
completed. As a comparison, Kerr and Nanda (2009) find that the relationship
between banking liberalisation and business creation is weaker. Using data from
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), they show that the total number of
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Table 2.3: Impact of Banking Deregulation on Firm Entry and Size
Dependent Variables
(I) (II) (III)
Firm Start–ups Total Firm Number Firm Size
Deregulation 7.44*** 7.50*** –7.31***
(3.43) (15.00) (15.22)
[4.15* / 11.07***] [5.55*** / 9.46***] [–9.12*** / –5.42***]
R2 0.32 0.89 0.90
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,630 6,630 6,630
Simulations 500 500 500
Notes: Table reports the results of the fixed effects panel regressions Ys,t = αs + αt + β · Ds,t + s,t,
for Y = {log(ne), log(n), log(k)}. The dependent variables in model (I), (II), and (III) are the logs of
new firm start–ups, total number of firms, and firm size, respectively. Regression output in each
specification presents the results associated with the median estimate of the β coefficient in front
of the deregulation dummy. The values in brackets correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of
the estimates for the β coefficient. Slope coefficients are multiplied by 100. Absolute values of
t–statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
firm start–ups increased by only 6 percent after interstate banking was permitted,
whereas intrastate deregulation had virtually no effect.
Finally, column (III) in Table 2.3 indicates that the simulated model somewhat
understates the effect on firm size. Output volume of intermediate good producers
decreases by about 7.3 percent at the median after deregulation. In a recent
paper, Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) use the number of employees in manufacturing
establishments as a proxy for the size of production sites. They show that the
average size of external finance dependent establishments has shrunk by as much
as 12.3 percent relative to external finance independent establishments after the
relaxation of all geographical branching restrictions.23
2.5.3 Business Cycle Volatility
Next, I explore in how far my model helps to understand the relationship between
financial liberalisation and macroeconomic volatility. To measure the impact of
23Similar effects of financial liberalisation can be found for the European Union (EU). Cetorelli
(2004) shows that increased bank competition after the passage of the Second Banking Coordination
Directive in 1993, which allowed banks to branch freely across the EU, has led to less concentration
and reduced average firm size in non–financial sectors.
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bank market integration on state business cycle volatility, I adopt the approach of
Morgan et al. (2004). Again, I perform fixed effects panel regressions of the simple
form:
Ys,t = αs + αt + β ·Ds,t + s,t, for s = 1, . . . , 51. (2.37)
The dependent variable Ys,t is the fluctuation of the growth rate of output, income
of private households, or income of entrepreneurs, respectively. Fluctuations are
determined by the absolute deviation from the conditional mean growth of the
corresponding variable. To estimate conditional mean growth rates, I run the
auxiliary regression
∆ log(Xs,t) = γs + γt + δ ·Ds,t + ηs,t, for s = 1, . . . , 51, (2.38)
where Xs,t equals output, household labour income, and entrepreneurial portfolio
income, respectively, in state s at time t. In words, the conditional mean growth
rates are fitted by regressing first differences in logs of each variable on state
fixed effects γs, time fixed effects γt, and the deregulation dummy Ds,t. Thus,
growth fluctuations in equation (2.37) can be calculated by the absolute value of
the residuals in auxiliary regression (2.38), i.e.
Ys,t = |ηs,t|. (2.39)
Results are displayed in Table 2.4. My findings support the notion that banking
deregulation leads to a stabilisation of variations in output and income growth.
The coefficient on the deregulation dummy enters highly significant in all regres-
sions. The estimated effects are also economically sizeable. Column (I) presents
the results for output growth fluctuations. The removal of entry restrictions in the
banking industry reduces output growth volatility by about 0.2 to 0.3 percentage
points. The effect is even stronger if we look at income volatility of households
and entrepreneurs in columns (II) and (III). Evidently, entrepreneurs are not only
the main beneficiaries from a liberalisation of the banking sector due to lower
borrowing costs but also in terms of reduced variability of their portfolio income.
The median estimate of the β coefficient is –1.1244 in the regression for entrepren-
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eurial income growth variations compared to –0.6504 for labour income growth
variations.
In a nutshell, estimation results in Table 2.4 closely reflect the empirical findings
in Morgan et al. (2004). Their analysis shows that the transition to inter– and
intrastate branching reduced growth fluctuations of the gross state product by
0.6 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. This effect is a bit stronger than my
simulated economy suggests. Regarding the volatility of personal income growth,
they report a decline by 0.5 (0.1) percentage points after interstate (intrastate)
deregulation, which is very close to the estimates I obtain in the regression for
labour income fluctuations.
How can we explain the moderation of the business cycle followed by the
liberalisation of the banking market? In principle, the influence of deregulation
on economic volatility in the model is ambiguous. Banking deregulation changes
the propagation of shocks in different ways. For instance, consider a positive
transitory shock to bank competition. An increase in the elasticity of substitu-
tion between loans temporarily pushes down the borrowing interest rate, which
induces entrepreneurs to expand their demand for credit and to increase invest-
ment new firms. As described above, enhanced firm entry translates into higher
income and consumption for both entrepreneurs and households. However, it
is important to note that after the banking reform, the steady state level of the
borrowing interest rate is lower. This implies that the relative drop in rb is smaller,
which curbs the effect on lending, investment, income, and consumption.
A similar line of reasoning applies if we look at a shock to labour–augmenting
technology. As productivity of workers goes up, firm production and profits
increase. This creates incentives for investors to finance new firm start–ups. Recall
from Section 2.4 that banking deregulation leads to a permanent fall in the shadow
value of an additional producer. Intuitively, an entrepreneur’s marginal benefit of
funding new firm entrants is lower compared to the pre–deregulation era, which
attenuates the portfolio expansion effect induced by the positive productivity
shock. That means that the relative increase in investment is muted and so is the
respective rise in income and consumption.
In contrast, the effects of a collateral shock become more pronounced once the
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Table 2.4: Impact of Banking Deregulation on State Business Cycle Fluctuations
Dependent Variables
(I) (II) (III)
Output HH Income Entr. Income
Fluctuations Fluctuations Fluctuations
Deregulation –0.2657*** –0.6504*** –1.1244***
(4.8768) (8.6080) (8.2025)
[–0.3351*** / –0.1901***] [–0.7587*** / –0.5180***] [–1.2873*** / –0.9181***]
R2 0.0742 0.1416 0.1370
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,579 6,579 6,579
Simulations 500 500 500
Notes: Table reports the results of the fixed effects panel regressions Ys,t = αs + αt + β · Ds,t + s,t.
The dependent variables in model (I), (II), and (III) are growth fluctuations of output, household
labour income, and entrepreneurial portfolio income, respectively. Fluctuations are determined by
the absolute deviation from conditional mean growth in the corresponding variable. Regression
output in each specification presents the results associated with the median estimate of the β
coefficient in front of the deregulation dummy. The values in brackets correspond to the 10th
and 90th percentile of the estimates for the β coefficient. Slope coefficients are multiplied by 100.
Absolute values of t–statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
banking industry is more competitive. A positive shock to κ lifts the borrowing
limit since banks are more willing to accept future portfolio earnings as collateral.
As a consequence, loan demand and investment of entrepreneurs go up. The fact
that credit is permanently cheaper after the regime switch actually reinforces the
increase in borrowing, such that the rise in bank credit and firm entry is stronger
relative to the pre–deregulation economy.24
In the present calibration exercise, the mitigated effects of productivity and
bank competition shocks after the reform outweigh the amplified responses as-
sociated with disturbances in the collateral value. Thus, the predominance of
24This effect becomes more clear if we reconsider the complementary slackness condition for
the borrowing constraint (2.17) in log–linear form:
κ̂t + n̂t + n̂t+1 + Et[piFt+1] =
rb
1 + rb
r̂bt+1 + b̂t+1
(2.22)⇐⇒ κ̂t + n̂t + n̂t+1 + Et[piFt+1] =
(
r
( − 1)(1 + rb) + Λ
)
r̂t+1 −Λ(1 + r)b̂t
+ (1 + 2Λ)b̂t+1 −ΛEt[b̂t+2] − (1 + r)Λk̂Bt+1 + ΛEt[k̂Bt+2],
where Λ ≡ (−1)(1+rb)
θ0θ21
b
(
1
kB
)θ1
. Note that factor Λ is lower after deregulation. Hence, changes in
the collateral shock variable κ, ceteris paribus, lead to stronger reactions in the demand for loans.
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technology and bank competition shocks in driving the dynamics of the model
accounts for the overall stabilisation of the business cycle.
In light of that, bank market integration may have contributed to the significant
drop in aggregate economic volatility in the United States over the 1980s and 1990s.
This phenomenon has become known as the “Great Moderation”.25 Yet the Great
Recession of 2008–2009 has led to the impression that the Great Moderation is
finally over. Note, however, that the resurgence in macroeconomic volatility in
recent years still might be consistent with the implications of my model. On
the one hand, we can think of the last two decades of the twentieth century as
a period in which disturbances to productivity and bank competition were the
driving forces behind macroeconomic fluctuations. This explains the empirically
observed stabilisation of the business cycle after deregulation. On the other
hand, collateral shocks might have become more important in recent years, such
that economic volatility has actually increased again. In fact, Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007) interpret the occurrence of financial distress, like during the
financial crisis of 2008, as the result of large negative shocks to the collateral
value.
2.5.4 Risk Sharing
Lastly, I examine the impact of banking deregulation on risk sharing. Economic
agents in my model face substantial income uncertainty over the business cycle.
They benefit from high income in booms, but suffer from lower endowment dur-
ing recessions. The services provided by banks, however, allow agents to buffer
their consumption against income shocks. In particular, households and entre-
preneurs can transfer cash flows across time through the trade of non–contingent
financial assets in form of sight deposits and loans, respectively. Having shown
that banking deregulation reduces macroeconomic volatility, it is now natural to
ask whether financial liberalisation can also help agents to better diversify their
25There exists a huge literature on the potential sources of the Great Moderation. Among the
most prominent explanations are a better conduct of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve
(see Clarida et al. (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)), improved inventory management (see
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)), good luck in form of absent or smaller economic shocks (see
Stock and Watson (2002) and Blanchard and Simon (2001)), or a decline in the volatility of shocks
(see Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)).
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consumption risk.
To test how deregulation affects consumption risk sharing, I build on the
empirical model described in Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011):26
∆c˜ks,t = αs + αt + β1 · ∆y˜s,t + β2 ·Ds,t + β3 · ∆y˜s,t ·Ds,t + s,t, for k = {H,E}, (2.40)
where variables with a tilde denote log–deviations from the average across all
states. That is, ∆c˜Hs,t ≡ ∆ log
(
cHs,t
cHt
)
, ∆c˜Es,t ≡ ∆ log
(
cEs,t
cEt
)
, and ∆y˜s,t ≡ ∆ log
(
ys,t
yt
)
, where
cHt , c
E
t , and yt stand for the national average of per capita household consumption,
entrepreneurial consumption, and output, respectively. Again, αs and αt control
for state and time fixed effects, Ds,t is the deregulation dummy variable, and s,t is
the error term.
In equation (2.40), I regress ∆c˜ks,t on state output growth relative to the mean
growth in the cross–section instead of relative household or entrepreneurial in-
come growth. In the theoretical economy, output equals total income (see equation
(2.33)) and output changes are associated with direct endowment changes for both
groups of agents. Hence, the specification in regression (2.40) serves as a conveni-
ent approach to assess the risk sharing pattern in the model. The fact that output is
highly correlated with personal income also explains why I focus on consumption
risk sharing rather than income insurance. Per construction, individuals cannot
hedge their labour or capital income stream against state–specific business cycle
shocks, such that an analysis of income risk sharing would not be very enlighten-
ing. Besides, it is changes in consumption and not income that determines how
severely people are affected by economic up– and downturns. In this vein, the
choice of relative consumption growth as dependent variable appears to be more
reasonable.
As Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) point out, panel regressions
of this form have become very popular in empirical macroeconomic research on
financial market completeness. In this setup, the coefficient β1 usually takes on
a value between 0 and 1 and captures the impact of state income growth on
26Contrary to my analysis here, Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) mainly focus on
how intrastate deregulation affected the procyclicality of consumption risk sharing. They find
that interstate risk sharing has become less procyclical after the reform.
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state consumption growth. Therefore, we can easily interpret β1 as the fraction
of state–specific, or idiosyncratic, output risk that is uninsured. In theory, all
idiosyncratic risk can be diversified away if financial markets are complete, i.e.
trade of state contingent Arrow–Debreu securities is possible. In this case, perfect
risk sharing is achieved and consumption growth is independent of state level
business cycle risk, i.e. β1 = 0. Primary interest of my analysis lies in the
magnitude of the coefficient β3 in front of the interaction between the deregulation
dummy and state output growth relative to average nationwide output growth.
This coefficient measures the (negative) change in consumption insurance once
a state lifts its bank entry restrictions. To be more precise, β1 determines the
share of non–diversified idiosyncratic risk before deregulation, whereas (β1 + β3)
measures the share of uninsured risk after deregulation. If deregulation leads to
improved risk sharing, the relationship between state level income changes and
consumption growth will be weaker, so that β3 < 0.
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results of this exercise. Here, I present the
regression output accompanied with the median estimate of the β3 coefficient on
the interaction term. As before, numbers in brackets refer to the 10th and 90th
percentile of the respective estimated coefficient.
Let us first consider the pattern of consumption risk sharing of private house-
holds, summarised in column (I). The estimate of the coefficient on ∆y˜s,t associated
with the median estimate of β3 is 0.2667 and significant at the 1% level. This means
that prior to deregulation, roughly one quarter of idiosyncratic output risk cannot
be hedged through trade of financial securities. Interestingly, this figure is fairly
close to its empirical counterpart. For instance, based on annual state level data on
US per capita consumption and output over the period 1963–2005, Hoffmann and
Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) report an estimate of about 0.2. More importantly,
my estimation results suggest that consumption risk sharing of private house-
holds does not change once the banking sector becomes liberalised. Estimates of
the β3 coefficient are close to zero and mostly statistically insignificant.
Turning to consumption risk of entrepreneurs, we see that the picture is clearly
different. As is evident from column (II) in Table 2.5, consumption insurance
of investors is far from perfect. Estimates of the β1 coefficient are as high as
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Table 2.5: Impact of Banking Deregulation on Consumption Risk Sharing
Dependent Variables
(I) (II)
Household Consumption Entrepreneurial Consumption
∆y˜s,t 0.2667*** 0.6151***
(15.5950) (34.3231)
[0.2915*** / 0.2632***] [0.6444*** / 0.6051***]
Ds,t –0.0023*** –0.0019**
(1.9649) (2.2326)
[–0.0020** / –0.0011] [–0.0011 / –0.0015*]
∆y˜s,t ·Ds,t –0.0312 –0.1578***
(0.3343) (4.6010)
[–0.0711** / 0.0057] [–0.2021*** / –0.1174***]
R2 0.0793 0.2712
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 6,579 6,579
Simulations 500 500
Notes: Table reports the results of the fixed effects panel regressions ∆c˜ks,t = αs + αt + β1 · ∆y˜s,t +
β2 · Ds,t + β3 · ∆y˜s,t · Ds,t + s,t, for k = {H,E}. The dependent variables in model (I) and (II) are
first differences of the log–deviations of household and entrepreneurial consumption per capita
from their national averages, respectively. Regression output in each specification presents the
results associated with the median estimate of the β3 coefficient in front of the interaction term
between log–deviation of state output from average output and the deregulation dummy. The
values in brackets correspond to the 10th and 90th percentile of the estimates for the corresponding
coefficient. Absolute values of t–statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
0.6 and significant at the 1% level. This implies that entrepreneurs can only
hedge around 40 percent of state–specific business cycle risk before the regime
switch.27 However, the regulatory change in banking brings about a considerable
improvement in risk sharing of investors. As a matter of fact, deregulation reduces
the share of uninsured idiosyncratic shocks by about 16 percentage points at the
median. This effect is not only economically sizeable but also highly significant
throughout all regressions.
Estimation results for the simulated economy are to some extent in line with
findings of the empirical literature. For instance, Demyanyk et al. (2007) show
that the permission of state– and nationwide banking had a positive impact on
27The model proposes that risk sharing is much lower for entrepreneurs than for private house-
holds. In fact, this prediction can be supported empirically. For example, Agronin (2003) analyses
income risk sharing across US states over the period 1963–1999. He shows that proprietorial
income risk is substantially less diversified than non–proprietorial income risk.
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personal income insurance. On average, banking deregulation increased the
portion of diversified idiosyncratic shocks by around 10 percentage points. The
effect is even more pronounced in states where small businesses are relatively
important. In these states income risk sharing improved by about 20 percentage
points. This observation can be attributed to the importance of bank finance
for small enterprises and the close link between personal income of firm owners
and firm profits. Furthermore, bank market integration markedly reduces the
sensitivity of proprietorial income to state–specific business cycle shocks. As
a consequence, it is especially proprietors, or equivalently, entrepreneurs in my
theoretical economy, who enjoy better diversification following the regime switch.
What is more, Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) find no evidence
that deregulation altered the level of average consumption risk sharing. This
result can be consistent with the prediction of my model. The fact that only
entrepreneurs but not private households can better hedge their consumption
risk after financial liberalisation suggests that the effects may cancel out, so that
we observe no change in consumption risk sharing on average.
This leaves us with one question: Why does the model predict an increase in
risk sharing of entrepreneurs, whereas private households cannot benefit from
enhanced insurance after deregulation? The degree to which agents can hedge
macroeconomic risks depends on the type and availability of financial assets. Prior
to deregulation, high borrowing costs hamper investors’ access to external fin-
ance. Expensive credit effectively limits the potential of entrepreneurs to smooth
consumption over time, such that income fluctuations largely translate into con-
sumption changes. Financial liberalisation permanently decreases loan interest
rates and eases the collateral constraint, which ameliorates borrowing opportun-
ities. As a result, risk sharing increases since entrepreneurs can better buffer
consumption against changes in their portfolio income. In principle, we can think
of bank market integration as improving insurance, because financial intermediar-
ies now partly absorb the firm portfolio income risk of entrepreneurs. Conversely,
deregulation does not permanently affect deposit interest rates. In other words,
financial trading conditions for private households remain unchanged and hence
they do not enjoy better diversification.
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2.6 Conclusion
Empirical research on the economic effects of the relaxation of US intra– and in-
terstate banking limitations has been very active. What is striking, however, is
that theoretical work on this issue has been rather limited. My paper aims at
contributing to filling this gap and analyses the macroeconomic implications of
banking deregulation from a theoretical perspective. I present a DSGE model
with financial frictions and endogenous firm entry that helps to understand the
interaction between banking and the real side of the economy. The model em-
phasises the essential role of financial intermediation for economic activity. Banks
provide plain vanilla financial services: they collect sight deposits from private
households, accumulate equity through retained earnings and supply loans to
entrepreneurs. The financial system is characterised by monopolistic competition
in the credit market. Consequently, banks exploit their market power and charge
a high premium on loan interest rates. Financial deregulation spurs competition
in the banking sector and thus ameliorates credit market access of entrepreneurs.
A key contribution of my analysis is how I link my theoretical framework to
the existing empirical literature. I apply a state–specific calibration of the model
and generate panel data, which I then use to perform various regression exercises
similar to those implemented in related studies. The model is able to explain
various empirical findings. In particular, it predicts that financial liberalisation
leads to an increase in firm creation, a decline in average firm size, an erosion of
the bank capital ratio, lower state business cycle volatility, and an improvement
of entrepreneurial risk sharing.
The events of the recent financial crisis have stressed the need for incorporating
more sophisticated financial sectors in dynamic macro models. Banking in my
setup is rather stylised. All investors are identical and there is no risk of default.
No matter what state of the world occurs, creditors pay back the full amount of
their debt. Financial intermediaries have only one type of assets in their balance
sheets which is totally safe. This is tantamount to saying that banks cannot fail
and stability of the financial system is always granted. Of course, this assumption
is a strong simplification of the real world. Hence, it would be interesting to
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extend the framework along this dimension and study the impact of deregulation
on the riskiness of financial institutions.
Nevertheless, this paper is a stark reminder of the potential benefits associated
with free banking. Today, we call for tougher regulation of the financial industry
to avoid the recurrence of a global financial meltdown. No doubt, reforming our
financial system is inevitable. Nevertheless, policymakers and regulators should
not forget the merits of liberal financial markets when they redefine the regulatory
environment for banks.
53
Chapter 3
Business Cycles in Emerging
Markets: the Role of Liability
Dollarisation and Valuation Effects
3.1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the world economy has witnessed a growing import-
ance of Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). While their share of global output
at purchasing power parity was about 30 percent in 1990, it has risen to more
than 50 percent by 2013 according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).1 As
a consequence, EMEs have increasingly influenced the global business cycle and
are catching up to the rich world at a remarkable pace. What is striking, however,
is that business cycles in these countries reveal noticeably different patterns com-
pared to developed economies. This naturally raises the questions of why do we
observe these discrepancies.
In recent years, considerable attention in research on international macroeco-
nomics has been devoted to understanding business cycle fluctuations in EMEs.
Many researchers have documented certain empirical regularities among these
countries (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), and
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010)). First, EMEs are generally exposed to more severe busi-
ness cycle fluctuations than developed economies. Second, EMEs have strongly
countercyclical net exports and their international capital inflows are subject to
so–called “sudden stops” (see Calvo (1998), Calvo and Reinhart (2000), and Men-
1See The Economist, article “When giants slow down”, July 27th, 2013.
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doza (2010)). Third, consumption volatility exceeds income volatility.2
This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
of a small open economy (SOE) to address these business cycle phenomena and
the importance of credit market imperfections in EMEs. The basic structure of
our framework goes back to the workhorse SOE real business cycle (RBC) model
of Mendoza (1991). We build on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and introduce a
permanent productivity shock in addition to a conventional transitory productiv-
ity shock in our theoretical economy. Moreover, we contribute to the existing
RBC literature on emerging markets by featuring differentiated home and foreign
goods as well as exogenous foreign demand shocks in our model. In this vein,
we also incorporate endogenous real exchange rate fluctuations in our setup.
As Chari et al. (2007) point out, one can think of the non–stationary technology
component as efficiency wedge which captures various forms of market distor-
tions. Nevertheless, since our analysis aims at investigating the role of specific
financial frictions in emerging market business cycles we also augment our frame-
work along this dimension. In particular, similar to Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) we
introduce credit market imperfections in form of a debt–elastic country premium
on the interest rate. Indeed, this reduced form financial friction is a convenient
way to account for a positive link between higher external indebtedness and bor-
rowing costs, which seems to be empirically plausible (see Uribe and Yue (2006)
or Arellano (2008)).
More importantly, a major contribution of our work is that we also analyse the
phenomenon of liability dollarisation as a further form of financial frictions in our
framework.3 Emerging markets have traditionally depended heavily on external
funds in form of short–term debt to finance their growth opportunities (see Kose
and Prasad (2010)). In contrast to advanced economies, however, international
capital market imperfections have impeded EMEs to issue debt denoted in their
own currency. As a result, these countries have held the bulk of their external debt
in major international currencies such as US dollars. The inability of borrowing
2Another salient characteristic of emerging market business cycles is that real interest rates
tend to be countercyclical, very volatile and lead the cycle (see Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
Uribe and Yue (2006)). This feature, however, is not subject of the analysis in this paper.
3The term “liability dollarisation” was coined by Calvo (2001).
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abroad in domestic currency faced by emerging markets, which Eichengreen et al.
(2005) refer to as the “Original Sin” phenomenon, is a well–known fact and has
been documented in a number of previous studies (see Reinhart et al. (2003b),
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005), and Lane and Shambaugh (2010)).4 Our
paper does not investigate the reasons behind liability dollarisation in emerging
markets, but studies its implications. To this end, we extend our benchmark model
and assume that the small open economy can only borrow in foreign currency.
In our empirical exercise, we apply a mixture of country–specific calibration
and Bayesian estimation. Related studies have predominantly investigated partic-
ular emerging markets and partly tried to derive conclusions for EMEs in general.
However, given the fact that EMEs share the aforementioned stylised business
cycle features, we think it is crucial to expand the analysis to a broader selection of
countries and thus also allow for potential heterogeneity. Therefore, we study the
cases of Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Besides, we additionally estimate our
benchmark model for a cohort of developed countries, namely Canada, Sweden,
and Switzerland. This enables us to confront the results obtained for emerging
and advanced economies.
To estimate our models, we take real time series data on output, consumption,
interest rates, and exchange rates. A substantial contribution of our work is how
we capture off–model dynamics in our estimation. In particular, we follow Sargent
(1989) and Ireland (2004) by including a (vector–)autoregressive measurement
error component. To our knowledge, this has not been done yet in this strand of
the literature and goes beyond the procedures applied by existing studies (e.g.
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013)).
Estimation results show that financial frictions are generally more pronounced
in EMEs than in industrialised countries, which is in line with the conclusion of
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). Besides, off–model dynamics appear to be of minor
importance for the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates in general. This result
4In recent years, several emerging markets have implemented various policies to tackle dollar-
isation. The process of dedollarisation is generally protracted and in most cases incomplete (see
Kokenyne et al. (2010)). While some countries have been successful, others have failed to achieve
persistent dedollarisation (see Reinhart et al. (2003a)). Nevertheless, our empirical analysis uses
data from a period in which liability dollarisation was a prevalent feature of external finances in
EMEs.
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suggests that our model is capable of explaining a great deal of the variation in
the data. Moreover, we show that for the group of EMEs, the model with liability
dollarisation by and large outperforms the benchmark setup in capturing the
dynamics in the variables we use for estimation. This outcome provides a strong
argument in favour of the introduction of liability dollarisation in the model.
Our analysis suggests that the co–existence of financial market imperfections
and trend shocks helps us to explain macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
markets. In EMEs, the transitory productivity process is the driving force behind
output in the short–run, whereas non–stationary technology shocks determine
income fluctuations in the long–run. Contrary to that, transitory productivity
shocks determine output fluctuations over all horizons in developed economies.
Hence, although we incorporate various financial frictions in our model, we still
find support for the famous hypothesis by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) that “the
cycle is the trend” in emerging markets. That said, our findings contradict the
conclusions of other studies which argue that this notion rests upon the absence
of certain market distortions. For instance, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang
and Fe´rnandez (2013) show that once one incorporates financial frictions in the
framework, the permanent shock strongly loses importance. Likewise, a recent
paper by Boz et al. (2011) studies a real business cycle model in which agents learn
to differentiate between permanent and transitory disturbances. These authors
argue that it is more severe informational frictions in EMEs that explain observed
business cycle patterns even without a predominance of the non–stationary com-
ponent in total factor productivity.5
Our work is also related to a currently active research area which highlights
the importance of fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices for a country’s
external balance sheet (see Tille (2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), Gourinchas
and Rey (2007b), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and Gourinchas et al. (2010)).
5Nevertheless, the finding that trend shocks play a significant role for the business cycle can to
some extent be supported by a closely related area of research in international macroeconomics.
The literature on the empirics of the ”intertemporal approach to the current account” highlights
the importance of permanent shocks in explaining current account dynamics (see Glick and Rogoff
(1995), Hoffmann (2001b, 2003), Kano (2008), and Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012)). In particular,
Hoffmann and Woitek (2011) show that the world economy was predominantly characterised
by permanent shocks in the period between World War I and World War II, exactly like today’s
emerging markets according to our findings.
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These changes in the net foreign asset position, which are not due to capital flows,
are called valuation effects and drive a wedge between the change in the net foreign
asset position and the current account. Accounting for the fact that EMEs are not
able to borrow on international markets in their own currency, our model yields
further interesting insights with respect to the role of external balance sheet effects,
which, though investigated in other areas (see Ce´spedes et al. (2004), Tille (2008),
and Nguyen (2011)), has hitherto been unrecognised in this line of research. In
particular, we find that valuation effects stabilise the change in the net foreign
asset position induced by trend productivity shocks, whereas they amplify it
after foreign demand shocks. In contrast, transitory technology shocks lead to
valuation effects that may reinforce or mitigate the changes in the external balance
sheet. Given that EMEs are characterised by a prevalence of trend shocks, we find
that valuation effects act stabilising on average.
Furthermore, the model featuring liability dollarisation can account for various
business cycle phenomena in EMEs. In particular, our model generates more
severe macroeconomic fluctuations in EMEs than in advanced economies, and
predicts a volatility of consumption that exceeds the one of output. Moreover, the
model produces a countercyclical trade balance. But based on our estimation, it
fails to quantitatively match the strong countercyclicality of net exports observed
in the data. Finally, we show that the model succeeds in reproducing the reversal
of capital flows to Mexico during the Tequila Crisis between 1994 and 1995.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we start
with some descriptive business cycle statistics of selected countries and briefly
discuss certain empirical features of valuation effects in EMEs. Section 3.3 outlines
our benchmark model as well as the setup with liability dollarisation. In Section
3.4, we describe the data and introduce our calibration and estimation technique.
Estimation results are presented in Section 3.5, while Section 3.6 discusses the
dynamics of our model in greater detail. Some concluding remarks appear in
Section 3.7.
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3.2 Descriptive Analysis
Before we introduce our theoretical framework, which we later use to examine
macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs, we take a look at some descriptive statistics
first. We begin with illustrating the distinct empirical regularities about business
cycles in EMEs contrary to industrialised countries. To this end, we calculate
standard business cycle moments for numerous EMEs and compare them with
those obtained for a group of developed small open economies. Subsequently, we
document the stabilising impact of valuation effects on the external balance sheet
in EMEs.
3.2.1 Business Cycle Features
The now well–established term “Emerging Market” was originally introduced by
Antoine van Agtmael in 1981, describing developing countries that experience
rapid economic progress and potentially catch up with developed economies (see
Van Agtmael (2007)). Today, there exists a wide range of definitions of an emerging
market and numerous different classifications. For that reason, we rely on three
well–known classifications and focus our descriptive analysis on the so–called
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and CIVETS (Columbia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Egypt, Turkey, South Africa) countries as well as selected economies from the list
of emerging markets compiled by the Dow Jones Indexes.
At this point, we use annual data from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) on output, consumption, exports, imports, and the real exchange rate.6 For
the real exchange rate we construct an index which we normalise to 100 in year
2005. To derive real per capita variables for output and consumption, we divide
each series by population and subsequently deflate output using the GDP deflator,
and consumption using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). To study business cycle
fluctuations, we detrend all variables except for the net exports to output ratio.
For this purpose, we apply the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP) filter on logged
6We use real exchange rates vis–a`–vis the US. The choice of annual rather than higher frequency
time series enables us to investigate a longer time period. Nevertheless, we did the same exercise
using quarterly data and found no qualitative differences in the results.
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series with smoothing parameter 100.7
Descriptive sample statistics are displayed in Table 3.1. Various stylised busi-
ness cycle facts are worth emphasising.8 First, fluctuations in macroeconomic ag-
gregates in EMEs are generally more pronounced than in developed economies.
For instance, our selected countries on the Dow Jones list exhibit average standard
deviations of output, consumption and net exports that are more than twice as
high as in the group of industrialised economies. This salient feature is visual-
ised in Figure 3.1, which plots the cyclical component of GDP for each country.
The graph clearly demonstrates the excess business cycle volatility in emerging
markets relative to advanced economies. Second, consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility in EMEs, whereas the standard deviation of consumption is on
average lower than that of output in developed countries. Third, the net exports
to output ratio tends to be fairly countercyclical. For instance, the mean correla-
tion of GDP and the net exports to output ratio is as much negative as −0.45 for
the CIVETS countries. By contrast, advanced economies exhibit a rather weak
link between these variables. In fact, our calculations yield a correlation of merely
−0.04 on average.
Somewhat surprisingly, previous studies in this line of research have not put
particular focus on the business cycle features of the real exchange rate. Table 3.1
indicates that there are differences between EMEs and advanced countries along
this dimension, too. The real exchange rate is more volatile in emerging markets
than in developed economies. Moreover, real appreciations are associated with
a fall in the trade balance to GDP ratio in EMEs. The mean correlation between
these variables is −0.36 across all EMEs. On the other hand, the link between
net exports and real exchange rates appears to be much weaker in the group of
developed economies, for which we find basically no correlation on average.
The empirical regularities documented here are very robust. Nevertheless, we
also detect some minor differences within the cohort of emerging markets. For
7We are aware of the shortcomings of this filtering method. Hence, we also looked at first
differences of the logged series as well as cubically detrended logged series to check the robustness
of our findings. Indeed, business cycle moments seem to be rather insensitive with respect to the
filter choice.
8We confidently call certain business cycle patterns as “stylised facts” because they have already
been documented in a number of earlier studies. See, among others, Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), and Kose and Prasad (2010).
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Table 3.1: Business Cycles in EMEs and Developed Economies
σ(Y) σ(C) σ
(
NX
Y
)
σ(e) σ(C)σ(Y) ρ
(
NX
Y ,Y
)
ρ
(
NX
Y , e
)
BRIC
Brazil (BRA) 2.93 12.17 2.42 21.67 4.16 −0.30 −0.37
Russia (RUS) 5.64 8.51 4.80 17.79 1.51 −0.28 −0.75
India (IND) 2.16 4.00 1.37 6.13 1.85 −0.13 −0.32
China (CHN) 3.11 3.55 2.76 7.85 1.14 0.08 0.00
Mean 3.46 7.06 2.84 13.36 2.17 −0.16 −0.36
CIVETS
Colombia (COL) 2.65 4.70 3.44 11.50 1.78 −0.27 −0.50
Indonesia (IDN) 3.89 4.80 3.47 15.58 1.23 −0.37 −0.28
Vietnam (VNM) 1.29 2.15 4.15 6.46 1.67 −0.50 −0.54
Egypt (EGY) 1.88 2.83 4.07 22.57 1.51 −0.42 −0.54
Turkey (TUR) 4.11 6.10 2.81 9.99 1.49 −0.66 −0.68
South Africa (ZAF) 2.02 3.35 3.70 10.94 1.66 −0.47 −0.21
Mean 2.64 3.99 3.61 12.84 1.56 −0.45 −0.46
Dow Jones List
Argentina (ARG) 5.67 10.32 3.75 30.96 1.82 −0.76 −0.29
Chile (CHL) 5.55 7.66 36.56 19.77 1.38 −0.26 0.09
Malaysia (MYS) 3.82 6.06 9.80 7.33 1.58 −0.37 −0.31
Mauritius (MUS) 4.01 7.14 5.87 7.49 1.78 −0.23 −0.40
Mexico (MEX) 3.26 5.76 3.21 11.15 1.77 −0.27 −0.65
Morocco (MAR) 3.02 3.08 4.20 9.97 1.02 −0.06 −0.03
Thailand (THA) 4.13 4.31 5.50 7.10 1.04 −0.54 −0.38
Mean 4.21 6.33 9.84 13.40 1.48 −0.36 −0.28
Mean EMEs 3.48 5.68 5.99 13.19 1.67 −0.34 −0.36
Developed
Australia (AUS) 1.66 1.40 1.26 8.54 0.84 −0.10 0.07
Austria (AUT) 1.57 2.08 2.30 11.72 1.32 0.00 −0.13
Canada (CAN) 2.19 2.24 1.94 4.97 1.02 0.03 −0.37
Sweden (SWE) 2.12 2.21 3.12 9.80 1.04 −0.03 −0.14
Switzerland (CHE) 2.21 1.89 3.60 11.40 0.86 −0.16 0.05
Mean 1.63 1.64 2.04 7.74 0.85 −0.04 −0.09
Notes: Data are annual and taken from the IFS. All series, except for the net exports to output ratio,
are real per capita variables, have been logged and filtered using the HP filter with smoothing
parameter λ = 100. Standard deviations are reported in percentage points. The samples are:
Brazil, 1980–2010; Russia, 1995–2010; India, 1970–2010; China, 1986–2010; Colombia, 1970–2010;
Indonesia, 1970–2010; Vietnam, 1995–2010; Egypt, 1982–2009; Turkey, 1987–2010; South Africa,
1960–2010; Argentina, 1970–2010; Chile, 1970–2009; Malaysia, 1970–2010; Mauritius, 1970–2010;
Mexico, 1970–2010; Morocco, 1975–2008; Thailand, 1960–2010; Australia, 1960–2010; Austria,
1978–2010; Canada, 1950–2010; Sweden, 1950–2010; and Switzerland, 1970–2010.
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Figure 3.1: Business Cycles in Output
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Notes: Deviations of logged real GDP per capita from HP trend. Table notes of Table 3.1 on data
information apply here, too.
instance, the degree of countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio varies
across EMEs. While Turkish GDP is highly negatively correlated with the net
exports to output ratio, there is hardly any relation between these two variables
in China. Similar discrepancies can be found regarding the excess volatility of
consumption. In Mexico, the standard deviation of consumption is almost twice
as high as the standard deviation of GDP. Conversely, there is virtually no excess
volatility of consumption in Thailand and Morocco. Furthermore, although real
depreciations are generally attended by higher net exports in EMEs, we do not
observe this particular feature in Chile, China, and Morocco.
A large literature has been devoted to analysing these business cycle phenom-
ena in emerging markets. Yet previous studies have predominantly focused on
Latin American countries. Especially, Argentina (Kydland and Zarazaga (2002),
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010)) and Mexico (Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007), Boz et al. (2011), and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013)) have been
at the centre of earlier research. Given the potential heterogeneity across EMEs,
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we would like to contribute to the existing literature by investigating a broader
selection of countries. In the empirical part of our paper in Sections 3.5 and 3.6,
we therefore parametrise our DSGE model introduced below for the emerging
markets of Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey as well as the advanced economies
of Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland. This allows us to get more general insights
into the different business cycle patterns in these two county groups.
3.2.2 Valuation Effects
Valuation effects refer to changes in a country’s net foreign asset position that do
not arise from cross–border financial flows but are due to movements in asset
prices or exchange rates. Accordingly, valuation effects (VAL) are the difference
between the change in the net foreign asset position (∆NFA) and the current
account (CA):
VAL = ∆NFA − CA.
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between valuation effects
and the current account in EMEs. Our descriptive exercise relies on annual data
on the stock of foreign liabilities in Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey over the time
period from 1980 to 2007 provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Current
account data are taken from the IFS database. We use foreign debt instead of
net foreign assets because it is the empirical counterpart to the net foreign asset
position in the theoretical model analysed in this paper.9 As a consequence, we
calculate valuation effects simply by subtracting the current account from the
negative change in the foreign debt position.10
Figure 3.2 portrays annual valuation effects as well as the current account, both
as a percentage of current GDP. As is evident from the graph, there is a negative
link between the current account and valuation effects. This is especially the case
9Note that foreign short–term debt traditionally accounts for a large part of the total external
balance sheet in emerging markets (see Kose and Prasad (2010)). Consequently, movements in the
net foreign asset position in these countries essentially reflect changes in foreign liabilities. It is
therefore not surprising that we obtained similar results when we performed this exercise based
on the actual net foreign asset position.
10Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) point out that differences between the change in the net foreign
asset position and the current account may also arise from other factors than valuation effects,
such as measurement errors or omissions in the data. Therefore, we have to be careful when
interpreting the magnitude of valuation effects computed here.
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Figure 3.2: Valuation Effects and the Current Account in Emerging Markets
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Notes: Valuation effects and the current account in Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey as a
percentage of GDP. To compute valuation effects, we subtract the current account from the
negative change in foreign liabilities. Data on foreign debt are taken from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), while current account data are retrieved from the IFS database.
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for Mexico and South Africa but less obvious for Turkey. The sample correlation
between the two series is −0.58, −0.75, and −0.05 for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey, respectively. This means that a current account deficit is associated with
positive valuation effects, which actually dampens the deterioration of the net
foreign asset position. Hence, our descriptive analysis hints at a stabilising nature
of valuation effects.
3.3 The Model
Consider a real business cycle model of a small open economy. The domestic
economy is inhabited by a unit mass of atomistic, identical, and infinitely lived
households. Agents form rational expectations and seek to maximise lifetime
utility by consuming two differentiated commodities: a home–produced good as
well as a foreign good imported from the rest of the world. Some key ingredients
of our framework are borrowed from Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). In particu-
lar, production technology features both a permanent and a transitory stochastic
component. In addition, we augment our setup with financial frictions as pro-
posed by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). That is, agents have access to an incomplete
international credit market on which the price of debt is determined according to
a debt–elastic interest rate rule.
In what follows, we choose the domestically produced good as nume´raire
and normalise its price in the home country to one, i.e. pH,t = 1. Thus, all
variables are expressed in units of the home good. Section 3.3.1 presents our
benchmark model. In Section 3.3.2, we introduce a further financial distortion in
our framework by assuming that domestic agents can only borrow in foreign
currency on international capital markets. We call this modified setup the liability
dollarisation model. Section 3.3.3 provides a summary of both models and shows
how we solve them. A detailed description of the liability dollarisation model
including the derivation of optimality and steady state conditions is presented in
Appendix B.
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3.3.1 Benchmark Model
Producing Economy
The home economy produces a differentiated domestic final good in a perfectly
competitive environment. Technology is described by a neoclassical production
function of the form
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α, (3.1)
with Yt, lt, Kt, and α denoting aggregate output of the home good, labour input,
aggregate capital, and the economy’s capital share, respectively. Moreover, zt and
Γt describe two different exogenous technology processes. On the one hand, the
economy is exposed to transitory fluctuations in total factor productivity captured
by zt, which follows a stationary first–order autoregressive (AR) process in logs:
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ), with 
z
t ∼ N(0, σ2z). (3.2)
On the other hand, we build on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and assume that
the producing economy is not only hit by transitory shocks but also by trend
shocks. For this reason, production technology features a non–stationary labour–
augmenting productivity component represented by Γt, which equals the cumu-
lative product of growth shocks:
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, where gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ), with 
g
t ∼ N(0, σ2g).
(3.3)
The underlying structure of the non–stationary technology process implies that a
realisation of gs will never die out and therefore has a permanent impact on Γt,
for all t ≥ s. Parameters |ρz| < 1 and |ρg| < 1 determine the persistence of the
two exogenous processes. zt and 
g
t represent shocks to the transitory and per-
manent technology process, respectively, with σ2z and σ2g being the corresponding
variances. Finally, µg refers to the long–term or steady state gross growth rate of
the economy.
Let It denote investment in the capital stock at date t. The evolution of the
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capital stock is described by the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt. (3.4)
The last term in equation (3.4) introduces quadratic capital adjustment costs.
Parameter φ determines the weight of adjustment costs and δ is the depreciation
rate.
Representative Household
The representative household’s objective is to maximise expected lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(Ct, 1 − lt), (3.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, u(.) is period utility, which is
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in both arguments, and (1 − lt)
denotes time spent on leisure activities in period t. Ct is a composite consumption
index characterised by a standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) aggregate:
Ct =
[
θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of home goods in consumption, and η ∈ (0,∞) is the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution between differentiated home and foreign
goods. Consequently, CH,t and CF,t correspond to consumption of the home and
foreign good, respectively.
We follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and assume that preferences are de-
scribed by a canonical Cobb–Douglas Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
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utility function:11
u(Ct, 1 − lt) =
[
Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
]1−σ
1 − σ ,
where σ co–determines the degree of relative risk aversion, and γ ∈ (0, 1) describes
the consumption weight in utility.12
Our theoretical economy features only one non–contingent financial asset.
At each time t, the representative agent can issue Dt+1 one–period bonds on
international capital markets at a predetermined risk–free rate rt. Accordingly,
the household faces the following period resource constraint:
Yt + Dt+1 ≥ ptCt + It + Dt(1 + rt−1), (3.6)
where pt denotes the price of composite consumption. Equation (3.6) embeds the
standard interpretation. It simply requires that total expenditures at date t in form
of consumption, investment, and debt repayments (RHS) are financed by income
plus new loans (LHS).
Since variables Yt, Ct, CH,t, CF,t, It, Kt, and Dt exhibit a stochastic trend, they
need to be detrended in order to ensure stationarity of the system. Let lower
case letters xt indicate the stationary counterpart of Xt. We can then detrend our
relevant variables in a straightforward manner:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
.
We can now return to the optimisation rationale of the representative agent
stated in (3.5). We can split the problem into two stages: intratemporal and in-
tertemporal optimisation. First, intratemporal household optimisation yields the
11This instantaneous utility function is non–separable in consumption and leisure and thereby
leads to income effects on labour supply. A number of studies in this strand of the literature
(Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), Boz et al. (2011), and
Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013)) use a quasi–linear period utility function pioneered by Greenwood
et al. (1988), so–called GHH preferences, and generalised by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). A
key characteristic of this preference specification is that it rules out any income effects on labour
supply.
12Note that this functional form of utility implies that the Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion corresponds to 1 − γ(1 − σ) rather than σ. Accordingly, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is given by 11−γ(1−σ) .
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following demand functions for the home and foreign consumption good:
cH,t = θp
η
t ct, (3.7)
and
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct. (3.8)
In addition, the price index of composite consumption is determined by
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
, (3.9)
where pF,t denotes the price of the foreign good expressed in units of the home–
produced good.
Next, we consider the intertemporal optimisation problem. Final good produ-
cing firms are owned by the representative household who hires labour and rents
capital for which it pays competitive prices. Thus, we can combine the detrended
versions of the production function (3.1), the law of motion of capital (3.4), and the
aggregate resource constraint (3.6) to state the stationary maximisation problem
at time t as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,dτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(Γγ(1−σ)τ−1 u(cτ, 1 − lτ))
s.t.
yτ + (1 − δ)kτ + gτdτ+1 ≥ pτcτ + gτkτ+1 + φ2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + dτ(1 + rτ−1),
taking as given kt, dt, as well as the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rt+s
]
=
0. The solution to this maximisation problem renders the following optimality
conditions:
1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[
1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ ·
pt
(
α yt+1kt+1 + (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 − µg
)
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 −
φ
2
(
gt+1 kt+2kt+1 − µg
)2)
pt+1
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)) ], (3.10)
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1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= βgγ(1−σ)−1t Et
[
1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ pt
pt+1
]
(1 + rt), (3.11)
and
pt
1 − γ
γ
ct
1 − lt = (1 − α)
yt
lt
. (3.12)
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) represent the intertemporal Euler equations with re-
spect to capital and bond holdings, respectively. Condition (3.12) specifies the
standard labour–leisure trade–off.
Interest Rates
We assume that the interest rate rt on international debt borrowed at date t and
due in period t+1 is increasing in expected future external debt relative to income:
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[Dt+1
Yt+1
]
− D
Y
)
− 1
)
. (3.13)
The reason why we introduce this interest rate rule in our setup is twofold. First,
as Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) point out, it is a convenient way to make
the deterministic equilibrium independent of initial conditions and thus to close
the model. Second, it allows us to feature financial frictions in our theoretical
economy in a reduced form.
According to equation (3.13), the cost of debt depends on the steady state
interest rate r, the economy’s steady state debt to GDP ratio DY , and the expected
level of debt over GDP in the next period Et
[
Dt+1
Yt+1
]
. Note that for ease of interpret-
ation we use the debt to GDP ratio to determine the interest rate rather than the
level of total debt. Intuitively, a country finds it hard to borrow on soft terms and
is charged a premium over the equilibrium interest rate if it is expected to face
high debt relative to the size of its economy in the future.13
13Admittedly, there is no micro foundation upon which we build our interest rate rule. Nev-
ertheless, the imposed positive relationship between debt over GDP and borrowing costs in our
framework is consistent with findings in the sovereign debt literature. For instance, Arellano
(2008) develops a model which shows how higher indebtedness increases the probability of de-
fault and thus raises the interest rate. Likewise, a large body of empirical research has emphasised
the importance of a country’s external debt in explaining interest rate spreads (see Uribe and
Yue (2006)). Furthermore, as Uribe (2006) demonstrates, we could also introduce a borrowing
constraint in our small open economy framework to generate an endogenous country spread. In
such a model, a premium over the equilibrium interest rate emerges if the debt ceiling is binding.
In light of this, we believe that our interest rate rule provides a convenient way to capture credit
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In our benchmark setup, we follow Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and interpret ψ
as a catchall parameter for financial frictions and financial development. A high
value of ψ implies that the interest rate reacts more sensitively to changes in the
expected future debt to GDP ratio, which reflects severe capital market distortions
in the economy.14 Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) highlight the importance of the size
of ψ for the analysis of business cycles in both developed economies and EMEs.
In light of this, our empirical analysis below permits ψ to take on values that are
substantially greater than zero. Therefore, we allow for variation in the interest
rate, which entails important implications for the dynamics in our model.15
Exchange Rate
The household’s optimisation problem abroad is analogous to the home country.
Since we consider an SOE framework, the home economy is infinitesimally small
relative to the rest of the world. That is, the foreign country is approximately
closed and only consumes goods produced abroad. As a result, the foreign price
index of the foreign consumption composite p?t boils down to the foreign price of
goods produced in the rest of the world p?F,t, i.e. p
?
t = p
?
F,t. We assume that the law
of one price holds, such that
pF,t =
p?F,t
st
=
p?t
st
,
where st = p?H,t defines the price of the home good in the foreign country. In fact,
st can be interpreted as the “nominal exchange rate” determining the price of the
domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency, since we have normalised the
market imperfections even though it leaves out an endogenous explanation within the model.
14At this point it is intuitive to look at the log–linearised version of the interest rate rule given
by
r̂t r =
d
y
ψEt
[
d̂t+1 − ŷt+1
]
⇔ ∆rt
∆Et
[(
d
y
)
t+1
] ≈ ψ,
where hatted variables denote log–deviations from steady state and ∆ indicates absolute changes.
Accordingly, r̂t · r approximately corresponds to the absolute deviation of the interest rate from
its steady state value r. Hence, we can identify the effective debt–elasticity of the interest rate as
ψ
r · dy . More specifically, parameter ψ determines by how many percentage points the interest rate
at date t increases if, ceteris paribus, we expect the debt to income ratio to rise by one percentage
point in period t + 1.
15ψ needs to be positive in order to induce stationarity. However, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
and other related studies set ψ equal to 0.001, i.e. virtually equal to zero. In doing so, these
authors basically shut down interest rate changes and thereby eliminate any feedback effects from
the interest rate on other macroeconomic variables (see Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010)).
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domestic price of the home good to one (pH,t = 1). As a result, we can define the
real exchange rate as the price of the domestic composite consumption good in
units of the foreign composite consumption good:
et =
ptst
p?t
=
ptst
p?F,t
=
ptst
pF,tst
=
pt
pF,t
. (3.14)
Net Exports and Current Account
We assume that the consumption index of agents abroad is also characterised by
a CES aggregate. For simplicity, we also assume that variables in the domestic
economy and the rest of the world exhibit the same stochastic trend component,
i.e. Γt−1 = Γ?t−1. Let c
?
t denote detrended foreign consumption, such that we can
derive foreign demand for the home good, from the perspective of the home
country, as
c?H,t = θ
?pη
?
F,t c
?
t , (3.15)
where θ? ∈ (0, 1) denotes the share of home goods in foreign consumption, and
η? ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution abroad.
Consequently, net exports in the home economy can be easily calculated as the
difference between exports and imports:
nxt = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t. (3.16)
Furthermore, the current account is given by the trade balance minus interest
payments on external debt:
cat = −rt−1dt + nxt. (3.17)
As in any standard intertemporal model of the current account (see Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1996)), the current account in our benchmark economy simply equals the
change in the country’s net foreign asset position:
∆n f at+1 = −gtdt+1 + dt = cat. (3.18)
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General Equilibrium
In a general equilibrium, all markets have to clear. Equilibrium in the market for
the home–produced good requires that output equals domestic absorption plus
foreign demand:
yt = cH,t + it + c?H,t. (3.19)
Finally, foreign consumption is assumed to follow an exogenous first–order
AR process in logs:
c?t = (c
?
t−1)
ρc exp(ct), with 
c
t ∼ N(0, σ2c ). (3.20)
This specification introduces external disturbances in our setup, which potentially
allows foreign demand shocks, along with permanent and transitory productivity
shocks, to drive the dynamics in the model.
3.3.2 Liability Dollarisation
A well–known characteristic of EMEs is that they have had difficulties in borrow-
ing in their own currencies on international capital markets.16 In fact, the bulk of
external debt in these countries has traditionally been issued in major currencies
like US dollar, euro, sterling, or Swiss francs (see Eichengreen et al. (2005)). Being
denominated in foreign currency, the amount of outstanding loans is subject to
substantial exchange rate fluctuations which may induce non–negligible external
balance sheet effects. In order to account for this phenomenon, which is often
referred to as liability dollarisation, we now extend our benchmark framework
from the previous subsection along this dimension.
The basic structure of the model coincides with our benchmark model. Thus,
most of equations and optimality conditions from Section 3.3.1 simply carry over.
As we have set up our model in real terms, liability dollarisation means that the
home country can only borrow in units of foreign consumption. Accordingly, the
16This phenomena has been documented by an extensive literature. See, for instance, Reinhart
et al. (2003b), Lane and Shambaugh (2010), and contributions in Eichengreen and Hausmann
(2005).
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resource constraint of the economy adjusts to17
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
≥ ptCt + It + pt Dtet (1 + rt−1). (3.21)
This has an immediate impact on household optimisation, such that we obtain an
intertemporal Euler equation with respect to foreign debt of
1
ct
(
cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
= βgγ(1−σ)−1t Et
[ 1
ct+1
(
cγt+1(1 − lt+1)1−γ
)1−σ et
et+1
]
(1 + rt). (3.22)
Note that liability dollarisation changes the price of consumption at date t ex-
pressed in units of date t + 1 relative to the benchmark case in equation (3.11).
In particular, it alters the impact of the exchange rate fluctuations on the optimal
intertemporal consumption allocation of the representative household.
In addition, our interest rate rule modifies to
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1Dt+1
et+1Yt+1
]
− pD
eY
)
− 1
)
. (3.23)
It is worth emphasising that with interest rates determined by equation (3.23),
parameter ψ can no longer be interpreted as a catchall variable for financial fric-
tions as we do in the benchmark economy (see equation (3.13)). When households
issue new debt, they do not know how much they have to repay in the future
because exchange rate variations change the value of outstanding debt. Hence,
the fact that countries are forced to borrow in foreign currency itself represents a
special form of capital market distortions. In the model at hand we can therefore
encompass the extent of financial frictions by the interplay of liability dollarisation
and debt–elastic interest rates.18
Importantly, the value of outstanding international debt depends on the evol-
17Note that international debt D is expressed in units of the foreign composite consumption
good such that De is denoted in units of the domestic consumption good. Hence, we have to
multiply De by the price of domestic consumption p in order to obtain foreign debt expressed in
units of the home–produced good.
18Note that the log–linearised version of the interest rate rule is given by
r̂t r =
pd
ey
ψEt
[
p̂t+1 + d̂t+1 − ŷt+1 − êt+1
]
⇔ ∆rt
∆Et
[( pd
ey
)
t+1
] ≈ ψ.
The interpretation of the size of parameter ψ is the same as in the benchmark case.
74
ution of the real exchange rate. As a result, the change in the country’s net foreign
asset position no longer equals the current account but is now adjusted for valu-
ation effects stemming from exchange rate changes. We can write the detrended
current account as
cat = nxt − rt−1pt dtet . (3.24)
Moreover, we derive the change in detrended net foreign assets as the sum of the
current account and valuation effects:
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
(3.25)
(3.21)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = yt − ptct − it − rt−1pt dtet + pt−1
dt
et−1
− pt dtet
(3.19)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t − rt−1pt
dt
et
+ dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
(3.16)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = nxt − rt−1pt dtet + dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
(3.24)⇐⇒ ∆n f at = cat + valt.
Hence, the stationary version of valuation effects at date t is given by
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
. (3.26)
3.3.3 Model Solution
Once the variables incorporating the stochastic permanent component have been
detrended, the models introduced above constitute stationary systems of non–
linear expectational difference equations. In the benchmark model the system is
featured by 18 variables (yt, ct, rt, et, it, lt, cH,t, cF,t, c?H,t, pt, pF,t, nxt, cat, kt, dt, zt, gt,
c?t ) in the stationary versions of equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8),
(3.9), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), (3.17), (3.19), and (3.20). The
model with liability dollarisation forms a system of 20 variables (yt, ct, rt, et, it, lt,
cH,t, cF,t, c?H,t, pt, pF,t, nxt, cat, ∆n f at, valt, kt, dt, zt, gt, c
?
t ) in the detrended versions of
equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16),
(3.19), (3.20), (3.21), (3.22), (3.23), (3.24), (3.25), and (3.26).
For each setup, we use a first–order approximation of the respective model
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solution and log–linearise the system around its deterministic steady state. All
equations being log–linearised, we end up with a linear system of first–order
expectational difference equations, which we solve using the method proposed
by Klein (2000). The solution yields a state space representation of the form
yt =Zαt
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt,
(3.27)
where yt is an (n× 1) vector of control variables and αt is the (m× 1) unobservable
state vector, which is driven by the exogenous processes ηt of dimension (x ×
1). Therefore, the matrix R, which links the state variables to the exogenous
processes, has dimension (m × x).19 This representation enables us to estimate
certain structural parameters of our models using country–specific data, which
will be described in detail in the next section.
3.4 Estimation and Calibration
To gauge the models’ ability to explain macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs, we
quantify our theoretical economy for three EMEs: Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey. Furthermore, to assess the peculiarity of business cycles in emerging
markets, we also parametrise the benchmark model for a group of developed
small open economies, represented by Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.
We choose a mixture of country–specific calibration and Bayesian estimation.
In particular, we estimate the parameters determining the exogenous processes in
the model as well as the debt–elasticity of the interest rateψ. All other parameters
are calibrated. Given our focus on the role of liability dollarisation as a form of
financial frictions in EMEs, we estimate both models for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey, whereas for our developed economies, we only analyse the benchmark
framework.
19Accordingly, in the benchmark model, we have x = 3, m = 5, and n = 13. In the liability
dollarisation model, we have x = 3, m = 5, and n = 15.
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3.4.1 Data
The time unit t in our theoretical economy is counted as quarters. To estimate
our linearised models, we use quarterly time series on real per capita GDP and
consumption, real interest rates, and real exchange rates. All data are taken from
the IFS database. The time series of real per capita output and consumption are
seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA procedure. Our
selection of countries and sample period is motivated by data availability and
comparability with existing literature. Table 3.2 summarises the sample period
used for estimation for each country.
Table 3.2: Data for Estimation
Emerging Markets Developed Economies
Mexico (MEX) 1981Q1–2011Q4 Canada (CAN) 1960Q1–2011Q4
South Africa (ZAF) 1960Q1–2011Q4 Sweden (SWE) 1981Q1–2011Q4
Turkey (TUR) 1987Q1–2011Q4 Switzerland (CHE) 1970Q1–2011Q3
Notes: All data are taken from the IFS database. Variables used for estimation are real GDP per
capita, real consumption per capita, the real interest rate, and the real exchange rate.
To calculate real per capita variables, we divide the respective nominal series
by population and subsequently deflate output using the GDP deflator and con-
sumption using the CPI. Population data are only available on an annual fre-
quency. Hence, we pin down population in the respective second quarter at the
reported annual figure and interpolate missing data points using annual growth
rates. Our construction of real interest rates is similar to the approach chosen
by Neumeyer and Perri (2005). That is, we subtract domestic expected inflation
based on the GDP deflator from the annual nominal interest rate, which is then
transformed into a 3–month rate.20 Expected inflation is calculated as the average
of actual inflation in the current period and the three previous quarters. Finally,
for each country we construct a real exchange rate index, which is normalised
to 100 in 2005Q2 by multiplying the respective nominal US dollar exchange rate
20For Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland we use T–bill rates, whereas
for Turkey we take the deposit rate. Note that Neumeyer and Perri (2005) subtract expected
US inflation from the dollar interest rate based on the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index
(EMBI) spread. We use domestic expected inflation instead because our model describes the
behaviour of a domestic representative agent as opposed to an international investor.
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(US dollar per national currency) by the domestic CPI and dividing by the US
CPI. Moreover, we follow Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and filter our data prior to
estimation by removing the cubic trend from the real series in logs.
3.4.2 Calibration
Table 3.3 reports the calibration of our parameters. We keep the majority of
structural parameters constant across both models and countries, and assign
conventional values suggested by previous literature. In doing so, we try to
retain a high degree of comparability with earlier contributions. In particular,
we follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and set the subjective discount factor β
equal to 0.98, the weight of consumption in the utility function γ equal to 0.36,
the parameter governing the curvature of the utility function σ equal to 2, the
weight of the adjustment costs φ equal to 4, the capital share in the production
function equal to 0.32, and the rate of depreciation δ equal to 0.05. Without loss
of generality, we normalise the mean value of both the transitory productivity
process z and the foreign consumption process c? to 1. There is no consensus in
the literature concerning which value to choose for the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution between home and foreign goods (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)).
We assume that the price elasticity of goods is the same throughout the world
and follow Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) by setting its value equal to unity, i.e.
η = η? = 1. Moreover, we pin down θ = 0.8 and θ? = 0.2 to match a consumption
import share both at home and abroad of 20 percent. This choice is motivated by
empirical figures reported in Burstein et al. (2005).
Two parameters are fixed country–specifically. We calibrate the mean of the
non–stationary productivity process µg at the average quarterly gross growth rate
of real per capita GDP. We pin down the steady state external debt to GDP ratio at
the average annual net foreign asset position.21 That is, we set DY in the benchmark
model and pDeY in the model with liability dollarisation equal to 35.63 percent, 24.36
percent, 23.20 percent, 31.08 percent, and 18.63 percent for Mexico, South Africa,
Turkey, Canada, and Sweden, respectively. Switzerland is a net creditor to the
21Average net foreign asset positions are calculated based on annual data between 1970 and
2007 collected by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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Table 3.3: Calibrated Values
General Parameters
β discount factor 0.98 θ? foreign share of home goods 0.20
γ consumption weight in utility 0.36 η domestic elasticity of intratemporal
σ curvature of utility 2.00 substitution 1.00
φ weight of adjustment costs 4.00 η? foreign elasticity of intratemporal
α capital share 0.32 substitution 1.00
δ depreciation rate 0.05 z mean of z process 1.00
θ domestic share of home goods 0.80 c? mean of c? process 1.00
Country–specific Parameters( p
e ·
)
D
Y external debt ratio µg mean gross growth rate
MEX 0.36 MEX 1.0018
ZAF 0.24 ZAF 1.0026
TUR 0.23 TUR 1.0063
CAN 0.31 CAN 1.0049
SWE 0.19 SWE 1.0046
CHE −0.90 CHE 1.0029
Notes: In the benchmark model, we pin down DY . In the model with liability dollarisation, we
calibrate pDeY at the reported value of the external debt to income ratio.
rest of the world and thus exhibits a positive average net foreign asset position
relative to GDP of 90 percent.
3.4.3 Estimation
Similar to recent studies in this field of research (e.g. Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010)
and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013)), we adopt a Bayesian viewpoint. Besides
computational advantages, this allows us to incorporate prior beliefs about the
structural parameters in a straightforward manner. As pointed out above, the
size of parameter ψ, which determines the debt–elasticity of interest rates, may
have important implications for the dynamics in the model. However, ex–ante
we do not have strong beliefs about the size of the debt–elasticity of interest rates.
To this end, we estimate parameter ψ as well as the parameters governing the
exogenous structural shocks in the model.
A major contribution of this work is that our estimation procedure allows for
a dynamic structure in the “measurement error”, which captures the off–model
dynamics in the data. To our knowledge, this represents a novel approach in this
strand of the literature. Related previous studies deal differently with the crucial
issue on how to address these residual dynamics of our observable variables in
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the estimation.22 Naturally, our SOE setup is too stylised to account for all the
dynamics in real macroeconomic time series. Hence, we build on Sargent (1989)
and Ireland (2004) and include a (vector–)autoregressive “measurement error”
component to capture the dynamics in the data that cannot be replicated by the
structural model itself. Accordingly, our state space representation in equation
(3.27) modifies to
yt =Zαt + t
αt =Tαt−1 + Rηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Σ)
t =At−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,Ω)
(3.28)
where t is an (nestimation×1) vector of measurement errors and nestimation denotes the
number of observables we use for estimation, which is four in our case. We assume
that the off–model dynamics inherent in each variable follow an autoregressive
process, such that all off–diagonal entries of the (nestimation × nestimation) coefficient
matrix A are restricted to zero.
We apply a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation by using the
Metropolis–Hastings algorithm within the Gibbs sampler to derive the posterior
distributions of the parameters. First, we implement Gibbs sampling to simulate
the posteriors of the parameters defining our exogenous processes ρz, σ2z , ρg, σ2g, ρc,
σ2c , A, andΩ. Then, at each simulation iteration, conditional on the current Gibbs
draw, we add a Metropolis–Hastings step in order to approximate the posterior
distribution of ψ. We therefore apply a random walk Metropolis Hastings al-
gorithm in which we choose the variance of the proposal density, such that we get
an acceptance ratio of about 20 to 40 percent. We estimate the whole model with
different starting values in order to control for the possibility of multiple modes
in the posterior distribution.
Apart from the volatility in the off–model dynamics, our prior beliefs are con-
stant across all models and countries. They are summarised in Table 3.4. We
impose a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and variance 0.02 on the autore-
22For instance, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013) impose a simple White
Noise process on the measurement error. In addition, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) tightly restrict the
variance of the measurement error, so that it cannot explain more than 6 percent of the variation
in the respective observable variable.
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Table 3.4: Prior Distributions
Prior Dist. Prior Prior Dist. Prior Prior Dist. Prior
90% Bands 90% Bands 90% Bands
Harmonised Priors
ψ U(0.001, 5) –
ρz N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρg N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρc N(0.5, 0.02) [0.269,0.733]
ρy N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρc N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρr N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
ρe N(0, 0.05) [−0.367,0.367]
σ2z IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
σ2g IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
σ2c IG(2.05, 0.011) [0.002,0.028]
Country–Specific Priors
Mexico South Africa Turkey
σ2y IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.002) [0.000,0.006]
σ2c IG(2.01, 0.003) [0.001,0.010] IG(2.00, 0.002) [0.000,0.006] IG(2.01, 0.004) [0.001,0.012]
σ2r IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.001]
σ2e IG(2.16, 0.021) [0.004,0.050] IG(2.21, 0.025) [0.005,0.056] IG(2.15, 0.020) [0.004,0.050]
Canada Sweden Switzerland
σ2y IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.003] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.004] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.001]
σ2c IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.002] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.003] IG(2.00, 0.001) [0.000,0.001]
σ2r IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000] IG(2.00, 0.000) [0.000,0.000]
σ2e IG(2.02, 0.007) [0.001,0.019] IG(2.00, 0.022) [0.005,0.062] IG(2.24, 0.028) [0.005,0.060]
gressive coefficients of structural shocks. Regarding the persistence parameters
of measurement errors, it is more difficult to come up with informative priors.
Therefore, we implement rather diffuse priors and assume they follow a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance 0.05. Since the normal distribution has
infinite support, we enforce stationarity by restricting the AR coefficients to lie
within the unit circle. Priors on the volatility of the structural exogenous processes
are harmonised and are described by an inverse Gamma distribution with shape
parameter 2.05 and scale factor 0.0105.23 Furthermore, we fix the prior distribu-
tion of the measurement error variance country–specifically, such that its mean
matches the variance of the respective observable time series used for estimation.
Finally, we impose a fairly flat uniform distribution with support [0.001, 5] on our
financial frictions parameter ψ.
23This prior distribution implies a mean of 0.01 and variance of 0.002.
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3.5 Estimation Results
This section discusses the estimation results for the six countries under investig-
ation. First, we present the posterior distributions of our estimated parameters.
Then, we run a “horse race” between the benchmark model and the liability dol-
larisation setup with respect to their ability to capture the dynamics in our four
observable variables.
3.5.1 Parameter Distributions
In the following, we focus on the estimation results concerning the structural part
of the model. Table 3.5 displays the posterior distribution of the estimated struc-
tural parameters. A complete description of all estimated parameters, including
those determining the off–model dynamics, can be found in Appendix B.
All results are based on 150,000 draws of which the initial 100,000 (125,000)
draws were burned for EMEs (developed economies). We keep only every 25th
(10th) draw for EMEs (developed economies) in order to avoid autocorrelation
problems. Furthermore, we have performed a convergence test for each spe-
cification. Columns four and seven in Table 3.5 report the p–values of Geweke’s
χ2–test (see Geweke (1992)). We can never reject the null of convergence at con-
ventional significance levels. Therefore, we are rather confident that our posterior
distributions have converged.
Let us first consider the estimates of parameter ψ. We do not only find het-
erogeneity with respect to the choice of the model but also regarding the country
group. What is striking is thatψ is considerably higher in the benchmark economy
than in the model featuring foreign currency debt. Thus, once we introduce liab-
ility dollarisation as a further form of capital market imperfections, the estimated
debt–elasticity of interest rates becomes less pronounced.24 This is particularly
the case for the Mexican economy, where we observe an extreme discrepancy in ψ
24Admittedly, this finding is not very surprising. In the liability dollarisation setup, variation
in the interest rate can additionally be attributed to exchange rates fluctuations. Compare the
interest rate rules in equations (3.13) and (3.23). Since real exchange rates in EMEs tend to be
procyclical, volatility on the right–hand side of the interest rate rule unambiguously rises once
we introduce liability dollarisation, while it remains unchanged on the left–hand side, such that
factor ψ must decline.
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Table 3.5: Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters
Posterior Posterior χ2 Posterior Posterior χ2
Median 90% Bands Test Median 90% Bands Test
Emerging Market Economies
Mexico
Benchmark Liability Dollarisation
ψ 4.342 [3.315,4.885] 0.27 0.216 [0.0880,0.488] 0.96
ρz 0.622 [0.487,0.744] 0.58 0.708 [0.5741,0.828] 0.50
ρg 0.751 [0.637,0.845] 0.58 0.790 [0.6316,0.890] 0.26
ρc 0.689 [0.458,0.875] 0.37 0.547 [0.3648,0.726] 0.21
σ2z 0.034 [0.028,0.043] 0.91 0.036 [0.0289,0.044] 0.79
σ2g 0.040 [0.031,0.052] 0.26 0.029 [0.0213,0.039] 0.83
σ2c 0.128 [0.082,0.201] 0.89 0.189 [0.1056,0.370] 0.45
South Africa
Benchmark Liability Dollarisation
ψ 1.664 [1.115,2.668] 0.31 0.275 [0.1578,0.420] 0.93
ρz 0.918 [0.874,0.958] 0.50 0.782 [0.6795,0.863] 0.92
ρg 0.827 [0.767,0.886] 0.86 0.797 [0.6900,0.869] 0.95
ρc 0.626 [0.442,0.815] 0.43 0.654 [0.4663,0.798] 0.59
σ2z 0.015 [0.014,0.018] 0.85 0.020 [0.0172,0.023] 0.91
σ2g 0.012 [0.010,0.014] 0.22 0.016 [0.0123,0.021] 0.86
σ2c 0.082 [0.059,0.110] 0.34 0.086 [0.0579,0.137] 0.56
Turkey
Benchmark Liability Dollarisation
ψ 4.067 [2.743,4.830] 0.50 0.455 [0.1259,1.182] 0.86
ρz 0.691 [0.552,0.803] 0.25 0.648 [0.5124,0.763] 0.24
ρg 0.629 [0.508,0.741] 0.46 0.705 [0.5614,0.811] 0.10
ρc 0.646 [0.428,0.822] 0.49 0.507 [0.3384,0.655] 0.48
σ2z 0.062 [0.049,0.078] 0.87 0.059 [0.0455,0.075] 0.49
σ2g 0.080 [0.060,0.107] 0.14 0.074 [0.0528,0.101] 0.66
σ2c 0.201 [0.114,0.384] 0.12 0.192 [0.1026,0.428] 0.20
Developed Economies
Canada Sweden
ψ 2.335 [1.646,3.573] 0.14 2.490 [1.486,4.103] 0.89
ρz 0.901 [0.852,0.948] 0.38 0.885 [0.829,0.939] 0.95
ρg 0.757 [0.676,0.832] 0.91 0.597 [0.488,0.706] 0.15
ρc 0.920 [0.860,0.958] 0.53 0.738 [0.523,0.878] 0.53
σ2z 0.013 [0.011,0.015] 0.70 0.022 [0.018,0.025] 0.46
σ2g 0.009 [0.008,0.011] 0.56 0.018 [0.015,0.022] 0.80
σ2c 0.047 [0.038,0.058] 0.88 0.074 [0.055,0.102] 0.55
Switzerland
ψ 0.165 [0.141,0.193] 0.54
ρz 0.880 [0.826,0.931] 0.55
ρg 0.596 [0.486,0.699] 0.52
ρc 0.697 [0.515,0.835] 0.92
σ2z 0.014 [0.013,0.016] 0.48
σ2g 0.012 [0.010,0.014] 0.89
σ2c 0.093 [0.067,0.129] 0.25
Notes: Results are based on 150,000 draws from the posterior distribution of which for EMEs the first 100,000 and for
developed economies the first 125,000 draws were burned. To avoid autocorrelation issues, we only keep every 10th draw
for developed economies, and every 25th for EMEs. The χ2 figure denotes the p–value of Geweke’s χ2–test for convergence
(4% taper). Variances are reported in percentages.
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across models. For instance, evaluated at the median of the posterior distribution,
a slight increase in the external debt to income ratio of merely one percentage point
lifts the cost of borrowing by as much as 4.34 percentage points in the benchmark
economy, whereas in the extended model interest rates rise by only 0.22 percent-
age points. In light of this simple numerical exercise, the model with foreign
currency debt seems to deliver debt–elasticities that are more reasonable in terms
of their economic significance.
Looking at the benchmark economy, our estimation results suggest that the
magnitude of reduced form financial frictions is more severe in EMEs than in
developed economies. In fact, apart from South Africa, the mode of the posterior
distribution of ψ obtained for EMEs is greater than its counterpart in the group
of developed countries. In general, our findings for EMEs are to some extent
consistent with the results reported by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010). On the one
hand, our estimates for Mexico and Turkey in the benchmark model indicate a
perceptibly higher debt–elasticity of the interest rate compared to their study’s
findings for Argentina. On the other hand, the elasticity obtained in the liability
dollarisation framework is lower for all three EMEs than the one documented by
Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010).
Turning to the parameters of the structural processes, we find that autocorrel-
ation coefficients tend to be relatively high. This is especially the case for South
Africa. By and large, however, we do not find large differences in the persistence
parameters both across models and countries. For the group of emerging markets,
the median of ρg, the parameter governing the persistence of the non–stationary
productivity process, ranges from about 0.6 to 0.8. These estimates are clearly
higher than those reported by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Garcı´a-Cicco et al.
(2010). Nonetheless, they fall into the range of the results obtained by Chang and
Fe´rnandez (2013) and Boz et al. (2011) for Mexico as well as Nguyen (2011) for the
United States.
Interestingly, the variances of our structural shocks seem to differ between
models and country groups. Estimated variances of the two technology pro-
cesses are generally higher in EMEs than in advanced economies. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) highlight the necessity of a high standard deviation of the per-
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manent relative to transitory productivity shock in their model in order to account
for certain business cycle phenomena in EMEs. In the benchmark model, we in-
deed find a higher ratio of volatilities σgσz for EMEs, except South Africa, than for
developed economies. However, our estimation exercise suggests a much lower
relative volatility of trend shocks in EMEs compared to Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007).25 What is more, we find that the ratio of standard deviations at the median
of the posterior is even lower in the model with liability dollarisation than in the
benchmark model for Mexico and Turkey, while it is the same in both model ver-
sions for South Africa.26 Nonetheless, as we will demonstrate in Section 3.6, our
model with liability dollarisation performs reasonably well in matching business
cycle patterns in EMEs despite a relatively low σgσz .
3.5.2 Model Fit
Next, we analyse the importance of the structural part relative to the off–model
part in driving the dynamics of the observable variables. For this purpose, Fig-
ure 3.3 depicts the fraction of the forecast error variance attributed to structural
shocks, i.e. permanent and transitory technology as well as foreign demand
shocks, confronted to the fraction explained by the off–model dynamics. While
evaluating the respective setup at the median of the posterior distribution, we
compute the mean forecast error variance decomposition across all EMEs in both
the benchmark economy and the model with liability dollarisation. This allows us
to study the extent to which our structural model is able to capture the dynamics
in our observables. Hence, we can easily assess and compare the fit of our two
25Looking at the median of the posterior distributions, we calculate a ratio of volatilities σgσz
equal to 0.8321, 0.9045, and 0.9258 for Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, respectively. In the
benchmark (liability dollarisation) model, we get a ratio of 1.0847 (0.8975) for Mexico, 0.8944
(0.8944) for South Africa, and 1.1359 (1.1199) for Turkey. For a comparison, GMM estimates
obtained by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) imply ratios as high as 4.0189 for Mexico and as low as
0.7460 for Canada. To gauge the relative importance of trend shocks, these authors calculate the
random walk component of the Solow residual, which also takes the persistence of shocks into
account. The size of the random walk component in our estimation can be found in Appendix B.
26What is striking is that estimation results for South Africa are in various aspects different
from those obtained for Mexico and Turkey. This peculiarity might be explained by the fact that
in contrast do other emerging markets, South Africa has had deep and well developed financial
markets for decades. Also, as pointed out by Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005), it is one of
the few emerging markets which traditionally has been able to issue bonds denoted in their own
currency on international capital markets.
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Figure 3.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Model Comparison
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Notes: Mean forecast error variance decomposition across all EMEs. Results are based on
median outcomes of the respective posterior distributions.
setups.
The graph reveals that the liability dollarisation setup outperforms the bench-
mark model in accounting for the variation in output, consumption, and real
exchange rates at all forecast horizons. The superiority of the framework with li-
ability dollarisation is most perceivable for consumption. Yet we also observe that
the benchmark model explains a larger portion of the variability in real interest
rates. We explain this peculiar result for the real interest rate by a change in the
importance of interest rate shocks once we augment the model with liability dol-
larisation. Recall that both our models abstract from any exogenous disturbances
in the interest rate like world interest rate or country premium shocks. Nonethe-
less, our estimation procedure implicitly controls for such interest rate shocks by
the inclusion of a dynamic measurement error. In light of this interpretation, our
exercise suggests that once countries can only borrow in foreign currency, interest
rate shocks apparently become more important.27 By and large, we therefore infer
27Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), and Chang and
Fe´rnandez (2013) have augmented their SOE models with interest rate shocks. These authors
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that the model with liability dollarisation fits the data in EMEs better than the
benchmark setup.
Furthermore, estimation results are generally in strong favour of our theoret-
ical framework. Though being quite stylised, the structural model performs very
well, especially in capturing the dynamics of the main macroeconomic aggreg-
ates, i.e. output and consumption. Regarding exchange rates, we observe that
only about 20 to 30 percent of the variation can be attributed to shocks specified
in the theoretical model. This finding is owed to the fact that our models cannot
produce exchange rate volatilities as high as we observe in the data.
3.6 Model Analysis
This section examines in how far our theoretical model helps us in understanding
macroeconomic dynamics in emerging markets. As the previous section has
demonstrated, the model with liability dollarisation outperforms the benchmark
setup in fitting the data. Hence, we confidently treat the liability dollarisation
framework as the more appropriate model for EMEs and focus on the analysis
of the extended setup for this country group. For comparison, we analyse the
benchmark model for EMEs in Appendix B.
We begin with implementing a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD)
to assess the relative importance of different shocks in explaining macroeconomic
fluctuations. We then turn to an impulse response analysis of the three structural
shocks in our liability dollarisation setup. Subsequently, we compare model im-
plied business cycle moments with their empirical counterparts to demonstrate
that our model succeeds in replicating various stylised business cycle facts. Fi-
nally, we show the model’s ability to account for the sudden stop in Mexico’s
capital inflows during the Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995.
stress the merits of this model extension for explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging
markets. In particular, Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013) show that interest rate shocks are amplified
by financial frictions. This underpins our finding that the off–model dynamics of interest rates
play a greater role in the setup with liability dollarisation.
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3.6.1 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In what follows, we study the relative contribution of various shocks in driving
the dynamics in our theoretical economy. For this purpose, we perform a forecast
error variance decomposition of the structural part of our model evaluated at the
median of the posterior distributions for each country.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plot the average FEVD of selected variables across all EMEs
and developed countries, respectively.28 Certain patterns are worth emphasising.
First, in both emerging markets and developed countries, transitory shocks are
the driving force behind output in the short–run. Looking at the developed
world, we observe this particular feature not only in the short–run but also in the
long–run. In EMEs, on the contrary, the permanent productivity process gains
importance over longer horizons and eventually becomes the major determinant
of output fluctuations in the long–run. Moreover, in both cohorts, trend shocks
predominantly account for consumption variation over all forecast horizons. But
permanent shocks are relatively more important for consumption fluctuations in
EMEs than in advanced economies.
Second, transitory technology disturbances generally play a minor role for the
dynamics in the cost of borrowing. It is essentially growth shocks that account
for interest rate variations in advanced countries. In EMEs, however, foreign
demand shocks also seem to govern interest rate dynamics to a non–negligible
extent, especially in the short–run. This finding indicates that changes in external
demand may have important feedback effects on the interest rate in emerging
markets.
Third, both transitory productivity and foreign demand disturbances explain
a considerable share of the variation in the real exchange rate in industrialised eco-
nomies. By contrast, it is permanent shocks that dominate relative international
price movements in EMEs over all forecast horizons.
Finally, this predominance of trend shocks in emerging markets is even more
striking if we look at the FEVD of the current account to output ratio. Figure
3.4 suggests that virtually all fluctuation in CAY can be attributed to permanent
28Forecast error variance decompositions for all six countries, as well as for both models for the
cohort of EMEs, can be found in the Appendix B.
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Figure 3.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Emerging Market Economies
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Figure 3.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Developed Economies
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productivity shocks. Similarly, more than 60 percent of the forecast error variance
of the valuation effects to GDP ratio is determined by innovations to the non–
stationary technology process. Foreign demand shocks account for about one
third of the variation in VALY , while the influence of transitory technology shocks
again is trifling.
In a nutshell, our exercise suggests that transitory productivity shocks are
far more important in explaining fluctuations of macroeconomic aggregates in
industrialised countries compared to EMEs. As opposed to Garcı´a-Cicco et al.
(2010) and Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013), we conclude that even though we account
for financial frictions in our model, both transitory and, above all, permanent
disturbances play a role in explaining business cycle variations in EMEs. This in
turn is concurrent with the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) who argue that
macroeconomic fluctuations in EMEs are mainly driven by trend shocks. Thus,
we largely find support for their famous hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend”.29
3.6.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Next, we shed more light on the mechanics of our model describing EMEs. To this
end, we parametrise the liability dollarisation setup at the median of the posterior
distributions and compute impulse responses to the three structural shocks for
each country.
Permanent versus Transitory Productivity Shocks
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 plot selected impulse responses to a one percent permanent
and transitory productivity disturbance, respectively.
A positive trend shock leads to an increase in consumption and foreign debt
relative to income. On the contrary, the effects on CY and
D
Y are reverse following a
positive transitory shock. These opposite responses follow from the optimal sav-
ings behaviour of the representative consumer and have the same interpretation
29In a recent study, Naoussi and Tripier (2013) estimate the framework of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) for a number of developed, emerging markets, and developing economies. They find that
permanent shocks are much more important in developing countries and emerging markets than
in advanced economies. Therefore, their results corroborate the notion that “the cycle is the trend”,
too.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent permanent productivity shock in the model with
liability dollarisation for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior
distribution.
Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses – Transitory Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent transitory productivity shock in the model with
liability dollarisation for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior
distribution.
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as in the model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). After a positive growth shock,
households do not only realise higher income today but also anticipate higher
income in the future. The expectation of higher future income is due to the fact
that (i) the positive impact on productivity is permanent and does not vanish over
time, (ii) adjustment costs imply a gradual change in capital, and (iii) in addition,
growth shocks are persistent (ρg > 0). Since agents prefer a smooth consumption
path over time, it is optimal to raise consumption by more than the initial increase
in output. In fact, households borrow on international capital markets in order
to finance their optimal consumption plan and additional investment, which ex-
plains the excess response of debt relative to GDP. In contrast, this consumption
smoothing rationale also induces households to curb international borrowing, i.e.
to save after a positive transitory shock, because income is expected to revert to
its long–run equilibrium path in the future. As a result, consumption reacts less
strongly than output, such that CY falls on impact.
A permanent shock also reduces the price of the composite consumption good
p, whereas a temporary productivity innovation raises the price level. This can
be explained as follows. Positive technology shocks lead to instantaneous jumps
in income. As explained above, if shocks are permanent, people do not only
benefit from higher income today but also anticipate even higher income in the
future. Hence, households sharply raise their demand for home–produced goods
(in form of consumption and investment) on impact. This increase in demand
actually overshoots the initial rise in supply, which drives up the price of home–
produced goods. As a consequence, the relative price of composite consumption
expressed in terms of home–produced goods p falls. On the contrary, the initial
increase in demand falls short of the one in supply after a transitory shock, such
that the price of home–produced goods must decline in equilibrium and the
relative price of total consumption p rises.
Due to imperfect substitutability between home and foreign goods the relative
change of the domestic price of the foreign good pF must always be stronger than
the one of the price of the overall consumption index p. This follows immediately
from the definition of the price index in equation (3.9). As a consequence, the real
exchange rate in equation (3.14) appreciates (depreciates) following a positive
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trend (transitory) productivity shock.
The response of the real interest rate is in principle ambiguous. A higher
expected debt to income ratio after a permanent shock puts an upward pressure
on the interest rate. At the same time, however, the associated real appreciation
reduces the debt burden, which dampens the increase in the interest rate. Inter-
estingly, our results suggest that the real appreciation effect outweighs the debt to
income ratio effect in the case of Mexico, while the effects largely offset each other
in South Africa and Turkey. Regarding the reaction after a temporary productivity
shock, we witness a fall in the real interest rate in all three countries.
Irrespective of its nature, a positive productivity shock induces households
to consume more. Consequently, consumption of both home and foreign goods
goes up, too. As described above, the price of foreign goods relative to home
goods pF falls after a positive trend shock. This means that the rest of the world
experiences a real depreciation and thus demands less goods produced in the
home country c?H (see equation (3.15)). In sum, the home country exports less,
while at the same time the value of its imports increases, such that net exports
decline. In contrast, domestic exports rise after a transitory shock because of a
real appreciation abroad. Hence, the increase in both imports and exports leave
the overall impact on the trade balance unclear. In our exercise at hand, these
two counteracting effects largely cancel out, such that we observe a rather weak
response of the net exports to output ratio.
The deterioration of the trade balance together with higher interest payments
on foreign debt translates into a worsening of the current account to income
ratio after a trend shock. Furthermore, the associated real appreciation reduces
the amount of outstanding foreign debt and therefore initially generates positive
valuation effects (see equation (3.26)). The change in the net foreign asset position
in (3.22) is given by the sum of the current account and valuation effects. As a
result, positive valuation effects in fact dampen the negative change in foreign
assets induced by the fall in the current account. In the case of Mexico, these
valuation effects exceed the drop in the current account, such that the value of net
foreign assets actually goes up on impact.
The response of CAY to a transitory shock is slightly positive in Mexico and
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Turkey, but negative in South Africa. In Mexico, for instance, the fall in interest
payments on foreign debt obligations more than compensates the deterioration
of the trade balance, such that there is a positive reaction of the current account.
Likewise, the real depreciation leads to negative valuation effects, which have a
negative impact on the net foreign asset position. What is striking is that these
external balance sheet effects are strong enough to generate a fall in net foreign
assets in countries where we observe an initial increase in the current account,
namely Mexico and Turkey.
Foreign Demand Shock
Figure 3.8 displays impulse responses to a one percent increase in foreign con-
sumption. By and large, outcomes do not vary substantially across countries.
A positive shock to foreign consumption c? directly translates into a rise in
domestic exports c?H. Consequently, net exports increase on impact. Furthermore,
higher demand for domestically produced goods, ceteris paribus, puts an upward
pressure on the price of home goods such that the relative prices of foreign goods
pF and composite consumption p fall. Since the relative drop in pF prevails the
decrease in p, the real exchange rate appreciates.
The favourable movement in the real exchange rate entails a positive wealth
effect, which induces domestic households to consume more. As a matter of fact,
the relative increase in consumption c is larger than the one in output y, such that
the consumption to GDP ratio rises.30 Also, households substitute consumption of
relatively more expensive home goods cH for relatively cheaper foreign goods cF.
This somewhat dampens the positive reaction of the trade balance and explains
its reversal in the periods after the shock.
In addition, the external debt to income ratio falls. Although consumption
becomes cheaper, real appreciation drives up the price of consumption today
expressed in units of consumption tomorrow (see equation (3.22)). Agents know
that the demand shock is only temporary and anticipate a real depreciation in
the future. Therefore, they have an incentive to save more, i.e they reduce their
30The increase in output initiated by higher foreign demand for home–produced goods is
dampened by lower domestic absorption (i.e. lower domestic consumption of the home good and
lower investment).
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Responses – Foreign Demand Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one percent foreign demand shock in the model with liability
dollarisation for all EMEs evaluated at the median of the respective posterior distribution.
international debt holdings.31 A lower DY , along with an appreciated real exchange
rate, pushes down the real interest rate. The resulting cut in interest payments
plus higher net exports lead to an increase in the current account, which in turn
increases the domestic foreign asset position. Positive valuation effects, originated
by real appreciation, eventually boost the improvement of the external balance
sheet.
Stabilising or Destabilising Valuation Effects?
Our impulse response analysis illustrates that the impact of valuation effects on
the net foreign asset position depends on the nature of the underlying shock. On
the one hand, valuation effects mitigate the change in net foreign assets induced
by the decline in the current account following a permanent productivity shock.
Hence, they have a stabilising impact on the external balance sheet in this case. On
the other hand, valuation effects amplify the influence of the current account on
31We can think of domestic households investing in foreign goods by reducing the amount of
international debt. In other words, they go long in foreign goods.
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net foreign assets after a foreign demand shock. Regarding transitory technology
shocks, the effect is generally unclear. In our exercise, transitory productivity
shocks entail external balance sheet effects that counteract the reaction of the
current account in Mexico and Turkey, but reinforce it in South Africa. Having
said this, our findings conflict with the implications of the model of Nguyen
(2011), which predicts stabilising (amplifying) valuation effects after a transitory
(permanent) technology shock.
3.6.3 Business Cycle Moments
In this subsection, we gauge our structural model’s ability to reproduce various
business cycle patterns. To this end, we simulate the respective model evaluated
at the median of the posterior distributions for each country. We generate data
covering a time span of 100 periods and subsequently compute various moments
based on the detrended series of our variables. On the whole, we repeat this
exercise 5,000 times. Table 3.6 compares empirical moments with their model
generated counterparts, which correspond to the median across all simulations.
Empirical moments are calculated using quarterly real data from the IFS, apart
from those involving valuation effects for which only annual data from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) are available. All series, except for the net exports to output
ratio and valuation effects, have been logged, seasonally adjusted and filtered
using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 1,600.
Consistent with the data, the model predicts generally higher standard de-
viations of income, consumption, and the net exports to output ratio in EMEs
than in advanced economies. Hence, our theoretical economy can well account
for the empirical regularity that macroeconomic fluctuations are more severe in
emerging markets as compared to developed countries.
Furthermore, the model is not only able to generate excess volatility in con-
sumption relative to output in EMEs, but also matches relative consumption
volatilities in advanced countries quite well. This observation raises the ques-
tion of why? On the one hand, as shown in Section 3.6.1, our estimation results
suggest that macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs are predominantly driven by the
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Table 3.6: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Emerging Market Economies
Mexico S. Africa Turkey
σ(Y) 2.42 5.31 1.60 4.25 3.70 6.30
σ(C) 3.68 6.71 2.46 5.08 5.72 7.65
σ(NX/Y) 6.63 1.58 4.04 0.95 3.42 1.46
σ(e) 9.63 7.71 8.70 5.05 9.54 7.47
σ(C)/σ(Y) 1.52 1.57 1.54 1.41 1.55 1.45
ρ(NX/Y,Y) −0.17 −0.10 −0.40 −0.19 −0.56 −0.27
ρ(e,NX/Y) −0.31 −0.62 −0.12 −0.43 −0.45 −0.48
ρ((NX/Y)t, (NX/Y)t−1) 0.97 0.69 0.85 0.67 0.84 0.57
ρ((VAL/Y)t, (CA/Y)t) −0.58 −0.34 −0.75 −0.30 −0.05 −0.38
ρ((VAL/Y)t, et) 0.45 0.29 −0.31 0.28 0.19 0.30
Developed Economies
Canada Sweden Switzerland
σ(Y) 1.42 4.13 1.75 4.57 1.76 3.68
σ(C) 1.36 4.12 1.51 4.00 1.44 3.11
σ(NX/Y) 1.96 0.54 2.77 0.45 3.74 0.65
σ(e) 3.41 5.34 8.81 4.61 7.94 5.53
σ(C)/σ(Y) 0.96 1.00 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.71
ρ(NX/Y,Y) 0.01 −0.36 −0.01 −0.39 −0.17 0.27
ρ(e,NX/Y) −0.03 −0.21 −0.07 −0.14 −0.02 −0.59
ρ((NX/Y)t, (NX/Y)t−1) 0.93 0.28 0.94 0.15 0.84 0.49
Notes: Standard deviations are expressed in percentages except for the model implied standard
deviation of the net exports to output ratio, which is expressed in percentage points. All series,
except for the net exports over output ratio and valuation effects, are real per capita variables,
have been logged, seasonally adjusted and filtered using the HP filter with smoothing parameter
λ = 1,600. Theoretical moments are based on sample moments of model generated data. For the
group of EMEs, we have used the liability dollarisation framework. Each theoretical economy is
simulated 5,000 times with a sample size of 100. Median outcomes are reported.
non–stationary productivity component. On the other hand, the preceding sub-
section has demonstrated that consumption overshoots output after a permanent
technology shock. It is the interplay of these two features that explains the excess
volatility of consumption.
Our model also succeeds in generating a negative correlation between the
net exports to GDP ratio and income in EMEs. Yet it struggles to match this
moment from a quantitative point of view. In fact, the model understates the
countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio in EMEs, but it also overstates
this countercyclicality for the cohort of advanced economies, except Switzerland.
Recall that permanent technology shocks induce households to purchase more
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foreign goods, while the real depreciation experienced by the rest of the world
cuts the external demand for home goods. This leads to a deterioration of the
home country’s trade balance and explains why our model generates a negative
correlation between the net exports to GDP ratio and income. The fact that we
cannot replicate the high degree of countercyclicality of NXY in EMEs is due to the
relatively persistent non–stationary productivity process. Indeed, the higher the
autocorrelation of the permanent technology process, the weaker the countercyc-
licality of the trade balance. As a matter of fact, if trend shocks are persistent
enough, the income effect on labour supply induces households to work less after
a positive permanent shock. In this scenario, output falls, which actually implies
a positive correlation between income and net exports.32
Our model suggests that real exchange rates are in general more volatile in
EMEs than in developed economies. This prediction is in line with what we
observe in the data. Furthermore, the model reproduces the negative correlation
between the real exchange rate and the net exports to output ratio in EMEs. In
contrast, the benchmark model has difficulties in replicating the weak relationship
between these two variables in the group of industrialised countries.
A key contribution of the paper by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) is that their
model can account for the empirically observed downward sloping autocorrel-
ation function of NXY . Interestingly, our benchmark model exhibits a fairly low
first–order serial correlation of the net exports to income ratio in developed eco-
nomies, whereas the liability dollarisation setup matches this moment better for
EMEs. As Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) point out, it is important to allow for a ψ
that is significantly different from zero in order to obtain a falling autocorrelation
function of NXY . The reason for that is as follows. For instance, after a positive
permanent shock, households increase their international debt holdings and run a
trade balance deficit. In case of a high debt–elasticity ψ, the rise in debt relative to
GDP in turn raises the real interest rate. This induces households to consume less
and save more, which leads to an improvement of the trade balance. On the other
32Accordingly, our model’s weak performance regarding the countercyclicality of the trade
balance might be explained by our preference specification. As we have already mentioned in
Section 3.3, our choice of Cobb–Douglas period utility implies an income effect on labour supply.
In contrast, other researchers in this strand of the literature use GHH preferences, which do not
feature income effects on labour supply.
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hand, ifψ is close to zero (as for example in the calibration of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007)) the feedback effect of changes in DY on the cost of borrowing is virtually
shut down, which results in an autocorrelation function of NXY that resembles a
near unit root process. In fact, our estimates of ψ in the benchmark economy are
quite high compared to our liability dollarisation framework. This might help
us to explain why the model understates the first–order autocorrelation of NXY ,
especially for advanced economies.
Table 3.6 also provides meaningful insights with respect to the role of valu-
ation effects in EMEs. Not surprisingly, they are positively correlated with the
real exchange rate in our model. This feature is consistent with our descriptive
findings for Mexico and Turkey. More importantly, our model predicts a negative
relationship between valuation effects and the current account in all three EMEs.
As a matter of fact, this is line with the negative correlation between VALY and
CA
Y
in the data, especially for Mexico and South Africa. Consequently, we find that,
on average, valuation effects have a stabilising impact on the net foreign asset
position. In light of our discussion in Section 3.6.2, this outcome can be explained
by the fact that EMEs are predominantly exposed to trend shocks.
3.6.4 Mexico’s Tequila Crisis
Finally, we investigate the performance of our model in crisis times. Over the
last two decades, many EMEs have experienced severe balance of payments
(BOP) crises, such as Mexico during the Tequila crisis of 1994–1995; Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand during the Asian crisis of 1997;
or Argentina in 2001. A typical feature of BOP crises in emerging markets is the
sudden stop in capital inflows, which usually brings about a reversal in current
accounts and net exports, a drop in output, consumption, and investment, as well
as exchange rate depreciations (see Mendoza (2010)).
In what follows, we examine whether our theoretical framework is capable of
replicating Mexico’s sudden stop during the Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995. To do
so, we adopt a similar approach as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). We calibrate
our liability dollarisation model at the median of the posterior distributions for
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Figure 3.9: Mexico’s Tequila Crisis of 1994–1995
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Notes: Actual versus predicted net exports to output ratio for the Mexican economy between the
first quarter of 1993 and the fourth quarter of 1997.
Mexico. We use data on output, consumption, real interest rates, and real ex-
change rates and implement the Kalman filter to generate the unobservable state
variables. Subsequently, we feed the obtained states into the model to compute
time series for our control variables.
Figure 3.9 shows the true and predicted net exports to output ratio in Mexico
between 1993Q1 and 1997Q4. As is evident from the figure, our model can
reproduce the reversal in the Mexican trade balance between 1994 and 1995. At
a first glance, however, our model seems to struggle to quantitatively match the
dramatic change in NXY . It predicts an increase in the net exports to output ratio by
2.2 percentage points between the third quarter of 1994 and the second quarter of
1995, whereas the actual net exports to output ratio increased by as much as 7.7
percentage points. Note, however, that the steady state level of the trade balance
to GDP ratio is much lower than its empirical counterpart.33. If we look at the
33Recall from Section 3.4.2 that we do not pin down the steady state net exports to output ratio
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change of NXY relative to its long–run mean rather than the absolute change, we
actually find that our model performs quite well also from a quantitative point of
view.
The remaining question is then why does our framework succeed in explaining
the sudden stop in capital flows. The shock series produced by the Kalman filter
indicate that the Mexican economy was hit by a strong negative permanent shock
in the fourth quarter of 1994. As we have discussed in Section 3.6.2, a negative
trend shock leads to an increase in the net exports to output ratio. In addition, a
large negative permanent shock causes a sharp fall in output and consumption,
as well as a real depreciation, which is also in line with what we observe in the
data. What is more, our liability dollarisation model suggests that sudden stops
are associated with negative valuation effects. As a result, balance sheet effects
actually dampened the increase in Mexico’s net foreign asset position during the
Tequila crisis according to the model.
3.7 Conclusion
We develop a small open economy DSGE model featuring a non–stationary pro-
ductivity process, differentiated home and foreign goods, and endogenous ex-
change rate movements to study the importance of financial frictions and trend
shocks in explaining macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. We also extend our
benchmark setup and introduce liability dollarisation as a special form of finan-
cial market distortions in emerging markets. This model modification allows us
to analyse the impact of valuation effects on the external balance sheet in these
countries.
In the empirical part of the paper, we estimate our model using Bayesian
techniques for a group of EMEs. Furthermore, in order to investigate the difference
between emerging and advanced economies, we perform our estimation exercise
also for a group of developed countries. We account for off–model dynamics
by allowing for a (vector–)autoregressive measurement error in our estimation
procedure. As a matter of fact, this constitutes to a novel approach in this strand
in our calibration exercise.
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of the literature.
Our results show that the co–existence of financial frictions and trend shocks
helps to explain macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. In particular, incorporating
liability dollarisation in our framework improves the model fit. Our analysis sug-
gests that trend shocks are the driving force behind macroeconomic fluctuations
in EMEs. Therefore, we find support for the famous hypothesis that “the cycle is
the trend”, even though we include financial market distortions in our setup.
Our liability dollarisation model succeeds in replicating certain stylised facts
about emerging market business cycles: (i) it predicts more severe macroeco-
nomic fluctuations in EMEs than in developed countries, (ii) it matches the excess
volatility of consumption relative to output, (iii) it qualitatively reproduces the
countercyclicality of the net exports to output ratio, although it falls short to
match this moment on a quantitative basis, and (iv) it can replicate the sudden
stop of capital inflows during the Mexican Tequila Crisis between 1994 and 1995.
Interestingly, our liability dollarisation framework suggests that valuation effects
on average have a stabilising impact on the net foreign asset position in EMEs.
In this vein, we also contribute to a currently active line of research on external
balance sheet effects, which so far has mainly focused on developed economies.
Admittedly, the introduction of liability dollarisation as a from of financial
frictions in our model is fairly simple. One could go one step further and study
the implications liability dollarisation in the presence of other credit market dis-
tortions. In particular, we could build on the literature on credit frictions in
macroeconomics (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999)) and
incorporate collateral constraints in the model. In that case, the amount of debt
depends on the agent’s net worth, which is subject to exchange rate variations due
to liability dollarisation. It would then be interesting to see how the combination
of amplification effects, resulting from the imposition of collateral constraints, and
liability dollarisation affects macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs.
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Chapter 4
Current Account Dynamics in
Emerging Markets: Is the Cycle
really the Trend?
4.1 Introduction
Macroeconomic fluctuations in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) exhibit cer-
tain patterns which are distinct from those in advanced economies. For instance,
business cycles in EMEs are more volatile than in the developed world, con-
sumption volatility exceeds output volatility, and current accounts as well as net
exports are strongly countercyclical. What is more, emerging markets are ex-
posed to substantial reversals in international capital inflows. This observation is
frequently referred to as the “sudden stop” phenomenon, a term introduced by
Calvo (1998).1
A burgeoning number of studies have been devoted to investigate these com-
mon characteristics. One important line of research analyses real business cycle
(RBC) Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models of a small open
economy (SOE) in the spirit of Mendoza (1991) to shed light on the macroeco-
nomic dynamics in emerging markets. In a prominent contribution, Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) develop a stochastic growth model featuring both permanent
and transitory productivity shocks. They estimate their model for two countries:
Mexico and Canada, which represent emerging market and advanced econom-
1These stylised facts about business cycles in emerging markets have been documented by a
large number of researchers. See, among others, Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007), Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010), Kose and Prasad (2010), and Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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ies, respectively, in their analysis. Their findings suggest that macroeconomic
fluctuations in Mexico are mainly driven by permanent shocks. In fact, this pre-
dominance of trend shocks explains the negative correlation between the current
account and income, the excess volatility of consumption relative to output as well
as the experience of a large current account reversal during the “Tequila Crisis”
of 1994–1995. Conversely, their exercise also shows that transitory shocks are
the key determinant of the Canadian business cycle. Hence, messrs Aguiar and
Gopinath deduce the hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend” in emerging markets.
The findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) have sparked a debate on the
role of permanent shocks for business cycles in EMEs. While some contributions
to the literature find support for this notion (see Naoussi and Tripier (2013) and
Chapter 3 of this thesis), others provide contradictory evidence. In particular, an
influential study by Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) challenges the conclusions drawn by
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). These authors highlight the importance of augment-
ing the SOE model with financial frictions in form of debt–elastic interest rates and
country risk premium shocks in order to explain business cycles in EMEs. They
estimate their model using very long time series of macroeconomic aggregates
for Argentina. Indeed, they find that macroeconomic fluctuations in Argentina
can almost completely be attributed to various transitory disturbances, whereas
permanent shocks play only a negligible role. Similarly, a recent paper by Chang
and Fe´rnandez (2013) shows that the model with trend shocks does a poor job in
matching the dynamics in macroeconomic data. Yet the introduction of certain
financial frictions in their theoretical framework improves the model fit consider-
ably. Likewise, Boz et al. (2011) analyse an SOE model in which households learn
to differentiate between permanent and transitory shocks. They argue that the
distinct business cycle patterns can be explained by more severe informational
frictions in EMEs as compared to advanced economies.
Our paper uses a different approach to examine whether the cycle is really the
trend in emerging markets. We follow the empirical literature on the intertemporal
approach to the current account and employ a structural time series model.2 Our
2See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for the canonical models of the intertemporal approach to
the current account. Furthermore, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) provide an early overview of both
theory and empirics of the intertemporal approach.
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analysis takes the theoretical framework of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) as a point
of departure. Their DSGE model imposes a cointegrating relationship between
macroeconomic aggregates. We exploit this long–run equilibrium behaviour of
the variables and scrutinise their hypothesis by estimating a structural Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM) for a range of EMEs.
Many contributions to the empirics of the intertemporal approach emphasise
the crucial role of the persistence of shocks and the distinction between global and
country–specific disturbances for understanding current account dynamics (see
Glick and Rogoff (1995), Hoffmann (2001b, 2003), Nason and Rogers (2002), and
Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012)). For this reason, we build on the approaches
of Hoffmann (2001a, 2013) and Kano (2008) and develop an identification scheme
of the VECM to identify permanent and transitory as well as global and country–
specific transitory shocks. In this vein, our study aims at bridging the gap between
two important strands of the literature on international macroeconomics, which
have hitherto been largely silent about each other, despite their apparent related-
ness. On the one hand, there is the research on general equilibrium modelling
to study business cycles in emerging markets. On the other hand, there is the
empirical literature on the intertemporal approach to the current account.
Our analysis is based on a trivariate VECM which contains the world interest
rate, the current account to output ratio, and GDP. This specification allows us to
establish a technique to identify three structural shocks: permanent, global trans-
itory, and country–specific transitory shocks. Before we take our identification
method to the data, we gauge its strength. To this end, we apply it to model
generated data. That is, we simulate the model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007),
extended by an exogenous world interest rate process, to generate artificial time
series which we subsequently use to estimate our structural VECM. Indeed, we
find that our methodology does a strikingly good job at extracting the true un-
derlying shocks. In addition, the structural VECM succeeds in replicating the
theoretically implied dynamics of the current account reasonably well.
Once we have validated our identification scheme, we implement it on data
for 15 EMEs. A key finding of our empirical exercise is that there is no common
explanation for the countercyclicality of the current account in emerging markets.
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In only half of the countries in our sample, the countercyclicality of the current ac-
count results from permanent shocks, whereas country–specific transitory shocks
account for this phenomenon in the other half of the countries. Interestingly, if
a country exhibits a fall in the current account after a permanent shock, it also
features an increase in the current account following an idiosyncratic transitory
shock, and vice versa.
We show that we can to some extent explain this finding within the framework
of the intertemporal model. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) do not incorporate any
explicit frictions in their model. But this does not mean that they completely
ignore frictions in their analysis. They argue that market distortions appear in the
Solow residual and manifest themselves in the permanent productivity process.
According to Chari et al. (2007), we can then interpret the trend productivity com-
ponent as a domestic efficiency wedge. Hence, we can think of countries in which
permanent shocks lead to a fall in the current account as being mainly charac-
terised by domestic frictions. On the other hand, if we augment the intertemporal
model with distortions in international borrowing and lending, it can also predict
a fall in the current account after a transitory shock. Thus, international frictions
might be more prevalent in those EMEs which exhibit a negative response of
the current account to idiosyncratic transitory disturbances. This interpretation,
in turn, is consistent with the story of Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and
Fe´rnandez (2013).
However, our empirical impulse response analysis also reveals a puzzle. In
several EMEs, a permanent shock leads to a capital outflow rather than a capital
inflow. At the same time, the short–run rise in income undershoots its long–
run increase after a trend shock in these countries. As a result, the observed
joint dynamics of the current account and output are not consistent with the
implications of the standard intertemporal model. That said, we need to think
about how we can enrich the model in order to explain this particular reaction of
the current account.
Finally, in line with the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), we show
that permanent shocks are the main source of output fluctuations in most EMEs.
However, there are also countries in which trend shocks play a relatively marginal
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role. What is striking is that the fraction of income variation that can be attributed
to permanent shocks is larger in countries in which the countercyclicality of the
current account is driven by permanent shocks. This finding provides further
support for our notion that the relative importance of domestic and international
frictions varies across EMEs.
By and large, our results suggest that although EMEs exhibit common busi-
ness cycle patterns, there is no common explanation for them. Macroeconomic
dynamics may be driven by permanent shocks in one country, but they are mainly
determined by transitory shocks in the other. Hence, we believe that it is hazard-
ous to generally assert that “the cycle is the trend” in emerging markets.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the stochastic growth
model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), slightly extended by a world interest
rate shock. In Section 4.3, we introduce the empirical model and describe our
identification scheme, which we validate using model generated data. In Section
4.4, we apply our methodology to identify permanent and transitory as well as
global and country–specific components in macroeconomic variables for a large
cross section of EMEs. Some concluding remarks appear in Section 4.5.
4.2 Theoretical Model
This section introduces the stochastic growth model, which we later use for the
validation of our identification strategy. We present the model developed by
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) but augment their setup with a global shock in form
of a world interest rate shock.
Consider a small open economy, which is inhabited by a unit measure of
identical households. The theoretical economy features a homogeneous final
good as well as an incomplete international capital market, such that there is
only one risk–free non–contingent financial asset available for trade. Production
technology manifests both a permanent and a transitory productivity process and
is characterised by the following Cobb–Douglas function
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α,
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where Yt, Kt, lt, and α ∈ (0, 1) denote aggregate output, capital input, labour
input, and the economy’s capital share, respectively. Variables zt and Γt capture
two different exogenous technology processes. On the one hand, the economy is
exposed to temporary changes in total factor productivity, which are governed by
zt. This stationary technology component follows an AR(1) process in logs:
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ), with 
z
t ∼ N(0, σ2z),
where |ρz| < 1 corresponds to the autoregressive coefficient and zt denotes the
error term with variance σ2z . On the other hand, the economy is also subject to
permanent changes in productivity. The non–stationary component in technology
is represented by the labour–augmenting productivity process Γt, which equals
the cumulative product of growth shocks g:
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, where gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ), with 
g
t ∼ N(0, σ2g).
The properties of the non–stationary technology process imply that (i) each real-
isation of gs has a permanent impact on Γt, ∀ t ≥ s, and (ii) the steady state gross
growth rate in the economy is given by µg. Parameter |ρg| < 1 determines the
persistence of the permanent productivity process and gt describes the shock term
which has a variance of σ2g.
The aggregate period resource constraint of the representative agent is
Yt +
Bt+1
(1 + rt)
= Ct + It + Bt,
where 11+rt , Ct, and It denote the price of foreign debt, household consumption,
and aggregate investment, respectively. In addition, Bt describes the stock of
foreign debt at date t carried over from period t − 1, whereas Bt+1 is the amount
of newly issued international bonds with a maturity of one period.
In this framework the country’s current account and net exports are equivalent.
The current account equals the change in the foreign asset position, which is
108
determined by the difference between savings and investment:
NXt = Yt − Ct − It = St − It = Bt − Bt+1(1 + rt) = CAt.
The evolution of the capital stock is subject to quadratic adjustment costs and
described by the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt,
where φ determines the weight of adjustment costs and δ is the depreciation rate.
Per construction, Yt, Ct, It, Kt, CAt, and Bt exhibit a stochastic trend. In order
to ensure a stationary system, we need to detrend these variables. Let xt denote
the stationary counterpart of Xt, which incorporates the stochastic trend. We can
easily detrend our relevant variables through division by trend productivity in
the previous period t − 1:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
.
As Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) point out, the equilibrium dynamics of
SOE models with incomplete capital markets feature a random walk behaviour of
international asset holdings. A convenient way to eliminate this unit root problem
is to introduce a debt–elastic interest rate. In this vein, we assume that the interest
rate on foreign debt borrowed at date t is determined by
1 + rt = R?t + ψ
(
exp (bt+1 − b) − 1) , (4.1)
where R?t is the gross world interest rate, b is the steady state value of detrended
debt, and ψ > 0 governs the debt elasticity of the interest rate.
We slightly extend the model by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and additionally
allow for an exogenous stochastic interest rate shock. To be more precise, we
assume that the world interest rate R?t follows an AR(1) process in logarithms:
log(R?t ) = (1 − ρR) log(R?) + ρR log(R?t−1) + Rt , with Rt ∼ N(0, σ2R),
where |ρR| < 1, R? is the steady state value of the gross world interest rate, and Rt
109
denotes the interest rate shock term.
Preferences of the representative household are described by a standard Cobb–
Douglas period utility function
u(Ct, lt) =
[
Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ
]1−σ
1 − σ ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the consumption weight in utility and σ governs the curvature
of period utility.
As a consequence, we can eventually state the stationary optimisation problem
of the representative agent as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,bτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(Γγ(1−σ)τ−1 u(cτ, lτ))
s.t. yτ + (1 − δ)kτ + gτbτ+1(1 + rτ) = cτ + gτkτ+1 +
φ
2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + bτ,
for given kt, bt, and the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
(
bt+1+ j∏ j
s=0(1+rs)
)
= 0, where
parameter β ∈ (0, 1) defines to the subjective discount factor. The solution to this
maximisation problem as well as a summary of all model equations can be found
in Appendix C.
4.3 Identification Approach
We now present our identification methodology. We begin with a description of
our approach to identify permanent and transitory as well as global and country–
specific shocks in macroeconomic time series. Subsequently, we apply our method
to model generated data in order to scrutinise its performance.
4.3.1 Econometric Model
In the theoretical model described in Section 4.2, macroeconomic aggregates Yt,
Ct, It, Kt, CAt, and Bt share a common stochastic trend. In other words, the
model imposes a cointegrating relationship on these variables. Let Xt form a
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multivariate process consisting of any combination of variables in our model. If
Xt comprises any of our non–stationary variables in the system, Xt is I(1) (i.e.
integrated of order one) and cointegrated with a cointegrating matrix β, such that
the linear combination β′Xt is I(0) (i.e integrated of order zero).3 Accordingly, the
process Xt has an error correction representation, which serves as the reduced
form econometric model in our analysis.
The general form of a VECM is
Γ(L)∆Xt = αβ′Xt−1 + t. (4.2)
The cointegrating matrix β is of dimension (n × r), where n denotes the number
of variables in the system and r is the cointegrating rank. t denotes the (n × 1)
vector of reduced form shocks with mean zero and variance covariance matrix Σ,
and α is the (n× r) loading matrix, which governs the adjustment to the long–run
equilibrium. Γ(L) = In −∑p−1i=1 ΓiLi is an (n × n) lag polynomial, where p denotes
the lag length of the associated VAR in levels.
4.3.2 Identification
Permanent versus Transitory Shocks
Let us first focus on the identification of permanent and transitory components
in our cointegrated system. To this end, we apply the methodology described in
Hoffmann (2001a).
We can use a multivariate version of the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decom-
position of our VECM in equation (4.2) to get
Xt = C(1)
t∑
l=0
l + C?(L)t, (4.3)
where C(1)
∑t
l=0 l is the stochastic trend component and C?(L)t is the transitory
3Note that we do not directly follow the original definition of cointegration by Engle and
Granger (1987), which requires all components of Xt to be I(1) in order to let Xt be I(1). Instead,
we rely on the broader definition by Johansen (1995) according to which the process Xt is I(1) if
the highest order of integration of any of its elements is one. This notion of cointegration allows
unit vectors as potential cointegrating vectors.
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component of Xt, respectively. Since β′Xt is I(0) in our case, equation (4.3) implies
that β′C(1) = 0. Accordingly, the long–run multiplier matrix C(1) =
∑∞
j=1 C j has
reduced rank h < n, such that there are r = n − h cointegrating relationships and
h common trends in the system. We can then write C(1) = BA′, where B and A
are (n × h) matrices of rank h. As a result, β′B must be equal to zero, such that
B = β⊥, which is the orthogonal complement of β. Moreover, we have C(1)α = 0
implying that A = α⊥, which denotes the orthogonal complement of α.
According to Johansen (1995), the long–run multiplier matrix can be derived
as
C(1) = β⊥
(
α⊥Γ(1)β⊥
)−1
α′⊥.
Pre–multiplication of equation (4.2) by α′⊥ eliminates all transitory dynamics in
the model, which are captured in the error correction term β′Xt−1, and thereby
yields the (h × 1) vector of permanent components:
α′⊥Γ(L)∆Xt = α
′
⊥t ≡ pit.
These permanent innovations correspond to the common trends in the system,
such that we can easily rewrite equation (4.3) as
Xt = β⊥
t∑
l=0
pil + C?(L)t,
which states the so–called Stock and Watson (1988) representation of cointegrated
variables. Moreover, if we require permanent and transitory innovations to be
orthogonal to one another, we can derive the vector of transitory shocks as
τt = α′Σ−1t.
Next, we want permanent and transitory shocks to be orthogonal among
themselves and to have unit variances. Since the orthogonal complement of α is
not uniquely defined, our isolation of permanent from transitory disturbances is
not unique either. Hence, we follow the approach of Hoffmann (2013) and choose
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normalisation matrices Spi and Sτ, such that
pit = S′piα
′
⊥t
τt = S′τα
′Σ−1t.
Unit variance of structural shocks requires that
Var(pit) = S′piα
′
⊥Σα⊥Spi = Ih
Var(τt) = S′τα
′Σ−1αSτ = Ir.
Accordingly, we have α′⊥Σα⊥ = S−1
′
pi S−1pi and α′Σ
−1α = S−1′τ S−1τ . We can then
use a Choleski decomposition of S−1′pi S−1pi and S−1
′
τ S−1τ to obtain the normalisation
matrices Spi and Sτ.
Eventually, we can derive a matrix
P = [Σα⊥Spi αSτ] , (4.4)
which maps our mutually orthogonal, unit variance permanent and transitory
shocks Θt = [pit τt]
′ into reduced form disturbances t:
PΘt = t.
Thus, we have completed the first stage of our identification strategy. Now
recall that our DSGE model features three exogenous shocks: a permanent pro-
ductivity shock, a temporary productivity shock, and a temporary world interest
rate shock. It is therefore appropriate to focus on a trivariate system (i.e. n = 3)
in order to identify these three structural shocks. Our identification method spe-
cified so far allows us to isolate the single common trend (h = 1) as well as the two
transitory shocks (r = n − h = 2). Accordingly, we can immediately identify the
permanent productivity shock. But how can we distinguish between technology
and interest rate shocks among the transitory components?
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Global versus Country–Specific Shocks
We follow Kano (2008) and Hoffmann (2013) and additionally impose short–run
identifying restrictions in order to find the two temporary structural shocks. To
this end, we consider the system Xt =
[
r?t
CAt
Yt
yt
]′
, where r?t ≡ log(R?t ) and
yt ≡ log(Yt). Since the current account and income exhibit the same stochastic
trend, the ratio of these two variables is stationary as is the world interest rate
r?t . Consequently, our system is cointegrated with a trivial cointegrating matrix
β =
[ 1 0 0
0 1 0
]′.
In our DSGE model, the world interest rate r?t follows an exogenous process
and is thus only driven by shocks to itself. Therefore, we identify the transitory
productivity shock as a country–specific, or idiosyncratic, shock, which has no
contemporaneous impact on the world interest rate. In contrast, the world interest
rate shock represents a global transitory shock and can have a contemporaneous
impact on all variables in the system.
Matrix P shows the impact responses to permanent and transitory shocks. In
particular, the (3 × 2) matrix αSτ determines the period zero responses to the
two transitory shocks. Hence, our identification of global and country–specific
temporary shocks imposes a restriction on αSτ, such that
αSτ =

? 0
? ?
? ?
 .
How can we achieve this form of αSτ? Note that our transitory shocks are
already orthogonal to each other. Thus, if we apply a QR decomposition of the
of the upper (2 × 2) part of αSτ, we preserve the orthogonality of shocks. At the
same time, however, it yields the desired zero entry in the upper right element
of αSτ.4 As a result, we obtain an adjusted matrix P˜ that rotates our vector
of structural shocks Θt, which comprises the permanent productivity shock pit,
the transitory global interest rate shock τgt , and the transitory country–specific
4See Appendix C for details on how we use the QR decomposition to obtain our identifying
restriction.
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productivity shock τct , into the vector of reduced form innovations t:
P˜Θt = P˜

pit
τgt
τct
 = t.
Obviously, pit, τ
g
t , and τ
c
t are the identified counterparts of gt, R
?
t , and zt, respect-
ively, in the DSGE model.5
4.3.3 Validation of the Identification Scheme
Before we take our identification method to the empirical data, we want to assess
its strength. For this purpose, we use the DSGE model presented in Section 4.2
as data generating process and construct artificial time series. Subsequently, we
apply our identification scheme to the generated data and check whether it can
track the true underlying shocks.
Our approach is as follows. First, we log–linearise the stationary system
of the DSGE model around its deterministic steady state and solve the model.
Second, we assign parameter values to quantify the theoretical framework. For
the sake of comparability, we follow Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and choose
their quarterly parametrisation for the Mexican economy.6 Calibrated parameter
values are summarised in Table 4.1. Third, we generate data for the stationary
variables in the model from which we can easily recover the time series of the
variables incorporating the stochastic trend.
Researchers in empirical macroeconomics usually do not know the pleasure
of working with long time series data. For that reason, we produce data sets
covering time spans of only 50 and 100 periods, respectively. This allows us to
5Note that our identification strategy does not rule out that the permanent shock has a con-
temporaneous effect on the world interest rate. While the world interest rate is only driven by
transitory world interest rate shocks in the theoretical model, permanent shocks clearly might
have an influence on the interest rate in the real data. In this sense, our identified permanent
shock includes both global and idiosyncratic components. We will elaborate on this point in
Section 4.4.
6These authors do not include an interest rate shock in their setup. To pin down the parameters
governing the exogenous world interest rate process, we estimate an AR(1) model for the US gross
real T–bill rate in logs. We use data from the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of 2003, which
is the same time period analysed by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
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Table 4.1: Calibration of the Theoretical Model
β discount factor 0.98 z mean of z process 1.00
γ consumption weight in utility 0.36 b steady state debt 0.10
σ curvature of utility 2.00 ρz persistence of z process 0.95
φ weight of adjustment costs 4.00 ρg persistence of g process 0.01
α capital share 0.32 ρR persistence of R? process 0.63
δ depreciation rate 0.05 σz std. deviation of z process 0.48
ψ debt elasticity 0.001 σg std. deviation of g process 2.81
µg steady state growth rate 1.0066 σR std. deviation of R? process 0.44
Notes: Standard deviations of structural shocks are expressed in percentages.
test how well the identification works in small samples. Finally, we repeat the
data generating procedure 500 times to obtain a wide variety of data sets.
For each simulation, we estimate our VECM model from equation (4.2) spe-
cifying Xt =
[
r?t
CAt
Yt
yt
]′
and including an unrestricted constant. In principle,
we do not know how many lags we should use for estimation. Therefore, we
choose lag lengths p varying from 1 to 4.7 As we have discussed above, theory
suggests a cointegrating matrix β =
[ 1 0 0
0 1 0
]′. Hence, we impose β and estimate our
VECM using Least Squares (LS). Once we have estimated the model, we employ
our methodology to identify the three structural shocks.
Correlation between True and Identified Shocks
Let us first look at the comovement of the true underlying shocks, which we
have used to generate the data, and the corresponding shocks identified in the
VECM. Table 4.2 displays summary statistics of the absolute correlation between
the respective shock series. At this point, it is important to highlight that our
structural innovations extracted from the VECM are unique only up to sign.
Accordingly, we consider the absolute value of correlation coefficients, because
we can only interpret their magnitudes but not their signs.
7Note that linearised DSGE models do not necessarily have a VAR representation. Studies by
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2007) and Ravenna (2007) discuss under which conditions this type
of models can be written in VAR form. Indeed, our stochastic growth model does not have a
finite order VAR representation for the multivariate process of output, current account, and the
world interest rate. Ravenna (2007) highlights that estimating a finite order VAR approximation
of the model may lead to biased results. Having said that, we believe that estimating a VECM
which is not perfectly consistent with the underlying data generating process actually tightens
the assessment of our identification method.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics – Correlation between Identified and True Shocks
Panel A
T = 100
p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4
pi τg τc pi τg τc pi τg τc pi τg τc
Min 0.54 0.68 0.59 0.50 0.58 0.51 0.24 0.51 0.15 0.02 0.49 0.10
25% Quartile 0.91 0.95 0.84 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.81
Median 0.95 0.97 0.88 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.91 0.86
75% Quartile 0.97 0.99 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.89
Max 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.95
Mean 0.93 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.84
Std. Dev. 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.08
Panel B
T = 50
p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 p = 4
pi τg τc pi τg τc pi τg τc pi τg τc
Min 0.02 0.40 0.04 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.00
25% Quartile 0.81 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.61 0.73 0.65
Median 0.90 0.94 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.84 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.81 0.75
75% Quartile 0.96 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.81
Max 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.94
Mean 0.86 0.92 0.83 0.80 0.88 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.78 0.70
Std. Dev. 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.17
Notes: Summary statistics of the absolute value of the correlation between the true underlying
shocks and the identified shocks. Results are based on 500 artificially generated samples covering
a time span of 100 periods (Panel A) and 50 periods (Panel B), respectively. For each dataset, the
VECM has been estimated for various lag lengths p, where p denotes the lag size of the associated
VAR in levels.
The table reveals that our identification scheme does a remarkably good job. In
general, we observe a very strong correlation between true and identified shocks.
This is particularly true for permanent and global transitory disturbances. For
instance, with p = 1 and for a sample size of 100 periods, the correlation between
the true and identified permanent shocks is above 0.95 in half of our simulated
samples. Regarding the global transitory shock, the median correlation is even
0.97. In contrast, comovement of idiosyncratic transitory shocks is somewhat
weaker. Nonetheless, the correlation is 0.88 at the median, which still indicates a
rather strong link.
Irrespective of the sample size, we observe that the comovement of shocks
declines as the lag size increases. Moreover, our identification scheme works
better if we have a large sample. Admittedly, this is not very surprising. It
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is interesting, however, that even if there are only 50 observations available for
estimation, our method works considerably well. When we estimate the model
for small samples using one lag, we get median correlations as high as 0.90, 0.94,
and 0.87 for permanent, global transitory, and country–specific transitory shocks,
respectively.8
The strong relationship between actual and predicted innovations is visualised
in Figure 4.1. The graph plots the time series of true and identified shocks
associated with the median correlation between the two. The results are obtained
from estimations with one lag, based on samples with 100 observations. Recall
that the variances of structural shocks retrieved from the VECM are normalised
to one, while they are substantially less than one in the calibration of the DSGE
model (see Table 4.1). This explains why we have different scales for the two
series in the figure.
Identified Impulse Responses
Our exercise has hitherto demonstrated how well our identification strategy ex-
tracts structural shocks from the data. Next, we want to analyse estimated impulse
responses and compare them to their theoretical counterparts. Since our identi-
fied shocks are unique only up to sign, we basically do not know whether we are
looking at a positive or negative structural shock. To this end, we simply interpret
shocks as being positive if they cause a positive impact reaction of output.
Figure 4.2 shows estimated median impulse responses as well as their 90
percentage bounds of the current account to output ratio to our three shocks.
Again, we consider estimation results for the VECM with one lag, based on
samples covering 100 periods. For comparison, we also plot theoretical impulse
responses to positive one percent shocks.
Theory predicts a fall (rise) in the current account to output ratio following a
permanent (transitory) technology shock. Agents anticipate that a positive per-
manent shock not only raises present income but also leads to higher income in
8We have also investigated the asymptotic properties of our identification scheme (results
are not reported here). That is, we have performed our exercise using very large samples with
100,000 observations. Our findings suggest that the correlation between true and identified
shocks approaches to 1 as T → ∞. This convergence is particularly strong for permanent and
global transitory shocks.
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Figure 4.1: Time Series of Identified and True Shocks
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
−0.05
0
0.05
T r
u e
 S
h o
c k
s
−2
0
2
I d
e n
t i f
i e
d  
S h
o c
k s
Permanent Shocks
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
T r
u e
 S
h o
c k
s
−2
0
2
I d
e n
t i f
i e
d  
S h
o c
k s
Global Transitory Shocks
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
−15
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−3
T r
u e
 S
h o
c k
s
−2
0
2
I d
e n
t i f
i e
d  
S h
o c
k s
Horizon
Country−Specific Transitory Shocks
Notes: The figure shows the time series of shocks associated with the median correlation
between true and identified innovations. The series of identified shocks is corrected for the sign
of correlation. Results are based on the estimation of the VECM with lag length p = 1 and sample
size T = 100.
the future. The desire for a smooth consumption path over time induces house-
holds to increase consumption more than the initial gain in income. Accordingly,
the economy runs a current account deficit on impact in order to finance excess
consumption. By contrast, the consumption smoothing rationale of agents creates
an incentive to raise savings in response to a transitory shock. As a consequence,
the increase in output outweighs the rise in consumption, such that the current
account increases.
Likewise, CAY increases after a positive world interest rate shock. A higher
interest rate raises the price of today’s consumption in terms of consumption to-
morrow. This induces households to substitute present consumption for future
consumption (substitution effect). Moreover, our calibration exercise implies that
the small open economy has a negative net foreign asset position in the determ-
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Figure 4.2: Identified and True Impulse Responses
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Notes: Identified impulse responses versus model implied impulse responses of the current
account to output ratio to the three structural shocks.
inistic equilibrium. Thus, the representative agent has an additional incentive to
save more today in order to avoid higher interest payments on foreign debt (in-
come effect). Income and substitution effect therefore work in the same direction.
That is, a positive interest rate shock leads to an increase in domestic savings, or
equivalently, a current account surplus.
Our figure suggests that estimated impulse responses are largely consistent
with their theoretical counterparts from a qualitative perspective. On the one
hand, the econometric model succeeds in predicting that the current account
to income ratio increases after both types of transitory shocks, and falls after a
permanent shock. On the other hand, it fails to reproduce the hump–shaped
response of CAY following an idiosyncratic transitory shock. However, this failure
is not too bewildering. The VECM underlying the impulse responses in Figure
4.2 specifies only one lag. This implies that it can only generate impulse response
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functions that are geometrically decaying. Besides, our DSGE model describes
the joint dynamic behaviour of a rich system of variables. It is therefore hard
to expect our reduced form trivariate VECM to fully capture the dynamics of
the variables. Indeed, this might more generally explain the differences between
estimated and theoretical impulse responses.9
Overall, the exercise has illustrated that our identification strategy presents a
very powerful tool to isolate both permanent and transitory as well as global and
country–specific components in macroeconomic time series. We will now take
our method to the empirical data in order to shed light on the role of different
shocks in driving macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs.
4.4 Empirical Results
In the empirical part of our paper, we analyse the cointegrated VAR model from
above using emerging market data. As we want to learn about the determinants
of macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs in general, we estimate the model for a
broad selection of countries.
4.4.1 Data
We employ quarterly data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 15 EMEs. It is generally arguable whether
a country represents an emerging market or not because there exists no official
definition. To this end, we study countries that are considered as being an emer-
ging market according to at least one of the well–known lists of EMEs compiled by
the IMF, Colombia University’s Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) project,
Financial Times and Stock Exchange (FTSE), Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional (MSCI), Standard and Poor’s (S&P), and Dow Jones Indexes (DJI). Table
4.3 summarises country selection, data availability as well as EME classification.
Unfortunately, time series on macroeconomic variables at business cycle frequen-
9A further reason for why our econometric model fails to exactly replicate theoretical responses
is due to our VECM specification. As explained before, our DSGE model does not have a finite
order VAR representation. Ravenna (2007) shows that VAR approximations of such models can
lead to considerable discrepancies between estimated and theoretical impulse responses.
121
Table 4.3: List of Emerging Markets
Emerging Market Classification
Country Data Range IMF EMGP FTSE MSCI S&P DJI
Argentina (ARG) 1993Q1–2011Q4 ? ?
Brazil (BRA) 1995Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Czech Republic (CZE) 1994Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ?
Hungary (HUN) 1995Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Indonesia (IDN) 1990Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Korea (KOR) 1975Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ?
Malaysia (MYS) 1991Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Mexico (MEX) 1981Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Peru (PER) 1988Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Philippines (PHL) 1981Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Poland (POL) 1995Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Russia (RUS) 1995Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
South Africa (ZAF) 1975Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Thailand (THA) 1993Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ?
Turkey (TUR) 1987Q1–2011Q4 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Notes: All data are taken from the IFS database. All countries under investigation can be defined
as an emerging market according to at least one of the various and well–known classifications of
EMEs established by the IMF, Colombia University’s EMGP project, FTSE, MSCI, S&P, and DJI.
The table reports the EME classifications as of 2013.
cies in EMEs are usually short or not available at all. This lack of data explains
why our set of countries is rather limited and misses further economies that can
potentially be categorised as an emerging market.
To estimate our model, we use real per capita data on GDP (Y) and net exports
of goods and services (NX), which serves as a proxy for the current account
(CA), and the real world interest rate (R?).10 To construct real time series, we
deflate output using the GDP deflator, whereas net exports deflated by the CPI.11
Subsequently, we divide each series by population size to turn them into per
capita terms. Unfortunately, the IFS data set only provides annual population
data. To obtain quarterly population series, we interpret the reported figure as
being the population size in quarter two and interpolate the missing observations
using annual population growth rates. We use the real US T–bill rate as a proxy for
10Note that data availability motivates the choice of net exports instead of the current account
in our empirical analysis. However, given the fact that the trade balance accounts for the lion’s
share of the current account in most EMEs, we are confident that NX represents a good proxy for
CA. For this reason, we shall use these two expressions interchangeably in the rest of our paper.
11The Indonesian GDP deflator is not available for the whole sample period. For this country,
we take the CPI to compute real GDP.
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the world interest rate, which we determine by subtracting US CPI inflation from
the quarterly US T–bill rate. The real per capita series of output and net exports
are deseasonalised using the standard Census Bureau’s X–12 ARIMA approach.
4.4.2 Cointegration Tests
Before we estimate our model, we first perform standard cointegration tests for
each country. Table 4.4 displays the results of Johansen cointegration tests for the
process Xt =
[
r?t
CAt
Yt
yt
]′
based on the critical values provided by Osterwald-
Lenum (1992). For each country, we include an unrestricted constant in the model
and choose a lag length p as suggested by the standard information criteria AIC
and BIC.12
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4.4 report the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistic,
respectively, for the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0). There are only
two countries (Malaysia and Peru) for which we are not able to reject the null
of no cointegration at conventional significance levels in at least one of the two
tests. Turning to the null hypothesis of r = 1, columns 4 and 7 of the table show
that it is not to possible reject the null in most countries. In fact, the maximum
eigenvalue test can only be rejected in 5 countries, namely the Czech Republic,
the Philippines, Poland, Russia, and Turkey.
Accordingly, our findings indicate that there is no strong evidence of more than
one cointegrating relationship in the majority of countries. This is a contradiction
to our theoretical model, which suggests a cointegrating rank of two. Yet we
have to be careful in interpreting our results. A well–known drawback of these
cointegration tests is that they have low power. In other words, the probability
of not rejecting the null when it is wrong is very high. Hence, in some cases we
might spuriously infer that there is only one cointegrating vector. In the following
analysis, we will therefore presume that there is a single common trend in the
data, i.e. r = 2. Furthermore, as in Section 4.3, we impose the cointegrating matrix
12For some countries, the BIC suggests only one lag. In this case, we set p according to the AIC
in order to better capture the dynamics in the variables. Otherwise, our decision for the AIC or
BIC is based on diagnostic checks on model adequacy (e.g. white noise properties of residuals).
Nevertheless, inference on our cointegration tests appears to be fairly insensitive regarding the
criterion used to determine p.
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Table 4.4: Johansen’s Cointegration Test
p λtrace λmax
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2
ARG 5 31.46** 8.43 0.39 23.03* 8.04 0.39
BRA 5 27.39* 8.64 0.17 18.75* 8.48 0.17
CZE 1 66.08*** 24.59*** 1.60 41.48*** 23.00*** 1.60
HUN 2 54.37*** 8.90 2.83* 45.47*** 6.07 2.83*
IDN 1 54.34*** 12.57 1.01 41.77*** 11.56 1.01
KOR 4 32.46** 14.96* 5.65** 17.50 9.31 5.65**
MYS 3 25.23 10.10 2.86* 15.12 7.24 2.86*
MEX 3 32.19** 6.03 0.14 26.16*** 5.89 0.14
PER 5 20.57 6.74 2.60 13.82 4.14 2.60
PHL 1 62.81*** 13.99* 0.12 48.81*** 13.87* 0.12
POL 1 47.87*** 15.42** 0.08 32.45*** 15.34* 0.08
RUS 2 64.24*** 14.73* 0.30 49.51*** 14.43** 0.30
ZAF 3 27.05* 11.85 0.05 15.20 11.80 0.05
THA 1 58.19*** 11.53 1.67 46.66*** 9.87 1.67
TUR 2 67.12*** 16.60** 0.18 50.52*** 16.42** 0.18
Notes: Critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All models incorporate an unrestricted constant.
Selection of lag length is based on the application of the standard information criteria AIC and/or
BIC.
β =
[ 1 0 0
0 1 0
]′ as implied by the DSGE model.13
4.4.3 Global and Country–Specific Components
In Section 4.3, we have illustrated that our identification scheme succeeds in re-
trieving global and country–specific components from artificial data. Admittedly,
the fact that we knew the underlying data generating process helped us to impose
appropriate identifying restrictions on matrix P in equation (4.4). Unfortunately,
with the empirical data we cannot be a priori sure about the quality of this strategy.
To this end, we will now check how global and country–specific our identified
shocks in the data really are.
Our approach builds on Hoffmann (2001b) and Hoffmann (2003). Given that
we estimate the model for each country separately, we can assess the strength
of our method by inspecting the bilateral correlation of shocks. Clearly, our
13In Appendix C, we test the restrictions on the cointegrating space predicted by the DSGE
model. As a matter of fact, we reject the theoretically imposed cointegrating matrix in the ma-
jority of countries. Therefore, we also perform our empirical exercise based on an estimated
cointegrating matrix β. Yet the main empirical results in this paper seem to be robust to whether
we estimate or impose β.
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identification should yield country–specific shocks which are rather uncorrelated
across countries. By contrast, identified global shocks ought to be substantially
related.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show pairwise correlations of global and country–specific
innovations, respectively. Indeed, we observe a much stronger link between
global shocks than between idiosyncratic shocks. The average correlation of
global disturbances is significant at the 1% level for all countries. Regarding
country–specific shocks, mean correlations are very low and insignificant at con-
ventional levels for all but three countries. Although the average correlation of
idiosyncratic shocks is significantly different from zero for Indonesia, Peru, and
Poland, the coefficient is still rather small. Furthermore, all pairwise correlations
between global shocks are fairly high and positive, whereas they are generally
low and have mixed signs for country–specific shocks. As a consequence, our
theory guided identification of global and country–specific disturbances seems to
work well not only with artificial data but also with empirical data.
In addition, Table 4.7 presents the bilateral correlations of permanent shocks.
Note that our identification strategy isolates the single permanent shock, but
does not specify whether it is driven by global or idiosyncratic factors. In our
exercise with artificial data above, this was not our concern since we knew that
the common trend was driven by country–specific, non–stationary disturbances
in technology. In the real data, however, our identified permanent shock may
feature both global and idiosyncratic components. Indeed, the table shows that
the comovement of permanent shocks across countries is not negligible. For all
countries, except Korea and Poland, we find that average cross–correlations are
significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level. Mean correlations range
from −0.10 for Argentina to 0.27 for South Africa and Thailand. This finding
might suggest that permanent shocks have global components but are mainly
determined by idiosyncratic factors.
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4.4.4 Impulse Responses
Next, we evaluate the reaction of capital flows and income to the three structural
shocks. Table 4.8 summarises the impact responses of the current account to GDP
ratio and output. As mentioned before, our identification of shocks is unique only
up to sign. Hence, we again interpret shocks as being positive if they lead to a
period zero increase in output and accordingly adjust the sign of the CAY responses.
Complete impulse responses of the current account to output ratio and income
for each country are presented in Appendix C.
Before we indulge in the discussion of our results, it is worthwhile to first take
a look at the comovement of capital flows and income. Column two of the table
reports the sample correlation between the current account to GDP ratio and the
HP cycle of the log of output. The correlation is not only negative throughout the
sample, except for Russia, but also indicates a noticeable negative relationship
between the two variables in most countries. This observation just underpins the
stylised fact of a countercyclical current account to output ratio in EMEs.
But this raises the question of what drives this countercyclicality. To shed
more light on this phenomenon, we examine the reaction of the current account
to various shocks. As is evident from columns 3 to 5 of the table, there seems
to be no common pattern in the impact responses of CAY . What is striking is that
in all countries, except Turkey, the countercyclicality of the current account can
be explained by the response to either permanent or country–specific transitory
shocks, but never by both. In 7 countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand, the negative correlation
between the current account to output ratio and GDP arises from permanent
shocks. By contrast, temporary shocks account for the countercyclicality of CAY in
7 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, and South
Africa. Interestingly, all three types of shocks cause a capital inflow in Turkey,
whereof country–specific innovations lead to the most pronounced response.
This is one of the main findings of our empirical exercise. The two distinct
patterns in the reaction of the current account to output ratio is visualised in Figure
4.3. On the one hand, there are countries located in the north–west quadrant of
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Table 4.8: Impact Impulse Responses
Sample
Correlation CAY y
between
CA
Y and y pi τ
g τc pi τg τc
ARG −0.50 1.34 −0.76 −0.41 0.14 0.13 2.05
BRA −0.08 0.40 0.47 −0.77 0.88 0.02 0.66
CZE −0.10 −0.55 −0.13 1.26 1.57 0.01 0.44
HUN −0.27 −0.96 −0.06 1.06 0.80 0.16 0.37
IDN −0.08 −1.08 −0.35 1.50 1.69 0.41 1.84
KOR −0.32 −0.48 −1.05 1.42 1.09 1.24 0.62
MYS −0.25 −1.39 −0.90 2.73 1.59 0.20 0.05
MEX −0.35 −0.24 −0.11 0.97 1.40 0.22 0.09
PER −0.33 0.67 0.99 −0.62 0.52 0.82 2.29
PHL −0.33 0.10 0.40 −2.20 1.76 0.61 0.21
POL −0.50 0.45 −0.11 −0.86 1.06 0.02 0.62
RUS 0.05 1.86 0.32 −0.63 1.10 0.43 1.57
ZAF −0.39 0.32 0.05 −1.42 0.63 0.43 0.16
THA −0.46 −1.01 −0.70 3.07 2.08 0.62 0.65
TUR −0.55 −0.73 −0.33 −1.51 2.84 0.16 0.10
Median −0.33 −0.24 −0.11 −0.41 1.10 0.22 0.62
Mean −0.30 −0.09 −0.15 0.24 1.28 0.37 0.78
Std. Dev. 0.18 0.93 0.56 1.59 0.68 0.34 0.77
Notes: The table shows the impact responses of the current account to GDP ratio and income to
the three structural shocks. Responses have been multiplied by 100 and corrected for the sign
of the impact responses of output. The sample correlation between CAY and y corresponds to the
correlation between the current account to GDP ratio and the cyclical component of the log of
output, which has been derived using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 1,600.
the diagram, which exhibit an increase in CAY after a permanent shock and a fall
in CAY after a country–specific transitory disturbance. On the other hand, there
are EMEs located in the south–east quadrant of the diagram in which permanent
shocks lead to a capital inflow, whereas country–specific transitory disturbances
cause a capital outflow. In addition, the graph suggests that there is a negative
link between the impact responses to the two shocks. The stronger the reaction of
CA
Y to a permanent shock, the stronger is its response to an idiosyncratic transitory
disturbance, but in the opposite direction. Indeed, the correlation coefficient
between the responses is −0.64 and significant at the 5% level.
As a consequence, although EMEs share the empirical regularity of strongly
countercyclical current accounts, we do not find a common explanation for it. This
result is quite interesting in light of the conflicting arguments of two prominent
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Figure 4.3: Impact Responses of CAY
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Notes: The scatter plot displays the impact impulse response of the current account to output
ratio to a permanent shock (vertical axes) and a country–specific transitory shock (horizontal
axis). The solid line represents the OLS regression line.
contributions to the literature on macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs. On the one
hand, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) state that EMEs exhibit a countercyclical trade
balance and are more likely to suffer from sudden stops in capital inflows, because
they are more prone to permanent shocks. Our findings only partly support their
story since the impulse response of CAY to permanent shocks is not negative in all
countries. Nevertheless, we also observe that permanent shocks account for the
countercyclicality of the current account in Mexico, which is exactly the country
they analyse in their study. On the other hand, Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) argue
that the Argentine economy is predominantly hit by temporary shocks, whereas
permanent shocks play virtually no role. In this vein, our analysis complements
their findings since we detect that it is transitory and not permanent disturbances
that explain the countercyclicality of the current account in Argentina.
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So far, our discussion of impulse responses has focussed on permanent and
idiosyncratic transitory shocks. Let us now consider how global shocks affect
the current account. Column 4 of Table 4.8 shows that the current account to
output ratio falls after a transitory global shock in two thirds of EMEs. At a
first glance, this result seems to be inconsistent with an important implication of
the intertemporal approach to the current account. The intertemporal approach
predicts that global output shocks should not affect the current account, but
translate into changes in the world interest rate (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)).
Yet since we look at the ratio of the current account to output, the negative negative
sign of the response partly reflects the increase in output after a global shock. More
interesting, however, one third of the countries exhibit a positive response of CAY .
This implies that the increase in the current account actually outweighs the rise in
income following a global shock, which is a palpable contradiction to the theory
of the intertemporal approach.
Turning to the impulse responses of output in columns 6 to 8 of the table,
we observe that the reaction of income following a permanent shock is generally
more pronounced than after transitory shocks. In only four countries (Argentina,
Indonesia, Peru, and Russia), country–specific temporary shocks lead to a stronger
change in output than permanent innovations. Moreover, impact responses to
global disturbances appear to be fairly modest. The only exception in this respect
is Korea, where the period zero response of output to global shocks exceeds the
one to permanent and idiosyncratic shocks.
4.4.5 Explaining Current Account Dynamics
Our analysis in the previous subsection has revealed interesting patterns in the
impulse responses of the current account. We have shown that the negative
correlation of the current account and output in EMEs is driven by the response
of the current account to either permanent or transitory country–specific shocks,
but virtually never both. In this subsection, we want to shed more light on these
particular dynamics of the current account and discuss potential explanations for
them.
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Permanent Shocks
Reconsider the general equilibrium model of Section 4.2. As illustrated in Section
4.3, our DSGE model, and basically any standard model of the intertemporal
approach to the current account, predicts a decline in the current account after a
permanent shock. Yet our empirical results suggest that trend shocks lead to an
increase in CAY in about half of the countries. So how can we explain this apparent
anomaly within the framework of the intertemporal model?
In principle, our empirical impulse responses are not necessarily at odds with
their theoretical counterpart. Our calibration of the DSGE model virtually pre-
cludes persistence of the non–stationary productivity process (ρg = 0.01). As a
matter of fact, we can easily generate a positive conditional correlation between
CA
Y and output after a permanent shock by simply raising ρg.
14 The reason for
this can be explained by the income effect on labour supply implied by CRRA
preferences. The income effect induces agents to work less and enjoy more leisure
after a positive shock, whereas the substitution effect creates an incentive to work
more. Accordingly, if a very persistent non–stationary technology shock occurs,
the income effect predominates the substitution effect, such that labour input de-
clines. If the fall in labour outweighs the increase in productivity, output and
the current account fall initially, which implies a positive conditional correlation
between these two variables. However, if we take a look at the empirical impulse
responses of output, we do not observe this particular pattern in any country. This
finding suggests that there are no strong income effects in EMEs.15 Hence, we
cannot explain the observed positive reaction of the current account after trend
shocks by a high persistence of this type of shocks.
Another possible explanation for the positive impact response of CAY to a per-
manent disturbance would be an overshooting of output. Imagine that the imme-
diate reaction of income following a permanent shock is larger than its long–run
14In Appendix C, we present impulse responses of the current account to output ratio and
income to a permanent shock in the DSGE model for different values of ρg.
15Many researchers use so–called GHH preferences, named after Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Huffman (1988), instead of CRRA utility, because they produce more plausible labour dynamics
and allow the model to replicate certain business cycle properties in emerging markets (see
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Boz et al. (2011)). In fact, a key difference between CRRA and
GHH preferences is that the latter do not feature any income effects on labour supply.
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change. That is, output overshoots in the short–run and converges to its new
long–run level from above. In that scenario, a positive trend shock induces
households to save rather than borrow at international capital markets. As a
result, a permanent shock leads to an increase in both output and the current
account on impact. If we look at the estimated impulse responses of income to
a permanent disturbance, we only find such an overshooting pattern for Turkey.
But Turkey’s current account actually falls after a permanent shock. Accordingly,
an overshooting behaviour of output cannot be the explanation for the empirical
positive conditional correlation between CAY and income, either.
That said, our findings suggest a puzzle. Conditional on a positive impact
response of output, our dynamic general equilibrium model cannot explain the
positive reaction of the current account after a trend shock. In light of this, one
needs to think about potential missing ingredients in the intertemporal model
that help to resolve this puzzle.
Transitory Shocks
In Section 4.3, we have demonstrated that the stochastic growth model predicts
an increase in the current account in response to a stationary technology shock.
However, the current account actually drops after an idiosyncratic temporary
shock in roughly 50 percent of our countries.
We now show how we can augment the DSGE model with financial frictions
in a straightforward way, such that it succeeds in reproducing this particular
reaction of the current account. In a prominent article, Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
stress the virtue of decomposing the real interest rate into a world interest rate
and a country risk component. Therefore, we extend the model by a country risk
premium on the interest rate as an ad hoc form of financial market distortions.
That is, we adjust our interest rate rule in equation (4.1) to
1 + rt = R?t + ψ
(
exp (bt+1 − b) − 1) + St,
where St is the country spread, which captures the country’s risk of default. We
follow Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and assume that the risk of default depends on
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country fundamentals, such that shocks to the economy directly affect the spread
term. For the sake of simplicity, we specify the country spread as a decreasing
function of expected future stationary technology zt+1:
St = −η (exp (Et [zt+1] − z) − 1) ,
where parameter η ≥ 0 determines the sensitivity of the interest rate with respect
to changes in the stationary TFP component. The functional form of St reflects
the idea that the country risk and therefore the country premium is low (high)
if prospects about future economic activity are good (bad). Accordingly, the
interest rate does no longer equal the world interest rate but depends on domestic
economic conditions. That is why we can think of the modified interest rate rule
as featuring a reduced form financial friction.16
The inclusion of a country spread changes the propagation of a transitory TFP
shock.17 A positive temporary technology shock reduces the country risk and
therefore lowers the spread. The associated decline in the interest rate induces
households to increase consumption and investment by more than without a
change in the cost of borrowing. Accordingly, the country spread introduces an
amplification mechanism in the model. As a matter of fact, the more severe the
extent of the financial friction, i.e. the larger the size of parameter η, the stronger
is this amplification effect. If the drop in the interest rate is large enough, domestic
absorption exceeds output, such that the economy runs a current account deficit.
Accordingly, the introduction of reduced form financial frictions can indeed help
to explain the negative response of CAY to country–specific transitory shocks.
Domestic versus International Frictions
We have elaborated in how far the intertemporal model can account for the
empirical impulse responses of the current account. In light of our discussion, we
now try to provide a coherent explanation for the observed discrepancies in the
16Note that this specification also implies that the extended model nests the baseline setup from
Section 4.2. More precisely, if we set η = 0, there is no country premium and the interest rate rule
is again given by equation (4.1).
17Impulse responses of CAY and y to a temporary TFP shock in the extended model are presented
in Appendix C.
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current account dynamics.
We can imagine that EMEs are characterised by various forms of market fric-
tions, which have an impact on the behaviour of economic agents. Depending on
how and where market distortions appear in the economy, they can lead to very
different macroeconomic dynamics.
On the one hand, there is the story of Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and
Fe´rnandez (2013). They argue that imperfections at international capital markets
rather than trend shocks are responsible for the dynamics in emerging markets.
As we have shown above, the introduction of country spreads in the intertemporal
model indeed helps to reproduce a negative response of the current account to
transitory shocks. This suggests that countries in which transitory shocks drive
the countercyclicality of the current account are particularly characterised by
international frictions. Nevertheless, this interpretation does not resolve the puzzle
of why there is a positive conditional correlation between the current account and
income after a permanent shock in these countries.
On the other hand, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) advocate the theory that the
negative correlation between the current account and income arises from the re-
sponse of the current account to permanent shocks. Although their model does
not feature an explicit form of financial frictions, we can imagine that market dis-
tortions manifest themselves in the non–stationary productivity component. That
is, the Aguiar and Gopinath setup does not incorporate frictions in international
borrowing and lending but the permanent shock introduces a domestic efficiency
wedge in the model (see Chari et al. (2007)). Thus, we can think of EMEs in which
trend shocks drive the countercyclicality of the current account as being mainly
characterised by domestic frictions. Moreover, since these countries exhibit a cap-
ital outflow after an idiosyncratic transitory shock, international frictions seem to
be less pronounced.
This suggests that the relative importance of domestic and international fric-
tions varies across EMEs. That said, we would expect that permanent shocks play
a more important role in determining macroeconomic dynamics in EMEs with
domestic frictions compared to those with international frictions. Indeed, this is
what we find in the following when we take a closer look at the determinants of
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business cycle fluctuations in emerging markets.
4.4.6 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Finally, we investigate the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in EMEs. For
this purpose, we perform a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of the
variables in our system. Our analysis focuses on the contemporaneous FEVD,
which is presented in Table 4.9.18
Various findings are worth emphasising. First, columns 7 to 9 of the table
show that permanent shocks are the primary source of output fluctuations in most
EMEs. On average, permanent shocks account for about 65 percent of the short–
run variability of output. However, we also observe that the importance of this
type of shocks varies considerably across countries. For instance, trend shocks
account for less than 50 percent of income variation in Argentina, Indonesia,
Korea, Peru, and Russia, while they explain more than 90 percent in the Czech
Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, and Turkey.
Hence, our results are consistent with the findings of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) and Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) in this respect, too. Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) show that the Mexican business cycle is mainly driven by trend shocks.
Therefore, these authors posit the hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend” in emer-
ging markets. Garcı´a-Cicco et al. (2010) challenge this notion by showing that
income growth fluctuations in Argentina mainly arise from temporary disturb-
ances. This is exactly what we find in our analysis. It is trend (temporary) shocks
that explain almost all the variation in Mexican (Argentine) output. Overall, we
conclude that it might be too bold to generally state that “the cycle is the trend”
in emerging markets. Yet permanent shocks are indeed the main determinant of
output fluctuations in many EMEs.
Returning to our previous discussion of domestic versus international frictions
in emerging markets, it is now interesting to check how the importance of trend
shocks is related to its impact on the current account. To this end, in Figure
4.4 we plot the share of income variation that can be ascribed to the permanent
18Forecast error variance decompositions at different forecast horizons for each country can be
found in Appendix C.
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Table 4.9: Contemporaneous Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
r? CAY y
pi τg pi τg τc pi τg τc
ARG 24.59 75.41 70.65 22.63 6.72 0.44 0.37 99.19
BRA 37.12 62.88 16.88 22.47 60.65 63.98 0.05 35.97
CZE 2.75 97.25 15.98 0.89 83.14 92.86 0.00 7.13
HUN 0.11 99.89 44.95 0.16 54.89 79.94 3.37 16.69
IDN 18.16 81.84 32.96 3.50 63.54 44.72 2.64 52.64
KOR 50.63 49.37 6.95 33.12 59.93 38.26 49.32 12.42
MYS 5.41 94.59 19.05 7.90 73.05 98.41 1.50 0.10
MEX 21.19 78.81 5.49 1.21 93.30 97.13 2.48 0.39
PER 71.37 28.63 24.74 54.21 21.05 4.38 10.90 84.73
PHL 16.58 83.42 0.20 3.14 96.66 88.19 10.58 1.23
POL 0.09 99.91 21.51 1.16 77.33 74.37 0.04 25.59
RUS 0.42 99.58 87.44 2.58 9.98 31.24 4.71 64.05
ZAF 49.53 50.47 4.79 0.10 95.11 65.11 30.82 4.06
THA 20.55 79.45 9.39 4.44 86.17 84.32 7.52 8.16
TUR 0.47 99.53 18.06 3.83 78.12 99.57 0.30 0.13
Median 18.16 81.84 18.06 3.50 73.05 74.37 2.64 12.42
Mean 21.26 78.74 25.27 10.75 63.98 64.19 8.31 27.50
Std. Dev. 22.08 22.08 24.87 15.69 29.72 33.21 13.85 32.80
Notes: Percentage share of the contemporaneous forecast error variance explained by permanent,
global transitory, and country–specific transitory shocks.
component against the impact response of the current account to output ratio to
a permanent shock. As can be seen from the graph, there seems to be a negative
link between the two. In fact, we find a correlation coefficient of −0.64, which is
significant at the 5% level. Accordingly, the greater the share of trend shocks in
the forecast error variance of output, the smaller or more negative is the change in
CA
Y following a permanent disturbance. In other words, if trend shocks drive the
countercyclicality of the current account in a country, it is very likely that they also
account for a great deal of its business cycle fluctuations. This finding underpins
our interpretation of the difference between domestic and international frictions
in emerging markets. Macroeconomic fluctuations of countries where domestic
(international) frictions are relatively more important tend to be relatively more
(less) driven by trend shocks.
Second, for the majority of countries, global shocks account for a rather small
fraction of the variation in output. Apart from Korea, Peru, the Philippines,
and South Africa, this type of shocks determines less than 10 percent of the
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Figure 4.4: Impact Response of CAY and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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Notes: The scatter plot displays the impact impulse response of the current account to output
ratio to a permanent shock (vertical axes) and the fraction of contemporaneous output variance
explained by permanent shocks. The solid line represents the OLS regression line.
contemporaneous forecast error variance of GDP. Accordingly, changes in the
world interest rate, the variable we use to identify global shocks in our analysis,
have only a negligible impact on the business cycle in EMEs. In fact, this finding
corroborates the results of previous related studies. For instance, Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) show that although interest rate shocks explain a considerable
share of output variations, it is mainly the country risk component and less the
global component of interest rates that matters for the business cycle in Argentina.
Likewise, Chang and Fe´rnandez (2013) estimate a DSGE model for the Mexican
economy and show that innovations to the world interest rate only marginally
contribute to the variability of income. In contrast, Uribe and Yue (2006) find
that US interest rate shocks account for as much as 20 percent of macroeconomic
fluctuations in selected EMEs. However, these authors also point out that most
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of this effect is due to the influence of the world interest rate on country spreads.
Third, columns 4 to 6 indicate that a substantial portion of the variation in the
current account to income ratio can be attributed to transitory shocks. In particu-
lar, country–specific disturbances explain a considerable share of the fluctuation
in CAY . In fact, about three quarter of this variable’s variability is determined by
idiosyncratic disturbances in the median country. Interestingly, this outcome is
concurrent with the crucial message of the present value model of the current ac-
count (PVMCA). The PVMCA states that the current account is the transitory part
of output, such that international capital flows should only arise from temporary
shocks. Furthermore, in line with the prediction of the intertemporal approach to
the current account, our findings suggest that global shocks play a fairly marginal
role for most EMEs, except for those from South America (Argentina, Brazil, and
Peru) and Korea.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the famous hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend” in emerging
markets. For this purpose, we estimate a trivariate VECM which consists of the
world interest rate, the current account to GDP ratio, and income, for a large cross
section of EMEs. We propose an identification scheme of the VECM to detect
permanent, global transitory, and country–specific transitory components in the
data. When we apply our identification method to model generated data, we find
that it performs remarkably well in retrieving the true underlying shocks.
Our empirical exercise suggests that we cannot generally conclude that “the
cycle is the trend” in emerging markets. In particular, we find that permanent
shocks account for the countercyclicality of the current account in half of the
countries, whereas idiosyncratic transitory shocks explain this countercyclicality
in the other half. We also observe that it is either one of these two types of
disturbances that drive the negative correlation between the current account and
income, but virtually never both. We argue that different degrees of domestic and
international frictions in emerging markets might provide an explanation for this
result. Countries in which the countercyclicality of the current account is driven
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by permanent shocks mainly feature domestic frictions, whereas it is international
frictions that are more prevalent in emerging markets in which countercyclicality
of the current account arises from transitory shocks.
Furthermore, we find that business cycle fluctuations are mainly determined
by permanent shocks in the majority of countries. Yet in some EMEs transitory
disturbances account for the lion’s share of the short–run variation in income.
Interestingly, the share of output fluctuations explained by the permanent com-
ponent is higher in countries in which the countercyclicality of the current account
is driven by permanent shocks. This result underpins our interpretation that the
relative importance of domestic and international frictions varies across emerging
markets. Overall, we conclude that although EMEs share certain business cycle
patterns, there seems to be no common source behind them.
We distinguish between domestic and international frictions, but we cannot
say much about which particular types of distortions they present. In order to
really understand the determinants of current account dynamics in EMEs, we
need to learn more about these frictions. For instance, we might wonder what
is the role of financial markets in this context. Do institutional issues matter?
How important are policy related factors? We believe that an investigation of
these issues is a promising task of future research on business cycles in emerging
markets.
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Appendix A
Appendix to “Macroeconomic
Implications of US Banking
Liberalisation”
A.1 The Model
This section presents a detailed description of the model environment.
A.1.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a representative household with a unit mass of
atomistic, identical, infinitely lived members. The household seeks to maximise
expected lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint:
max
cHt ,dt+1,xt+1,lt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cHt , 1 − lt),
s.t. dt+1 + xt+1
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι + cHt ≤ (1 + rt)dt + xt
∫
ι
(at(ι) + νt(ι))dι + wtlt.
The representative household’s preferences are characterised by a standard
Cobb–Douglas CRRA period utility function:
u(cHt , 1 − lt) =
(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
1 − γ .
Notice that γ does not denote the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion,
or equivalently, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. It is easy
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to show that the coefficient of relative risk aversion with Cobb–Douglas CRRA
utility is given by 1−ξ(1−γ). Recall, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA)
is defined as
RRA = −cH ucc(c
H, 1 − l)
uc(cH, 1 − l)
where uc(cH, 1− l) = ∂u(cH ,1−l)∂cH = ξ
(
(cH)ξ(1 − l)1−ξ
)1−γ 1
cH and ucc(c
H, 1− l) = ∂2u(cH ,1−l)∂(cH)2 =(
ξ(1 − γ) − 1) ξ ((cH)ξ(1 − l)1−ξ)1−γ ( 1cH )2. As a result, we get
RRA = −cH
(
ξ(1 − γ) − 1) ξ ((cH)ξ(1 − l)1−ξ)1−γ ( 1cH )2
ξ ((cH)ξ(1 − l)1−ξ)1−γ 1cH
⇔ RRA = − (ξ(1 − γ) − 1)
⇔ RRA = 1 − ξ (1 − γ) .
Likewise, it is straightforward to show that with CRRA utility, the inverse of the
RRA equals the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). The EIS determines
by how many percent consumption growth falls if the ratio of marginal utilities
increases by one percent:
EIS = −
d log
(
cHt+1
cHt
)
d log
(
uc(cHt+1,1−lt+1)
uc(cHt ,1−lt)
) = −

d log
(
uc(cHt+1,1−lt+1)
uc(cHt ,1−lt)
)
d log
(
cHt+1
cHt
)

−1
.
Hence, we have
EIS = −

d
{
(1 − γ)ξ log
(
cHt+1
cHt
)
+ (1 − ξ)(1 − γ) log
(
1−lt+1
1−lt
)
+ log
(
cHt
cHt+1
)}
d log
(
cHt+1
cHt
)

−1
⇔ EIS = − [(1 − γ)ξ − 1]−1
⇔ EIS = 1
1 − ξ (1 − γ) .
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After this brief digression on RRA and EIS, I now return to the household’s
optimisation problem. The Lagrangian to this problem can be set up as
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[((cHt )ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ)1−γ
1 − γ
+ λHt
(
(1 + rt)dt + xt
∫
ι
(at(ι) + υt(ι))dι + wtlt − dt+1 − xt+1
∫
ι
υt(ι)dι − cHt
) ]
.
First–order conditions (FOCs) of this problem are given by
(I) FOC with respect to consumption
∂L
∂cHt
= βt
[(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)−γ
(cHt )
ξ−1(1 − lt)1−ξξ − λHt
]
≤ 0
cHt ≥ 0, ∂L∂cHt
cHt = 0
⇒ cHt > 0 and ∂L∂cHt = 0, such that
λHt =
ξ
(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
(II) FOC with respect to labour supply
∂L
∂lt
= βt
[(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)−γ
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)−ξ(1 − ξ)(−1) + λHt wt
]
≤ 0
lt ≥ 0, ∂L∂lt lt = 0
⇒ lt > 0 and ∂L∂lt = 0, such that
λHt wt =
(1 − ξ)
(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
1 − lt
(III) FOC with respect to bank deposits
∂L
∂dt+1
= βt
[
−λHt
]
+ βt+1Et
[
λHt+1(1 + rt+1)
]
≤ 0
dt+1 ≥ 0, ∂L∂dt+1 dt+1 = 0
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⇒ dt+1 > 0 and ∂L∂dt+1 = 0, such that
λHt = β(1 + rt+1)Et
[
λHt+1
]
(IV) FOC with respect to bank shares
∂L
∂xt+1
= βt
[
−λHt
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι
]
+ βt+1Et
[
λHt+1
∫
ι
(at+1(ι) + νt+1(ι)) dι
]
≤ 0
xt+1 ≥ 0, ∂L∂xt+1 xt+1 = 0
⇒ xt+1 > 0 and ∂L∂xt+1 = 0, such that
λHt
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι = βEt
[
λHt+1
∫
ι
(at+1(ι) + νt+1(ι)) dι
]
⇔ λHt νt = βEt
[
λHt+1(at+1 + νt+1)
]
,
where
∫
ι
νt(ι)dι ≡ νt and
∫
ι
at(ι)dι ≡ at.
From FOCs (I) and (III), we can derive the intertemporal Euler equation with
respect to bank deposits
(
(cHt )
ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
= β(1 + rt+1)Et

(
(cHt+1)
ξ(1 − lt+1)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt+1
 . (A.1)
Combining FOCs (I) and (IV), we obtain the standard consumption–based asset
pricing formula
νt = βEt
( (cHt+1)ξ(1 − lt+1)1−ξ(cHt )ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ cHt
cHt+1
(at+1 + νt+1)
 , (A.2)
or, more concisely,
νt = Et
[
mt,t+1(at+1 + νt+1)
]
,
where mt,t+1 = β
(
(cHt+1)
ξ(1−lt+1)1−ξ
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
cHt+1
determines the SDF between period t and
t + 1.
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Finally, using FOCs (I) and (II), we can derive the intratemporal labour–leisure
trade–off
wt =
1 − ξ
ξ
cHt
1 − lt . (A.3)
Moreover, the solution to the household’s optimisation problem must satisfy
the transversality conditions (TVCs):
lim
T→∞Et
T−1∏
k=1
dt+T
1 + rt+k
 = 0 and limT→∞Et [mt,t+Tνt+T] = 0,
where mt,t+T = βT
(
(cHt+T)
ξ(1−lt+T)1−ξ
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
cHt+T
is the T period SDF.
The two TVCs have the standard interpretation. The first TVC ensures that
the agent does not overaccumulate assets in form of bank deposits. That would
not be optimal since the agent could achieve higher expected lifetime utility by
decreasing savings and increasing consumption in any point of time. The second
TVC rules out bubbles in the stock price of the mutual fund. Bubbles inflate the
share price, such that everybody wants to purchase stocks today and resell it at a
higher price in the future. Obviously, this cannot be an equilibrium.
A.1.2 Firms
Final Good Producers
The final good is manufactured in a perfect competitive industry. Because of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale in the production function,
market size is indeterminate, such that we can consider a representative firm.
The representative producer assembles differentiated capital good inputs indexed
by ω ∈ [0,nt] according to a standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES production
function:
yt =
(∫ nt
0
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ dω
) φ
φ−1
.
Since the producer has to purchase intermediate goods in each period, the repres-
entative firm’s objective can be described by solving a series of static, one–period
profit maximisation problems. Accordingly, the representative producer chooses
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differentiated intermediate good inputs to maximise profits at each time t:
max
kt(ω)
(∫ nt
0
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ dω
) φ
φ−1
−
∫ nt
0
pt(ω)kt(ω)dω, ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where pt(ω) denotes the price for variety ω.
FOCs with respect to each specific capital good input kt(ω) are given by
∂ . . .
∂kt(ω)
=
(∫ nt
0
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ dω
) φ
φ−1−1
kt(ω)
φ−1
φ −1 − pt(ω) = 0
⇔ pt(ω) =
(
yt
kt(ω)
) 1
φ
, ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , and ω ∈ [0,nt]. (A.4)
Intermediate Good Producers
Production technology is linear in the only factor labour, and takes the simple
form
kt(ω) = ztlk,t(ω),
where zt denotes labour–augmenting technology. The TFP process zt can be
decomposed into a state–specific component zs,t and a country–wide component
zc,t, i.e. zt = zs,tzc,t. Both TFP components follow an exogenous AR(1) process in
logs:
log(zs,t+1) = (1 − ρzs) log(zs) + ρzs log(zs,t) + uzs,t+1, with |ρzs | < 1, (A.5)
log(zc,t+1) = (1 − ρzc) log(zc) + ρzc log(zc,t) + uzc,t+1, with |ρzc | < 1. (A.6)
Producers in the intermediate goods sector act under monopolistic competi-
tion. That is, although there exists a continuum of different capital goods, each
variety is supplied by a monopolist. This market structure enables them to gen-
erate profits. As a consequence, I can formulate the optimisation problem of firm
147
ω as
max
pt(ω)
pt(ω)kt(ω) − wtzt kt(ω), ∀ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
subject to (A.4).
I can rewrite the input demand function in the final good sector (A.4) as kt(ω) =
ytpt(ω)−φ, and substitute this expression for kt(ω) in the objective function. Sub-
sequent differentiation with respect to pt(ω) yields the optimal price setting func-
tion of firm ω:
pt(ω) = pt =
φ
φ − 1
wt
zt
. (A.7)
If I plug equation (A.7) into (A.4), I obtain the demand for a specified capital good
ω by the representative final good firm:
kt(ω) = kt =
(
φ − 1
φ
zt
wt
)φ
yt.
Optimality condition (A.7) reveals that price of intermediate good ω is simply
determined by a constant mark–up φφ−1 over marginal costs
wt
zt
, which are common
to all capital good producers. Thus, all intermediate goods producers choose the
same price–quantity combination pt and kt.
As a consequence, the production function in the final good sector boils down
to
yt = n
φ
φ−1
t kt, (A.8)
and condition (A.4) becomes
pt =
( yt
kt
) 1
φ
. (A.9)
Now, I can easily derive firm profits as a function of final output and the
number of capital good producers in the economy:
piFt = ptkt − wtzt kt
(A.7)⇐⇒ = 1
φ
ptkt
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(A.9)⇐⇒ = 1
φ
y
1
φ
t k
φ−1
φ
t
(A.8)⇐⇒ = 1
φ
yt
nt
. (A.10)
A.1.3 Entrepreneurs
There is a fixed discrete number µE of entrepreneurs in the economy. Each entre-
preneur j faces the optimisation problem
max
cEt ( j),bt+1( j),nt+1( j),ne,t( j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
(cEt ( j))
1−γE
1 − γE
]
,
subject to cEt ( j) + ne,t( j) + (1 + r
b
t )bt( j) +
χ
2
(
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
)2
nt( j) ≤ nt( j)piFt + bt+1( j),
nt+1( j) = (1 − δ)nt( j) + ne,t( j),
and (1 + rbt+1)bt+1( j) ≤ κtnt( j)Et
[
nt+1( j)piFt+1
]
,
whereκt is an exogenous collateral shock variable, which follows an AR(1) process
in logs:
log(κt+1) = (1 − ρκ) log(κ) + ρκ log(κt) + uκ,t+1, with |ρκ| < 1. (A.11)
The Lagrangian to this problem can be set up as
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtE
[
(cEt ( j))
1−γE
1 − γE
+ λEt ( j)
nt( j)piFt + bt+1( j) − ne,t( j) − (1 + rbt )bt( j) − χ2
(
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
)2
nt( j) − cEt ( j)

+ qt( j)
(
(1 − δ)nt( j) + ne,t( j) − nt+1( j))
+ µt( j)
(
κtnt( j)
[
nt+1( j)piFt+1
]
− (1 + rbt+1)bt+1( j)
) ]
,
which implies the following FOCs:
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(I) FOC with respect to consumption
∂L
∂cEt ( j)
= βtE
[
(cEt ( j))
−γE − λEt ( j)
]
≤ 0
cEt ( j) ≥ 0, ∂L∂cEt ( j)
cEt ( j) = 0
⇒ cEt ( j) > 0 and ∂L∂cEt ( j) = 0, such that
λEt ( j) = (c
E
t ( j))
−γE
(II) FOC with respect to loan demand
∂L
∂bt+1( j)
= βtE
[
λEt ( j) − µt( j)(1 + rbt+1)
]
+ βt+1E Et
[
λEt+1( j)(−(1 + rbt+1)
]
≤ 0
bt+1( j) ≥ 0, ∂L∂bt+1( j)bt+1( j) = 0
⇒ bt+1( j) > 0 and ∂L∂bt+1( j) = 0, such that
λEt ( j) − µt( j)(1 + rbt+1) = βE(1 + rbt+1)Et
[
λEt+1( j)
]
(III) FOC with respect to firm number
∂L
∂nt+1( j)
= βtE
[
−qt( j) + µt( j)κtnt( j)Et
[
piFt+1 + nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)
]]
+ βt+1E Et
[
λEt+1( j)
piFt+1 + nt+1( j)∂piFt+1∂nt+1 ∂nt+1∂nt+1( j) + χ2
(
ne,t+1( j)
nt+1( j)
)2
+ qt+1( j)(1 − δ) + µt+1( j)κt+1nt+2( j)piFt+2
]
≤ 0
nt+1( j) ≥ 0, ∂L∂nt+1( j)nt+1( j) = 0
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⇒ nt+1( j) > 0 and ∂L∂nt+1( j) = 0, such that
qt( j) − µt( j)Et
κtnt( j)
pi
F
t+1 + nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
Profit Destruction Externality


=βEEt
[
λEt+1( j)
pi
F
t+1 + nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
Profit Destruction Externality
+
χ
2
(
ne,t+1( j)
nt+1( j)
)2

+ qt+1( j)(1 − δ) + µt+1( j)κt+1nt+2( j)piFt+2
]
(IV) FOC with respect to firm entrants
∂L
∂ne,t( j)
= βtE
[
λEt ( j)
(
−1 − χne,t( j)
nt( j)
)
+ qt( j)
]
≤ 0
ne,t( j) ≥ 0, ∂L∂ne,t( j)ne,t( j) = 0
⇒ ne,t( j) > 0 and ∂L∂ne,t( j) = 0, such that
λEt ( j)
(
1 + χ
ne,t( j)
nt( j)
)
= qt( j)
(V) FOC with respect to the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint
∂L
∂µt( j)
=
(
κtnt( j)Et
[
nt+1( j)piFt+1
]
− (1 + rbt+1)bt+1( j)
)
≥ 0
µt( j) ≥ 0, ∂L∂µt( j)µt( j) = 0
⇒ µt( j)
(
κtnt( j)Et
[
nt+1( j)piFt+1
]
− (1 + rbt+1)bt+1( j)
)
= 0.
Next, I impose symmetry across entrepreneurs. Accordingly, we have nt =∑µE
j nt( j) = µEnt( j), c
E
t ( j) = c
E
t , bt( j) =
1
µE
bt, ne,t( j) = 1µE ne,t, qt( j) = qt, and µt( j) = µt.
The Profit Destruction Externality (PDE) of creating a new enterprise in FOC (III)
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can now be calculated as
nt+1( j)
∂piFt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt+1( j)
= − 1
φ
yt+1
n2t+1
nt+1( j)
⇔ = − 1
φ
yt+1
nt+1
nt+1( j)
nt+1
(A.10)⇐⇒ = −piFt+1
1
µE
.
As a consequence, combining FOCs (I) and (II) yields the intertemporal con-
sumption Euler equation
(cEt )
−γE = βE(1 + rbt+1)Et
[
(cEt+1)
−γE
]
+ µt(1 + rbt+1). (A.12)
From FOCs (I) and (III), we obtain the intertemporal investment Euler equation
qt = βEEt
[
(cEt+1)
−γE
( (
1 − 1
µE
)
piFt+1 +
χ
2
(ne,t+1
nt+1
)2 )
+ (1 − δ)qt+1
]
+µtκtnt
(
1 − 1
µE
)
Et
[
piFt+1
]
+ βEEt
[
µt+1κt+1nt+2piFt+2
]
.
(A.13)
Using FOCs (I) and (IV), we can derive the firm entry condition
qt = (cEt )
−γE
(
1 + χ
ne,t
nt
)
. (A.14)
Finally, FOC (V) defines the complementary slackness condition of the borrowing
limit
µt
(
κtntEt
[
nt+1piFt+1
]
− (1 + rbt+1)bt+1
)
= 0. (A.15)
In addition to conditions (A.12)–(A.15), optimal behaviour of entrepreneurs must
satisfy the resource constraint and the TVC limT→∞ Et
[∏T−1
k=1
bt+T
1+rbt+k
]
= 0. Besides,
the dynamic equation for the overall number of intermediate good producing
firms in the economy is given by
nt+1 = ne,t + (1 − δ)nt. (A.16)
152
A.1.4 Banks
There is monopolistic competition in the credit market. Entrepreneurs demand all
varieties of differentiated bank loans, which are aggregated according to a Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) CES aggregator:
bt+1 =
(∫
ι
bt+1(ι)
t−1
t dι
) t
t−1
,
where bt+1 is total demand for bank loans, and bt+1(ι) denotes a specific variety
of bank loan supplied by bank ι. Parameter t > 1 determines the elasticity of
substitution between differentiated loans, which follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log(t+1) = (1 − ρ) log() + ρ log(t) + u,t+1, with |ρ| < 1. (A.17)
To derive the loan demand faced by an individual bank ι, I have to solve the
cost minimisation problem of borrowers. In each period t, a borrower seeks to
minimise her net loan repayment, subject to the CES loan aggregator, by choosing
the amount of each differentiated loan bt+1(ι):
min
bt+1(ι)
rbt+1bt+1 =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)bt+1(ι)dι,
subject to
(∫
ι
bt+1(ι)
t−1
t dι
) t
t−1
= bt+1.
The Langrangian to this problem can be set up as
L =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)bt+1(ι)dι − ζ
bt+1 − (∫
ι
bt+1(ι)
t−1
t dι
) t
t−1
 ,
where ζ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. The FOC for the loan supplied by bank
ι is then given by
rbt+1(ι) = −ζ
(∫
ι
bt+1(ι)
t−1
t
) 1
t−1
bt+1(ι)
− 1t
⇔ rbt+1(ι) = −ζb
1
t
t+1bt+1(ι)
− 1t .
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Rearranging terms yields the demand for the differentiated loan from bank ι:
bt+1(ι) =
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1,
where I have substituted rbt+1 for the negative value of the Lagrange multiplier ζ.
Notice that the Lagrange multiplier determines the cost increase associated with
the demand for additional marginal unit of debt. Hence, −ζ can be interpreted as
the shadow price of loan demand as it represents the marginal cost of an extra unit
of debt. Since aggregation of loans is perfectly competitive, optimality requires
that price equals marginal costs, i.e. rbt+1
!
= −ζ.
As a final step, I can derive an explicit expression for the average loan interest
rate rbt+1. To this end, I plug the individual loan demand function into the cost
equation in order to derive the cost function:
rbt+1bt+1 =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)bt+1(ι)dι
⇔ =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1dι
⇔ =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)
1−tdι(rbt+1)
t︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
=rbt+1
bt+1.
From this expression, I can now easily solve for rbt+1:
rbt+1 =
∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)
1−tdι(rbt+1)
t
⇔ rbt+1 =
(∫
ι
rbt+1(ι)
1−tdι
) 1
1−t
.
Note that from the demand function of individual bank loans, we can easily
show that the elasticity of substitution between differentiated loans is indeed
given by t. The elasticity of substitution defines by how many percent relative
demand for bank loan ι changes if the relative loan interest rate of bank ι increases
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by one percent. More formally, the substitution elasticity is given by
−
d log
(
bt+1(ι)
bt+1(ι′)
)
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
) = −
d log

(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1(
rbt+1(ι
′)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1

d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
)
⇔ −
d log
(
bt+1(ι)
bt+1(ι′)
)
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
) = −d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
)−t
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
)
⇔ −
d log
(
bt+1(ι)
bt+1(ι′)
)
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
) = −−td log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
)
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
)
⇔ −
d log
(
bt+1(ι)
bt+1(ι′)
)
d log
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1(ι
′)
) = t.
Next, I can turn to the optimisation problem of banks. Each financial inter-
mediary seeks to maximise the discounted stream of expected future cash flows
to its shareholders. The cash flow to stock owners in each period is the dividend
payment, such that the optimisation problem of bank ι can be stated as
max
bt+1(ι),dt+1(ι)
E0
∞∑
t=0
m0,tat(ι),
subject to piBt (ι) = (1 + r
b
t (ι))bt(ι) + dt+1(ι) − (1 + rt)dt(ι) − bt+1(ι) −Θt(ι),
kBt+1(ι) = (1 − δB)kBt (ι) + piBt (ι) − at(ι),
bt(ι) = kBt (ι) + dt(ι),
bt+1(ι) =
(
rbt+1(ι)
rbt+1
)−t
bt+1,
Θt(ι) = θ0
(
1
bt(ι)
bt+1(ι)
kBt+1(ι)
)θ1
.
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I can substitute for at(ι), piBt (ι), Θt(ι), dt+1(ι), and bt+1(ι) in the objective function.
This simplifies the problem to
max
rbt+1(ι),k
B
t+1(ι)
E0
∞∑
t=0
m0,t
[
(rbt (ι) − rt)
(
rbt (ι)
rbt
)−t−1
bt − 2kBt+1(ι) + (2 + rt − δB)kBt (ι)
− θ0
(rbt+1(ι)rbt+1
)−t
bt+1
1
kBt+1(ι)
(
rbt (ι)
rbt
)t−1
b−1t
θ1 ].
FOCs to this optimisation problem are given by
(I) FOC with respect to loan interest rate
∂ . . .
∂rbt+1(ι)
=m0,tEt
θ0θ1 ( bt+1(ι)bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1−1
(t)bt+1(ι)
1
rbt+1(ι)
1
kBt+1(ι)
1
bt(ι)

+ Et
[
m0,t+1
(
bt+1(ι) + (rbt+1(ι) − rt+1)(−t)bt+1(ι)
1
rbt+1(ι)
− θ0θ1
(
bt+2(ι)
bt+1(ι)kBt+2(ι)
)θ1−1 bt+2(ι)
kBt+2(ι)
tbt+1(ι)−1
1
rbt+1(ι)
)]
= 0
⇔ θ0θ1t
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1
= Et
[
mt,t+1
(
− bt+1(ι)rbt+1(ι)
+ t(rbt+1(ι) − rt+1)bt+1(ι) + θ0θ1
(
bt+2(ι)
bt+1(ι)kBt+2(ι)
)θ1
t
)]
⇔ Et
[
mt,t+1rbt+1(ι)bt+1(ι)
]
=
t
t − 1Et
[
mt,t+1
(
rt+1bt+1(ι)
− θ0θ1
(
bt+2(ι)
bt+1(ι)kBt+2(ι)
)θ1 )
+ θ0θ1
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1 ]
.
Symmetry among banks and normalisation of the measure of banks to
one imply that rbt+1(ι) = r
b
t+1, bt+1(ι) = bt+1, dt+1(ι) = dt+1, k
B
t+1(ι) = k
B
t+1, and
piBt+1(ι) = pi
B
t+1. Hence, we get the optimality condition with respect to the
loan interest rate as
Et
[
mt,t+1rbt+1bt+1
]
=
t
t − 1Et
[
mt,t+1rt+1bt+1 + θ0θ1
( (
bt+1
btkBt+1
)θ1
−mt,t+1
(
bt+2
bt+1kBt+2
)θ1 )]
.
156
Note that in principle it is not possible to solve this equation for rbt+1 explicitly
because for two random variables x and y, we have E[xy] , E[x]E[y], unless
Cov(x, y) = 0.1 Nevertheless, since I will later use a first–order approx-
imation of the solution of the model, I can actually ignore the covariance
term. Furthermore, using equation (A.1) I can then substitute for the SDF
Et
[
mt,t+1
]
= Et
[
β
(
(cHt+1)
ξ(1−lt+1)1−ξ
(cHt )
ξ(1−lt)1−ξ
)1−γ
cHt
cHt+1
]
= 11+rt+1 . For ease of interpretation, I
therefore solve the FOC for rbt+1 to finally get
rbt+1 =
t
t − 1Et
rt+1 + θ0θ1bt+1
( bt+1btkBt+1
)θ1
(1 + rt+1) −
(
bt+2
bt+1kBt+2
)θ1︸                                                         ︷︷                                                         ︸
Marginal Cost of Lending
. (A.18)
(II) FOC with respect to bank capital
∂ . . .
∂kBt+1(ι)
= m0,t
(
− 2 + θ0θ1
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1−1 ( bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
) )
+ Et
[
m0,t+1
(
2 + rt+1 − δB
)]
= 0
⇔ 2 = θ0θ1
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1 1
kBt+1(ι)
+ Et
[
mt,t+1
]
(2 + rt+1 − δB)
⇔ 2 = θ0θ1
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1 1
kBt+1(ι)
+ Et
β ( (cHt+1)ξ(1 − lt+1)1−ξ(cHt )ξ(1 − lt)1−ξ
)1−γ cHt
cHt+1
 (2 + rt+1 − δB)
(A.1)⇐⇒ 2 = θ0θ1
(
bt+1(ι)
bt(ι)kBt+1(ι)
)θ1 1
kBt+1(ι)
+
1
1 + rt+1
(2 + rt+1 − δB).
Again, using the fact that the number of banks is normalised to one and
imposing symmetry across banks yields
2 =
θ0θ1
kBt+1
(
bt+1
btkBt+1
)θ1
+
2 + rt+1 − δB
1 + rt+1︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Marginal Benefit of Bank Capital
. (A.19)
1The general formula for the expected value of the product of two random random variables
x and y is E[xy] = E[x]E[y] + Cov(x, y).
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Furthermore, symmetry implies that the bank balance sheet, the dynamic
equation for bank capital, and bank profits simplify to
bt = kBt + dt, (A.20)
kBt+1 = (1 − δB)kBt + piBt − at, (A.21)
and
piBt =
(
1 + rbt
)
bt + dt+1 − (1 + rt) dt − bt+1 −Θt, (A.22)
respectively.
A.1.5 General Equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that xt = xt+1 = 1. Accordingly, the budget constraint of
private households becomes
cHt + dt+1 = (1 + rt)dt + at + wtlt. (A.23)
The budget constraint of an individual entrepreneur is
cEt +
1
µE
ne,t + (1 + rbt )
1
µE
bt +
χ
2
1
µE
(ne,t
nt
)2
nt =
1
µE
ntpiFt +
1
µE
bt+1,
such that the aggregate budget constraint of entrepreneurs can be written as
µEcEt + ne,t + (1 + r
b
t )bt +
χ
2
(ne,t
nt
)2
nt = ntpiFt + bt+1. (A.24)
From (A.20), (A.21), (A.22), (A.23), and (A.24) I can derive the aggregate re-
source constraint of the economy as
cHt + µEc
E
t + ne,t +
χ
2
(ne,t
nt
)2
nt + Θt + kBt+1 − (1 − δB)kBt = wtlt + ntpiFt . (A.25)
Final good market clearing requires that
yt = wtlt + ntpiFt . (A.26)
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According to Walras’ Law, once all markets for goods and assets are in equilibrium,
the labour market will be cleared implicitly:
lt =
1
zt
ntkt. (A.27)
A.1.6 Model Solution
The model constitutes a stationary system of 24 non–linear expectational differ-
ence equations in 24 variables. The model features 4 exogenous state variables, 5
endogenous state variables, and 15 controls:
• Vector of exogenous state variables:
xx,t =
[
zs,t zc,t t κt
]′
• Vector of endogenous state variables:
xe,t =
[
rt bt nt kBt r
b
t
]′
• Vector of endogenous control variables:
xc,t =
[
cHt c
E
t wt pi
F
t pi
B
t νt yt qt kt pt lt ne,t µt dt at
]′
.
The system of equations incorporates (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), (A.5), (A.6), (A.7), (A.8),
(A.9), (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13), (A.14), (A.15), (A.16), (A.17), (A.18), (A.19),
(A.20), (A.21), (A.22), (A.24), (A.25), and (A.26).
Unfortunately, the model does not have a closed form solution. Therefore, I
have to approximate its solution. I use a first–order approximation of the model
solution.
First, I log–linearise the system around its deterministic steady state, which
will be derived in Section A.2. To illustrate the straightforward concept of log–
linearisation, it is convenient to consider a system of only two variables z and y.
I can write the system as an implicit function
f (z, y) = 0,
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where z and y denote steady state values. Next, I can take the total differential to
get
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
dzt +
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
dyt = 0
⇔ ∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
dzt
z
+
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
dyt
y
= 0.
Let ẑt denote log–deviations from the steady state. That is,
ẑt ≡ log
(zt
z
)
≈ zt − z
z
=
dzt
z
.
Consequently, the total differential from above can be rewritten as
0 =
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
dzt
z
+
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
dyt
y
≈
(
∂ f (z, y)
∂z
z
)
ẑt +
(
∂ f (z, y)
∂y
y
)
ŷt.
Accordingly, log–linearisation of the model at hand yields a linear system of
(expectational) difference equations of the form
A˜ Et
[̂
xt+1
]
= B˜ x̂t,
where
Et
[̂
xt+1
]
=

Et
[̂
xe,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xx,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 =
Et
[̂
xs,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 ,
and x̂s,t+1 ≡ [̂xe,t+1 x̂x,t+1]′ denotes the vector of state variables in log–deviations
from steady state.
Second, I use the modified Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology suggested
by Klein (2000) to solve the log–linear approximation of the model. This approach
allows to express the model in state space form:
• Measurement Equation
x̂c,t = Z x̂s,t
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• Transition Equation
x̂s,t = T x̂s,t−1 + Rut, ut ∼ N(0,Σ)
with
R =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

ut =

uzs,t
uzc,t
uκ,t
u,t

Σ =

σ2zs 0 0 0
0 σ2zc 0 0
0 0 σ2κ 0
0 0 0 σ2

.
A.2 Steady State
This section derives the deterministic steady states for the pre– and post–deregulation
economy.
A.2.1 Pre–Deregulation Economy
• I set l = 0.3.
• I normalise z = 1.
161
• I pin down the steady state loan interest rate rb and capital ratio kBb .
• From (A.1), I derive
1 = β(1 + r)
⇔ r = 1
β
− 1.
• From equation (A.26)
y = wl + npiF
(A.10)⇐⇒ y = wl + n 1
φ
y
n
⇔ y
(
1 − 1
φ
)
= wl
⇔ y = φ
φ − 1wl. (A.28)
• From (A.15) and the assumption that the borrowing constraint of entre-
preneurs is binding in the deterministic long–run equilibrium, i.e. µ > 0, I
obtain
κn2piF = b(1 + rb)
(A.10)⇐⇒ b = κ
1 + rb
n2
1
φ
y
n
(A.28)⇐⇒ b = κ
(1 + rb)φ
φ
φ − 1wln
⇔ b = κ
(1 + rb)(φ − 1)wln. (A.29)
• From (A.19), I derive θ0 as
2 = θ0θ1(kB)−1−θ1 +
2 + r − δB
1 + r
(A.1)⇐⇒ 2 − β(2 + r − δB) = θ0θ1(kB)−1−θ1
⇔ θ0 =
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
) (kB)1+θ1
θ1
. (A.30)
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• From (A.23), I can calculate cH:
cH = rd + a + wl
(A.21)⇐⇒ cH = rd + piB − δBkB + wl
(A.22)⇐⇒ cH = rd + rbb − rd −Θ − δBkB + wl
⇔ cH = rbb − θ0
( 1
kB
)θ1
− δBkB + wl
(A.30)⇐⇒ cH = rbb − 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
)
(kB)1+θ1−θ1 − δBkB + wl
⇔ cH = rbb − 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
) kB
b
b − δB k
B
b
b + wl
⇔ cH =
[
rb − 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
) kB
b
− δB k
B
b
]
b + wl.
(A.29)⇐⇒ cH =
[
rb −
( 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
)
+ δB
) kB
b
]
κ
(1 + rb)(φ − 1)︸                                                               ︷︷                                                               ︸
≡constA
wln + wl.
(A.31)
• Using equations (A.3) and (A.31), I am now able to calculate a value for n:
constAwln + wl = (1 − l)w ξ1 − ξ
⇔ constAln = (1 − l) ξ1 − ξ − l
⇔ n =
(
ξ
1 − ξ
1 − l
l
− 1
)
1
constA
. (A.32)
• From equations (A.7) and (A.9), I derive the wage rate as
( y
k
) 1
φ
=
φ
φ − 1
w
z
(A.8)⇐⇒
(
n
φ
φ−1
) 1
φ
=
φ
φ − 1
w
z
⇔ w = φ − 1
φ
zn
1
φ−1 . (A.33)
• As a result, I can use equation (A.31) to calculate cH, equation (A.28) to get
y, and equation (A.29) to determine b.
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• Since I know b and the capital ratio kBb , the bank capital stock can be easily
computed by kB = k
B
b b.
• From (A.20), I derive bank deposits as
d = b − kB.
• Then, I use (A.30) to determine θ0.
• From (A.18), I can derive the mean value of the elasticity of substitution in
the credit market as
rb =

 − 1
[
r +
θ0θ1
b(kB)θ1
r
]
⇔ rb = 
[
rb − r − θ0θ1
b(kB)θ1
r
]
⇔  = r
b
rb − r
(
1 + θ0θ1
b(kB)θ1
) .
• From (A.16)
ne = δn.
• From (A.10)
piF =
1
φ
y
n
.
• From (A.8)
y = n
φ
φ−1 k
⇔ k = yn φ1−φ .
• From (A.7)
p =
φ
φ − 1
w
z
.
• From (A.22)
piB = rbb − rd − θ0
( 1
kB
)θ1
.
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• From (A.23)
a = cH − rd − wl.
• From (A.2)
ν =
β
1 − βa.
• From (A.13) and (A.14), together with (A.16), I can derive the number of
entrepreneurs as
1
1 − βE(1 − δ)
(
βE
(
piF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
+
χ
2
δ2
)
+ βEµκnpiF + µκnpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
) )
= (cE)−γE (1 + χδ)
⇔ βEpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
+ βE
χ
2
δ2 + βE(cE)γEµκnpiF + (cE)γEµκnpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
=
(
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ)
(A.12)⇐⇒ piF
(
1 − 1
µE
) (
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
)
=
(
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − βEχ2 δ2 − βE 1 − βE(1 + rb)1 + rb κnpiF
⇔
(
1 − 1
µE
)
=
[ (
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − βEχ2 δ2
− βE 1 − βE(1 + r
b)
1 + rb
κnpiF
] (
piF
(
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
))−1
⇔ 1
µE
=1 −
[ (
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − βEχ2 δ2
− βE 1 − βE(1 + r
b)
1 + rb
κnpiF
] (
piF
(
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
))−1
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⇔ 1
µE
=
[
piF
(
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
)
− (1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ)
+βE
χ
2
δ2 + βE
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κnpiF
] (
piF
(
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
))−1
⇔ µE =
piF
(
βE +
1−βE(1+rb)
1+rb κn
)
βEpiF +
(
1 + βE
) 1−βE(1+rb)
1+rb κnpi
F − (1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) + βE χ2δ2 .
• From (A.24) together with (A.16)
cE =
1
µE
(
npiF − ne − rbb − χ2 δ
2n
)
.
• From (A.12)
µ = (cE)−γE
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
.
• Finally, from (A.14) together with (A.16)
q = (cE)−γE (1 + χδ) .
A.2.2 Post–Deregulation Economy
• As before, I normalise z = 1.
• Also, from (A.1) I can derive r as
r =
1
β
− 1.
• From (A.30), I can compute bank capital kB as
kB =
(
θ0θ1
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
) 1
1+θ1
.
• The magnitude of the deregulation shock is determined by pinning down
the bank capital ratio after deregulation k
B
b . Accordingly, bank assets b can
be easily calculated by b =
(
kB
b
)−1
kB.
166
• Then, I can use (A.20) to calculate bank deposits d.
The remainder of the problem cannot be solved analytically. I now show how I
simplify the system before I approximate the solution.
• First, I use equation (A.29) to derive an expression for the gross loan interest
rate:
(1 + rb) =
κ
b(φ − 1)︸   ︷︷   ︸
≡constB
wln. (A.34)
• Second, I combine equations (A.13) and (A.14) to obtain another expression
for the gross loan interest rate:
1
1 − βE(1 − δ)
(
βE
(
piF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
+
χ
2
δ2
)
+ βEµκnpiF + µκnpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
) )
= (cE)−γE (1 + χδ)
⇔ βEpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
+ βE
χ
2
δ2 + βE(cE)γEµκnpiF + (cE)γEµκnpiF
(
1 − 1
µE
)
=
(
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ)
(A.12)⇐⇒ piF
(
1 − 1
µE
) (
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
)
+ −βEχ2 δ
2 + βE
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κnpiF
=
(
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ)
(A.15)⇐⇒ (1 + r
b)b
κn2
(
1 − 1
µE
) (
βE +
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
)
+ βE
χ
2
δ2
+βE
1 − βE(1 + rb)
1 + rb
κn
(1 + rb)b
κn2
=
(
1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ)
⇔ (1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − βEχ2 δ2 = βE(1 + rb) bκn2
(
1 − 1
µE
)
+ βE(1 − βE(1 + rb)) bn + (1 − βE(1 + r
b))
b
n
(
1 − 1
µE
)
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⇔ (1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − βEχ2 δ2
= (1 + rb)
[
βE
b
κn2
(
1 − 1
µE
)
− β2E
b
n
− βE bn
(
1 − 1
µE
)]
+ βE
b
n
+
b
n
(
1 − 1
µE
)
⇔ (1 − βE(1 − δ)) (1 + χδ) − χ2 δ2βE︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
≡constC
−
(
βE + 1 − 1µE
)
b
n
= (1 + rb)
b
n
βE
[
1
κn
(
1 − 1
µE
)
− βE − 1 + 1µE
]
⇔ (1 + rb) =
n
b constC −
(
βE + 1 − 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1 − 1µE
)
− βE − 1 + 1µE
] . (A.35)
• Third, I equalise consumption of private households from equations (A.3)
and (A.31) to derive a condition for the portion of hours worked:
w(1 − l) ξ
1 − ξ =
[
rb −
( 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
)
+ δB
) kB
b
]
κ
(1 + rb)(φ − 1)︸                                                               ︷︷                                                               ︸
≡constA
wln + wl
⇔ 1 − l
l
ξ
1 − ξ − 1 =
[
1 + rb − 1 −
( 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
)
+ δB
) kB
b
]
· κ
(1 + rb)(φ − 1)n
(A.34)⇐⇒ 1 − l
l
ξ
1 − ξ − 1 =
κ
(φ − 1)n
−
[
1 +
( 1
θ1
(
2 − β(2 + r − δB)
)
+ δB
) kB
b
]
κ
constB(φ − 1)︸                                                            ︷︷                                                            ︸
≡constD
1
wl
(A.33)⇐⇒ 1 − l
l
ξ
1 − ξ − 1 =
κ
(φ − 1)n − constD
1
l
φ
φ − 1
1
z
n
1
1−φ
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⇔ ξ
1 − ξ −
(
ξ
1 − ξ + 1 +
κ
φ − 1n
)
l = −constD φφ − 1
1
z
n
1
1−φ
⇐⇒ l =
ξ
1−ξ + constD
φ
φ−1
1
z n
1
1−φ
ξ
1−ξ + 1 +
κ
φ−1n
. (A.36)
• Fourth, I combine equations (A.33), (A.34), and (A.35) to write l as a function
of n
(1 + rb) = constBwln
(A.33)⇐⇒ constBφ − 1φ zn
φ
φ−1 l = (1 + rb)
(A.35)⇐⇒ l = 1
constB
1
z
φ
φ − 1n
φ
φ−1
n
b constC −
(
βE + 1 − 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1 − 1µE
)
− βE − 1 + 1µE
] . (A.37)
• Conditions (A.36) and (A.2.2) form a system of two equations in two un-
knowns: l and n. Now, I can easily substitute for l, which yields a function
F(n):
ξ
1−ξ + constD
φ
φ−1
1
z n
1
1−φ
ξ
1−ξ + 1 +
κ
φ−1n
=
1
constB
1
z
φ
φ − 1n
φ
φ−1
n
b constC −
(
βE + 1 − 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1 − 1µE
)
− βE − 1 + 1µE
]
⇔
ξ
1−ξ + constD
φ
φ−1
1
z n
1
1−φ
1
constB
1
z
φ
φ−1n
φ
φ−1
n
b constC−
(
βE+1− 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1− 1µE
)
−βE−1+ 1µE
]
=
ξ
1 − ξ + 1 +
κ
φ − 1n
⇔ n =

ξ
1−ξ + constD
φ
φ−1
1
z n
1
1−φ
1
constB
1
z
φ
φ−1n
φ
φ−1
n
b constC−
(
βE+1− 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1− 1µE
)
−βE−1+ 1µE
]
− 1 − ξ
1 − ξ

φ − 1
κ
≡ F(n).
Figure A.1 displays function F(n) based on the calibration for the average
state. F(n) is a function which maps the domain of n into itself. It intersects
the 45 degree line exactly once. This intersection determines the fixed point
in n, such that a unique solution for n exists.
169
Figure A.1: Fixed Point for n in the Average State
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Since F(n) is highly non–linear in n, it is not possible to simply solve for
n analytically with pencil and paper. Hence, I have to apply numerical
methods in order to derive the steady state firm number n.
Once I have calculated n, it is easy to recover the solutions for the remaining
variables.
• From (A.35), I obtain the loan interest rate
rb =
n
b constC −
(
βE + 1 − 1µE
)
βE
[
1
κn
(
1 − 1µE
)
− βE − 1 + 1µE
] − 1.
• I use equation (A.2.2) to calculate l.
• From equation (A.33), I get w.
• From equation (A.31), I calculate cH.
• From equation (A.28), I calculate y.
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• From (A.18), I derive the steady state elasticity of substitution in the credit
market:
 =
rb
rb − r
(
1 + θ0θ1
b(kB)θ1
) .
• From (A.16), I calculate ne.
• From (A.10), I get piF.
• From (A.8), I compute k.
• From (A.7), I obtain p.
• From (A.22), I determine piB.
• From (A.23), I calculate a.
• From (A.2), I calculate ν.
• From (A.24), I get cE.
• From (A.12), I obtain µ.
• Finally, from (A.14), I compute q.
A.3 State–Specific Calibration
Table A.1 presents the state–specific calibration of parameters β, µE, θ0, δ, and
the values of  before deregulation. These parameters are pinned down in order
to match certain financial and operating figures of banks in each federal state.
To be more precise, I set the parameters to obtain a capital ratio, loan interest
rate, return on deposits, return on equity, and dividend payout ratio in the pre–
deregulation steady state which is equal to the respective state average. Table A.2
lists the state average of these operating figures for the period between 1966 and
the year in which intrastate branching through M&As was permitted. Numbers
are calculated using aggregate commercial banking data taken from the HSOB
provided by the FDIC.
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Table A.1: State–Specific Calibration
β µE θ0 δB 
1 Alabama 0.9719 1.8069 1.51e-05 0.0874 1.5058
2 Alaska 0.9819 1.8399 1.44e-05 0.1287 1.2753
3 Arizona 0.9774 1.8629 9.79e-06 0.0768 1.4872
4 Arkansas 0.9614 1.7080 1.18e-05 0.0762 1.7512
5 California 0.9748 1.8746 1.05e-05 0.0701 1.5862
6 Colorado 0.9637 1.5176 3.02e-06 0.0223 1.5604
7 Connecticut 0.9768 1.7085 7.39e-06 0.0559 1.4078
8 Delaware 0.9874 1.9959 1.88e-05 0.0597 1.2329
9 District of Columbia 0.9844 2.0220 1.73e-05 0.0762 1.3119
10 Florida 0.9653 1.6585 8.30e-06 0.0718 1.6184
11 Georgia 0.9704 1.6485 8.83e-06 0.0786 1.4510
12 Hawaii 0.9603 1.6080 6.29e-06 0.0734 1.7106
13 Idaho 0.9809 1.9254 1.35e-05 0.0755 1.3887
14 Illinois 0.9549 1.7034 1.02e-05 0.0842 2.0480
15 Indiana 0.9595 1.6807 9.38e-06 0.0753 1.8279
16 Iowa 0.9587 1.6841 1.06e-05 0.0609 1.8612
17 Kansas 0.9617 1.6927 1.17e-05 0.0726 1.7151
18 Kentucky 0.9624 1.7380 1.31e-05 0.0859 1.7329
19 Louisiana 0.9626 1.7242 1.34e-05 0.1012 1.6619
20 Maine 0.9777 1.8220 1.27e-05 0.0648 1.4163
21 Maryland 0.9852 2.0905 2.14e-05 0.0811 1.2923
22 Massachusetts 0.9637 1.5744 5.39e-06 0.0591 1.5804
23 Michigan 0.9569 1.6513 6.93e-06 0.0625 1.9696
24 Minnesota 0.9576 1.6120 5.56e-06 0.0438 1.9045
25 Mississippi 0.9635 1.7096 1.16e-05 0.0891 1.6690
26 Missouri 0.9622 1.6504 8.17e-06 0.0620 1.7155
27 Montana 0.9588 1.5355 3.20e-06 0.0163 1.7518
28 Nebraska 0.9650 1.7076 1.20e-05 0.0821 1.6210
29 Nevada 0.9803 1.9359 1.62e-05 0.0833 1.3802
30 New Hampshire 0.9611 1.7100 1.20e-05 0.0750 1.7645
31 New Jersey 0.9762 1.8782 1.27e-05 0.0659 1.5142
32 New Mexico 0.9596 1.5911 6.39e-06 0.0634 1.6995
33 New York 0.9776 1.8325 9.73e-06 0.0549 1.4748
34 North Carolina 0.9815 1.9401 1.40e-05 0.0761 1.3760
35 North Dakota 0.9579 1.7034 1.16e-05 0.0790 1.8720
36 Ohio 0.9732 1.8767 1.55e-05 0.0701 1.5644
37 Oklahoma 0.9616 1.6718 1.07e-05 0.0891 1.6685
38 Oregon 0.9625 1.6337 6.39e-06 0.0721 1.7053
39 Pennsylvania 0.9651 1.7341 9.87e-06 0.0625 1.7569
40 Rhode Island 0.9776 2.0420 1.97e-05 0.0613 1.5368
41 South Carolina 0.9901 2.0001 1.92e-05 0.0779 1.1661
42 South Dakota 0.9802 2.0038 1.80e-05 0.0724 1.4215
43 Tennessee 0.9625 1.6540 8.32e-06 0.0690 1.6989
44 Texas 0.9614 1.6419 7.55e-06 0.0693 1.7293
45 Utah 0.9699 1.7183 9.52e-06 0.0848 1.5415
46 Vermont 0.9755 2.0263 1.66e-05 0.0597 1.6501
47 Virginia 0.9730 1.7717 1.05e-05 0.0662 1.5278
48 Washington 0.9622 1.5787 4.28e-06 0.0465 1.6810
49 West Virginia 0.9610 1.7922 1.68e-05 0.0783 1.8283
50 Wisconsin 0.9580 1.6758 8.99e-06 0.0673 1.9048
51 Wyoming 0.9609 1.5660 5.71e-06 0.0433 1.6476
Mean 0.9684 1.7273 1.01e-05 0.0701 1.6062
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Table A.2: State–Specific Financial and Operating Figures of Banks
Captial Ratio Loan Interest Return on Return on Dividend
Rate Deposits Equity Payout Ratio
1 Alabama 0.0782 0.0868 0.0289 0.1271 0.3120
2 Alaska 0.0617 0.0860 0.0184 0.1539 0.1638
3 Arizona 0.0562 0.0709 0.0231 0.1278 0.3989
4 Arkansas 0.0782 0.0943 0.0401 0.1161 0.3439
5 California 0.0596 0.0702 0.0258 0.1214 0.4227
6 Colorado 0.0710 0.1054 0.0377 0.1045 0.7865
7 Connecticut 0.0694 0.0826 0.0238 0.1083 0.4838
8 Delaware 0.0924 0.0682 0.0128 0.1337 0.5533
9 District of Columbia 0.0724 0.0669 0.0158 0.1277 0.4033
10 Florida 0.0701 0.0949 0.0360 0.1175 0.3892
11 Georgia 0.0745 0.0989 0.0305 0.1228 0.3599
12 Hawaii 0.0622 0.1001 0.0413 0.1345 0.4545
13 Idaho 0.0669 0.0701 0.0195 0.1248 0.3954
14 Illinois 0.0659 0.0930 0.0472 0.0994 0.1525
15 Indiana 0.0694 0.0939 0.0422 0.1159 0.3503
16 Iowa 0.0813 0.0939 0.0431 0.1150 0.4704
17 Kansas 0.0820 0.0963 0.0398 0.1150 0.3683
18 Kentucky 0.0765 0.0933 0.0391 0.1273 0.3254
19 Louisiana 0.0750 0.0984 0.0388 0.1063 0.0481
20 Maine 0.0792 0.0781 0.0228 0.1167 0.4444
21 Maryland 0.0765 0.0668 0.0150 0.1230 0.3405
22 Massachusetts 0.0673 0.1033 0.0377 0.1099 0.4619
23 Michigan 0.0626 0.0920 0.0450 0.1141 0.4526
24 Minnesota 0.0663 0.0938 0.0443 0.1109 0.6054
25 Mississippi 0.0731 0.0954 0.0379 0.1315 0.3225
26 Missouri 0.0734 0.0949 0.0393 0.1165 0.4682
27 Montana 0.0706 0.1006 0.0430 0.1150 0.8579
28 Nebraska 0.0785 0.0956 0.0363 0.1310 0.3731
29 Nevada 0.0720 0.0735 0.0201 0.1328 0.3726
30 New Hampshire 0.0795 0.0943 0.0405 0.1143 0.3441
31 New Jersey 0.0707 0.0723 0.0244 0.1188 0.4457
32 New Mexico 0.0692 0.1030 0.0421 0.1140 0.4438
33 New York 0.0686 0.0715 0.0229 0.1080 0.4914
34 North Carolina 0.0675 0.0696 0.0189 0.1175 0.3523
35 North Dakota 0.0757 0.0953 0.0440 0.1253 0.3692
36 Ohio 0.0789 0.0768 0.0275 0.1149 0.3897
37 Oklahoma 0.0742 0.1005 0.0399 0.0997 0.1068
38 Oregon 0.0601 0.0949 0.0390 0.1198 0.3979
39 Pennsylvania 0.0716 0.0846 0.0362 0.1159 0.4611
40 Rhode Island 0.0822 0.0660 0.0229 0.1150 0.4667
41 South Carolina 0.0828 0.0707 0.0100 0.1217 0.3599
42 South Dakota 0.0762 0.0686 0.0202 0.1148 0.3696
43 Tennessee 0.0709 0.0955 0.0390 0.1056 0.3464
44 Texas 0.0673 0.0960 0.0402 0.0980 0.2931
45 Utah 0.0652 0.0889 0.0310 0.1386 0.3881
46 Vermont 0.0736 0.0641 0.0251 0.0951 0.3722
47 Virginia 0.0720 0.0810 0.0278 0.1160 0.4297
48 Washington 0.0608 0.0975 0.0393 0.0969 0.5199
49 West Virginia 0.0863 0.0905 0.0406 0.1130 0.3074
50 Wisconsin 0.0703 0.0929 0.0438 0.1137 0.4080
51 Wyoming 0.0786 0.1042 0.0407 0.1108 0.6094
Mean 0.0722 0.0870 0.0326 0.1174 0.4030
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A.4 Banking Deregulation Dates
Table A.3 lists the years in which each federal state entered intra– and interstate
banking. Dates are taken from Demyanyk et al. (2007) who updated the years of
deregulation reported in Amel (1993) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).
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Table A.3: States and Year of Deregulation
Intrastate Branching Intrastate de novo Interstate
through M&A Branching Banking
1 Alabama (AL) 1981 1990 1987
2 Alaska (AK) < 1970 < 1970 1982
3 Arizona (AZ) <1970 < 1970 1986
4 Arkansas (AR) 1994 1999 1989
5 California (CA) < 1970 < 1970 1987
6 Colorado (CO) 1991 1997 1988
7 Connecticut (CT) 1980 1988 1983
8 Delaware (DE) < 1970 < 1970 1988
9 District of Colombia (DC) < 1970 < 1970 1985
10 Florida (FL) 1988 1988 1985
11 Georgia (GA) 1983 1998 1985
12 Hawaii (HI) 1986 1986 1995
13 Idaho (ID) < 1970 < 1970 1985
14 Illinois (IL) 1988 1993 1986
15 Indiana (IN) 1989 1991 1986
16 Iowa (IA) 1997 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1991
17 Kansas (KS) 1987 1990 1992
18 Kentucky (KY) 1990 2001 1984
19 Louisiana (LA) 1988 1988 1987
20 Maine (ME) 1975 1975 1978
21 Maryland (MD) < 1970 < 1970 1985
22 Massachusetts (MA) 1984 1984 1983
23 Michigan (MI) 1987 1988 1986
24 Minnesota (MN) 1993 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1986
25 Mississippi (MS) 1986 1989 1988
26 Missouri (MO) 1990 1990 1986
27 Montana (MT) 1990 1997 1993
28 Nebraska (NE) 1985 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1990
29 Nevada (NV) < 1970 < 1970 1985
30 New Hampshire (NH) 1987 1987 1987
31 New Jersey (NJ) 1977 1996 1986
32 New Mexico (NM) 1991 1991 1989
33 New York (NY) 1976 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1982
34 North Carolina (NC) < 1970 < 1970 1985
35 North Dakota (ND) 1987 1996 1991
36 Ohio (OH) 1979 1989 1985
37 Oklahoma (OK) 1988 2000 1987
38 Oregon (OR) 1985 1985 1986
39 Pennsylvania (PA) 1982 1989 1986
40 Rhode Island (RI) < 1970 < 1970 1984
41 South Carolina (SC) < 1970 < 1970 1986
42 South Dakota (SD) < 1970 < 1970 1988
43 Tennessee (TN) 1985 1990 1985
44 Texas (TX) 1988 1988 1987
45 Utah (UT) 1981 1981 1984
46 Vermont (VT) 1970 1970 1988
47 Virginia (VA) 1978 1986 1985
48 Washington (WA) 1985 1985 1987
49 West Virginia (WV) 1987 1987 1988
50 Wisconsin (WI) 1990 1989 1987
51 Wyoming (WY) 1988 1999 1987
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates that deregulation did not occur before 2001.
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Appendix B
Appendix to “Business Cycles in
Emerging Markets: the Role of
Liability Dollarisation and Valuation
Effects”
B.1 Model
This section describes the model environment of our framework with liability
dollarisation.
B.1.1 Model Framework
The economy is represented by:
Production Technology
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α Production Function
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ) Transitory Technology Process
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ) Permanent Technology Process
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt Law of Motion of Capital
with zt ∼ N(0, σ2z) and gt ∼ N(0, σ2g).
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Consumption
Ct =
[
θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
Consumption Index
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = [C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ]1−σ
1 − σ Household Period Utility Function
c?t = (c
?
t−1)
ρc exp(ct) Foreign Consumption Process
with ct ∼ N(0, σ2c ).
Price Indices
et =
pt
pF,t
Real Exchange Rate
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1Dt+1
et+1Yt+1
]
− pD
eY
)
− 1
)
Interest Rate
pt =
[
θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η Domestic Price Index
tott =
pH,t
pF,t
Terms of Trade
Aggregation
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
= ptCt + It + pt
Dt
et
(1 + rt−1) Resource Constraint
NXt = pH,tC?H,t − pF,tCF,t Net Exports
CAt = −rt−1pt Dtet + NXt Current Account
∆NFAt = CAt + VALt Change in Net Foreign Asset Position
VALt = Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
Valuation Effects
Yt = pH,t(CH,t + C?H,t + It) Good Market Clearing
Since there is no population growth in this model, the mass of population is
set equal to one. Moreover, the home–produced good serves as nume´raire, i.e.
we normalise its price pH,t to one. Accordingly, everything is expressed in units
of the home good instead of the domestic currency.
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B.1.2 Detrending the Variables
The variables Yt, Ct, CH,t, CF,t, It, Kt, and Dt as well as C?H,t and C
?
t exhibit a
common stochastic trend.1 They need to be detrended in order to obtain system
of stationary variables. Consequently, the relevant variables are detrended in the
following way:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
,
where xt denotes the stationary counterpart of Xt. Hence, our relevant equations
in detrended form are given by
• Production Function
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α
Γt−1
= ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α
• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 =
ΓtKt+1
ΓtΓt−1
=
(1 − δ)Kt + It
Γt−1
− φ
2
(Kt+1Γt
ΓtΓt−1
Γt−1
Kt
− µg
)2 Kt
Γt−1
= (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
gtkt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt
• Utility Function
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = (C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ =
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
(Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ
⇔ = Γγ(1−σ)t−1
((
Ct
Γt−1
)γ
(1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
1 − σ
⇔ = Γγ(1−σ)t−1︸︷︷︸
≡κt−1
(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ︸              ︷︷              ︸
u(ct,1−lt)
⇔ = κt−1u(ct, 1 − lt)
1In general, foreign and domestic variables can exhibit different stochastic trends. However,
to keep the model tractable, we assume that domestic and foreign variables share a cointegrating
relationship with cointegrating vector β = [1,−1]′.
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• Consumption Index
ct =
Ct
Γt−1
=
[
θ
1
ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
Γt−1
ct =
θ 1η
(
CH,t
Γt−1
) η−1
η
+ (1 − θ) 1η
(
CF,t
Γt−1
) η−1
η

η
η−1
ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
.
• Resource Constraint
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
ptCt + It + pt Dtet (1 + rt−1)
Γt−1
−Γtpt
Dt+1
et
Γt−1Γt
= ptct+it+pt
dt
et
(1+rt−1)−gtpt dt+1et
B.1.3 Maximisation Problem of the Household
The optimisation problem of the representative household can be decomposed
into two stages. The first stage describes the intratemporal optimisation prob-
lem and derives optimal consumption of home and foreign goods. The second
stage is the intertemporal optimisation problem, which determines the optimal
intertemporal consumption and saving behaviour.
First Stage – Intratemporal Optimisation
The detrended consumption index is given by
ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
,
where cH,t denotes detrended consumption of the home good, cF,t denotes de-
trended consumption of the foreign good, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of home goods in
consumption, and η ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between
home and foreign goods.
The price index pt is defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one
unit of the detrended composite good ct, given the prices of the home and foreign
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goods. Accordingly, the representative agent solves the minimisation problem
min
{cH,t,cF,t}
ptct = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t
s.t. ct =
[
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
= 1.
We set up the Lagrangian
L = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t − pt [ct − 1] ,
where we can use pt as the Lagrange multiplier because it determines the shadow
price of consumption. First–order conditions can then be derived as
∂L
∂cH,t
= pH,t − pt
(
η
η − 1
) [
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1−1
θ
1
η
(
η − 1
η
)
c
η−1
η −1
H,t = 0
⇔ pH,t = ptc
1
η
t θ
1
η c
− 1η
H,t
and
∂L
∂cF,t
= pF,t − pt
(
η
η − 1
) [
θ
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1 − θ)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1−1
(1 − θ) 1η
(
η − 1
η
)
c
η−1
η −1
F,t = 0
⇔ pF,t = ptc
1
η
t (1 − θ)
1
η c
− 1η
F,t .
Hence, we get
cH,t = θ
(
pt
pH,t
)η
ct,
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct.
Note that we can combine and rearrange the above equations for cH,t and cF,t to
obtain
cH,t
cF,t
=
θ
1 − θ
(
pH,t
pF,t
)−η
.
From this equation, we can easily show that the elasticity of intratemporal substi-
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tution between home and foreign consumption goods is given by η:
d log
(
cH,t
cF,t
)
d log
(
pH,t
pF,t
) = −η,
i.e. if the relative price of home consumption increases by 1 percent, relative home
consumption declines by η percent.
As a next step, we derive the consumption price index pt:
ptct = pH,tcH,t + pF,tcF,t
⇔ ptct = pH,tθ
(
pt
pH,t
)η
ct + pF,t(1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct
⇔ pt = θpηt p1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)pηt p1−ηF,t
⇔ p1−ηt = θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
⇔ pt =
[
θp1−ηH,t + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
.
Since we normalise the price of home goods to one, our equations determining
the consumption of home goods and the price index simplify to
cH,t = θp
η
t ct,
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η
.
Second Stage – Intertemporal Optimisation
Combining the detrended versions of production, law of motion of capital, and
the resource constraint yields the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
as a function of capital, labour, consumption, and foreign debt. As a result, the
representative household’s optimisation problem at time t can be stated as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,dτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ))
s.t. ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α+(1 − δ)kτ + gτpτdτ+1eτ ≥
pτcτ + gτkτ+1 +
φ
2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + pτ
dτ
eτ
(1 + rτ−1),
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taking as given kt, dt, as well as the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
[∏ j−2
s=0
dt+ j
1+rt+s
]
= 0.
Accordingly, the optimisation problem yields the following Lagrangian:
L =Et
 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ) + λτ
(
ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α + gτpτ
dτ+1
eτ
+ (1 − δ)kτ
−pτcτ − gτkτ+1 − φ2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ − pτdτeτ (1 + rτ−1)
))
with the following FOCs:
(I)
∂L
∂ct
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
− λtpt = 0
⇔ κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂ct = λtpt
⇒ κtEt
[
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1
]
= Et
[
λt+1pt+1
]
(II)
∂L
∂lt
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
+ λt
∂yt
∂lt
= 0
⇔ − κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂lt = λt
∂yt
∂lt
(III)
∂L
∂kt+1
= −λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
+ Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
= 0
⇔ λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
= Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
(IV)
∂L
∂dt+1
= λtgt
pt
et
− βEt
[
λt+1
pt+1
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
= 0
⇔ λtgt ptet = βEt
[
λt+1
pt+1
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
(V)
∂L
∂λt
= yt + (1 − δ)kt + pt gtdt+1et
− ct − gtkt+1 − φ2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt − pt dtet (1 + rt−1) = 0
⇔ yt + (1 − δ)kt + pt gtdt+1et =
ptct + gtkt+1 +
φ
2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt + pt
dt
et
(1 + rt−1)
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B.1.4 International Prices and Trade
The representative agent’s problem in the rest of the world (ROW) is analogous to
the home country. However, the domestic economy is infinitesimally small. That
is, the ROW is approximately closed and only consumes goods produced abroad.
Accordingly, the price index of the foreign consumption composite p?t boils down
to the foreign price of goods produced in the ROW p?F,t, i.e. p
?
t = p
?
F,t. We assume
that the law of one price holds:
pF,t =
p?F,t
st
=
p?t
st
,
and
pH,t =
p?H,t
st
,
where st represents the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of the domestic
currency in terms of the foreign currency. Since the domestic price of home goods
is normalised to one, the nominal exchange rate simply equals the foreign price
of home goods p?H,t. The real exchange rate is the price of the domestic composite
consumption good in units of the foreign composite consumption good:2
et =
ptst
p?t
=
ptst
p?F,t
=
ptst
pF,tst
=
pt
pF,t
.
Moreover, terms of trade are defined as the price of home–produced goods in
terms of imported foreign goods:
tott =
pH,t
pF,t
=
1
pF,t
.
Let c?t denote detrended foreign consumption. We assume that the ROW has
the same composite consumption index as the domestic economy. Hence, from
2Despite the assumption that the law of one price holds for our individual goods, purchasing
power parity is not fulfilled. Thus, the real exchange rate is not equal to one in our setup. At first
glance, this seems somewhat bewildering. However, note that the home country is infinitesimally
small from the viewpoint of the ROW, such that foreign composite consumption consists only of
foreign goods. Therefore, we generally have ptst , p?t and et , 1. Monacelli (2005) calls this the
“law of one price gap”.
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the perspective of the home economy, foreign demand for the home good is
c?H,t = θ
?
(
p?t
p?H,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
( p?F,t
p?H,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
(
pF,tst
pH,tst
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
(
pF,t
pH,t
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?
( 1
tott
)η?
c?t
⇔ c?H,t = θ?pη
?
F,t c
?
t .
Imports are given by pF,tcF,t, such that net exports can be calculated as
nxt = pH,tc?H,t − pF,tcF,t = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t.
B.1.5 Current Account and Valuation Effects
The change in the net foreign asset position equals the current account adjusted
for valuation effects:
∆NFAt = CAt + VALt.
It is straightforward to derive valuation effects in this model. The current account
is equal to the sum of negative interest payments on foreign debt and net exports:
CAt = −rt−1pt Dtet + NXt.
Also, recall that the aggregate resource constraint given by
Yt + pt
Dt+1
et
= ptCt + It + pt
Dt
et
(1 + rt−1).
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We can then rearrange the resource constraint to get
Yt − ptCt − It − rt−1pt Dtet = pt
(
−Dt+1
et
+
Dt
et
)
⇔ Yt − ptCt − It︸         ︷︷         ︸
= Primary Current Account
−rt−1pt Dtet = −pt
Dt+1
et
+ pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1 + pt−1
Dt
et−1
⇔ Yt − It︸︷︷︸
= Net Output
−pH,tCH,t − pF,tCF,t︸                ︷︷                ︸
=−ptCt
−rt−1pt Dtet = −pt
Dt+1
et
+ pt−1
Dt
et−1︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
=∆NFAt
+pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1
⇔ pH,tC?H,t + pH,tCH,t + It︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
=Yt by good market equilibrium
−It−pH,tCH,t − pF,tCF,t − rt−1pt Dtet
= ∆NFAt + pt
Dt
et
− pt−1 Dtet−1
⇔ ∆NFAt = pH,tC?H,t − pF,tCF,t︸              ︷︷              ︸
=NXt
− rt−1pt Dtet − pt
Dt
et
+ pt−1
Dt
et−1
⇔ ∆NFAt = NXt − rt−1pt Dtet + Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
︸          ︷︷          ︸
=VALt
⇔ ∆NFAt = CAt + VALt.
Hence, valuation effects are given by
VALt = Dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
.
Next, we take a look at the current account, net foreign asset position, and
valuation effects in stationary form. Let us first consider the current account:
cat =
CAt
Γt−1
= −rt−1pt Dt
Γt−1et
+
NXt
Γt−1
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,t
C?H,tΓ
?
t−1
Γt−1Γ?t−1
− pF,t CF,t
Γt−1
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,t
C?H,tΓ
?
t−1
Γt−1Γ?t−1
− pF,tcF,t
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,tc
?
H,t
Γ?t−1
Γt−1︸︷︷︸
=1
−pF,tcF,t
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⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + pH,tc
?
H,t − pF,tcF,t
⇔ cat = −rt−1pt dtet + nxt,
where we use the assumption that both the domestic small open economy and
the ROW share a common stochastic trend component: Γt−1 = Γ?t−1. The stationary
expression for the change in the net foreign asset position is given by
∆NFAt
Γt−1
= −Dt+1
Γt
Γt
Γt−1
pt
et
+
Dt
Γt−1
pt−1
et−1
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
.
Finally, detrended valuation effects can be derived as
VALt
Γt−1
=
Dt
Γt−1
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
.
B.1.6 Model Summary
Eventually, we can summarise our model, which is described by the following
optimality and necessary conditions:
• Production Function
yt = ztkαt (gtlt)
1−α (B.1)
• Period t Resource Constraint
yt = ptct + it + pt
dt
et
(1 + rt−1) − pt gtdt+1et (B.2)
• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
gtkt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt (B.3)
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• Investment Euler Equation
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[ pt
pt+1
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
(B.4)
• Labour–Leisure Trade–off
−pt∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂lt =
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
∂yt
∂lt
(B.5)
• Bond Euler Equation
∂u(ct, lt)
∂ct
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[
∂u(ct+1, lt+1)
∂ct+1
et
et+1
(1 + rt)
]
(B.6)
• Interest Rate
rt = r + ψ
(
exp
(
Et
[
pt+1dt+1
et+1yt+1
]
− pd
ey
)
− 1
)
(B.7)
• Consumption of the Home Good
cH,t = θp
η
t ct (B.8)
• Consumption of the Foreign Good
cF,t = (1 − θ)
(
pt
pF,t
)η
ct (B.9)
• Price of Consumption
pt =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η (B.10)
• Exchange Rate
et =
pt
pF,t
(B.11)
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• Exports of Home Goods
c?H,t = θ
?pη
?
F,t c
?
t (B.12)
• Good Market Clearing
yt = c?H,t + cH,t + it (B.13)
• Net Exports
nxt = c?H,t − pF,tcF,t (B.14)
• Current Account
cat = −rt−1pt dtet + c
?
H,t − pF,tcF,t (B.15)
• Change in NFA
∆n f at = −gtpt dt+1et + pt−1
dt
et−1
(B.16)
• Valuation Effects
valt = dt
(pt−1
et−1
− pt
et
)
= ∆n f at − cat (B.17)
• Transitory Technology Process
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t ) (B.18)
• Permanent Technology Process
gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t ) (B.19)
• Foreign Consumption Process
c?t = (c
?
t−1)
ρc exp(ct) (B.20)
Moreover, note that
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
=
γ(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
ct
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∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
= − (1 − γ)(c
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
(1 − lt)
∂yt
∂kt
= α
yt
kt
∂yt
∂lt
= (1 − α) yt
lt
Steady States
We now turn to the derivation of the deterministic steady state.
• From (B.18), z = 1.
• From (B.19), g = µg.
• From (B.20), c? = 1.
• From (B.6), r = µ1−γ(1−σ)g 1β − 1.
• From (B.4) and (B.6):
µγ(1−δ)−1g β
(
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ
)
= µγ(1−δ)−1g β(1 + r)
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ = 1 + r
k
y
=
α
r + δ
.
• From (B.3)
i =
(
µg − 1 + δ
)
k. (*)
• From (B.2) using (*)
y = pc + i + (1 + r − µg)pde
y = pc +
(
µg − 1 + δ
)
k + (1 + r − µg)pde
pc
y
= 1 +
(
1 − δ − µg
) k
y
+ (µg − 1 − r)pdey .
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• From (B.5)
1 − γ
γ
pc
1 − l = (1 − α)
y
l
pc
y
= (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
1 − l
l
l = (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
(
pc
y
+ (1 − α) γ
1 − γ
)−1
or, equivalently
γ =
pc
y
(
(1 − α)1 − l
l
+
pc
y
)−1
.
• From (B.1)
y = zkα
(
µgl
)1−α
y
k
= zkα−1
(
µgl
)1−α
k =
(
k
y
) 1
1−α
µglz
1
1−α .
• Accordingly, we get y = yk k, pde = pdey y, and pc = pcy y.
• From (*), we can determine i.
• From (B.16)
∆n f a =
pd
e
(
1 − µg
)
.
• From (B.17)
val = 0.
• From (B.15)
ca = ∆n f a.
• From (B.14) and (B.15)
nx = ca + r
pd
e
.
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• From (B.9) and (B.10), we can determine
pFcF =
[
θpη−1F + (1 − θ)
]−1
(1 − θ)pc.
Then we can insert this expression together with (B.12) in equation (B.14) to
derive a function of pF:
(1 − θ)(nx + pc) =
[
θθ?c?pη
?
F + (1 − θ)θ?c?pη
?−η−1
F − θnx
]
pη−1F .
Unless η = η? = 1, this function cannot be solved for pF analytically with
pencil and paper. However, we can apply numerical methods to obtain pF.
• From (B.10)
p =
[
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF
] 1
1−η
• Then we can determine c as c = pcp .
• From (B.12)
c?H = θ
?pη
?
F c
?
• From (B.8)
cH = θpηc
• From (B.9)
cF = (1 − θ)
(
p
pF
)η
c
• From (B.11)
e =
p
pF
• Finally, we have d = pde ep .
B.2 Solving the Model
Finally, we end up with a stationary system of 20 non–linear difference equations
(B.1) – (B.20) in 20 variables. The model features 3 exogenous state variables, 2
endogenous state variables, and 15 control variables:
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• Vector of exogenous state variables:
xx,t =
[
zt gt c?t
]′
• Vector of endogenous state variables:
xe,t =
[
kt dt
]′
• Vector of control variables:
xc,t =
[
yt ct rt et it lt cH,t cF,t c?H,t pt pF,t nxt cat ∆n f at valt
]′
.
Unfortunately, the model does not have a closed form solution. Therefore, we
have to approximate its solution. We do so by log–linearising the system around
its deterministic steady state. The technique of log–linearisation is described in
Appendix A Section A.1.6.
Applying this method to the optimality and necessary conditions in the model
at hand yields:
• Production Function
ŷt = ẑt + αk̂t + (1 − α)ĝt + (1 − α)̂lt
• Period t Resource Constraint
ŷt =
pc
y
(p̂t + ĉt) +
i
y
ît +
pd
ey
(1 + r)
(
d̂t + p̂t − êt
)
+
pd
ey
rr̂t−1 +
pd
ey
µg
(
ĝt + Et
[
d̂t+1
]
+ p̂t − êt
)
• Law of Motion of Capital
ĝt + Et
[
k̂t+1
]
=
1 − δ
µg
k̂t +
i
µgk
ît
• Labour–Leisure Trade–off
ŷt = p̂t + ĉt +
1
1 − l l̂t
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• Investment Euler Equation
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĉt − (1 − γ)(1 − σ)̂lt + φµg
(
ĝt + Et[k̂t+1] − k̂t
)
= µγ(1−σ)−1g β·[ (
α
y
k
+ 1 − δ
) (
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĝt + p̂t−p̂t+1 + (γ(1 − σ) − 1)Et[ĉt+1]−
(1 − γ)(1 − σ)Et[l̂t+1]
)
+α
y
k
(
Et[ŷt+1] − Et[k̂t+1]
)
+µ2gφ
(
Et[ĝt+1] + Et[k̂t+2] − Et[k̂t+1]
)]
• Bond Euler Equation
βµγ(1−σ)−1g (1 + r)
(
(γ(1 − σ) − 1)ĝt + êt − Et[êt+1] + r1 + r r̂t
)
=
(
1 − (1 − σ)γ) (Et[ĉt+1] − ĉt) + l1 − l ( 11 − lEt[l̂t+1] − l̂t)
• Interest Rate
r̂t =
ψ
r
pd
ey
[
Et[d̂t+1] + Et[p̂t+1] − Et[ŷt+1] − Et[êt+1]
]
• Consumption of the Home Good
ĉH,t = ηp̂t + ĉt
• Consumption of the Foreign Good
ĉF,t = η
(
p̂t − p̂F,t
)
+ ĉt
• Price of Consumption
p̂t =
(1 − θ)p1−ηF
θ + (1 − θ)p1−ηF
p̂F,t
• Exchange Rate
êt = p̂t − p̂F,t
• Exports of Home Goods
ĉ?H,t = η
?p̂F,t + ĉ?t
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• Good Market Clearing
ŷt =
c?H
y
ĉ?H,t +
cH
y
ĉH,t +
i
y
ît
• Net Exports
n̂xt =
c?H
nx
ĉ?H,t −
pFcF
nx
(
p̂F,t + ĉF,t
)
• Current Account
ĉat =
c?H
ca
ĉ?H,t −
pFcF
y
p̂F,t − pFcFy ĉF,t −
r
ca
pd
e
(
r̂t−1 + p̂t + d̂t − êt
)
• Change in NFA
∆n f a∆̂n f at = − µg dpe
[
ĝt + Et[d̂t+1] + p̂t − êt
]
dp
e
[
d̂t + p̂t−1 − êt−1
]
⇔ ∆̂n f at = 1µg − 1
[
µg ĝt + µgEt[d̂t+1] − d̂t + µgp̂t − p̂t−1 − µgêt + êt−1
]
• Valuation Effects
Valuation effects are zero in steady state. Therefore, we cannot determine
its log–deviation from steady state. Absolute deviation from steady state is
given by
∆valt = ∆
(
∆n f at
) − ∆cat
• Transitory Technology Process
ẑt = ρzẑt−1 + zt
• Permanent Technology Process
ĝt = ρg ĝt−1 + 
g
t
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• Foreign Consumption Process
ĉ?t = ρcĉ
?
t−1 + 
c
t
These conditions constitute a linear system of (expectational) difference equa-
tions of the form
A˜ Et
[̂
xt+1
]
= B˜ x̂t,
where
Et
[̂
xt+1
]
=

Et
[̂
xe,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xx,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 =
Et
[̂
xs,t+1
]
Et
[̂
xc,t+1
]
 ,
and x̂s,t+1 ≡ [̂xe,t+1 x̂x,t+1]′ denotes the vector of state variables in log–deviations
from steady state.
Next, we use the methodology suggested by Klein (2000) to solve the log–
linear approximation of the model. This approach allows to express the model in
state space form:
• Measurement Equation
x̂c,t = Z x̂s,t
• Transition Equation
x̂s,t = T x̂s,t−1 + Rt, t ∼ N(0,Σ)
with
R =

0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

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t =

zt
gt
ct

Σ =

σ2z 0 0
0 σ2g 0
0 0 σ2c
 .
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B.3 Estimation Results
B.3.1 Data for Estimation
Our estimation exercise relies on quarterly data of real per capita output and
consumption as well as gross real interest rates and real exchange rates. The data
section in Chapter 3 describes how we construct these real time series.
Figures B.1 to B.12 plot the series of our four variables in logs and the associated
cubic trends for each country under investigation. The second row in each graph
shows the cycle of the corresponding variable calculated by the log–deviation
from the cubic trend.
Figure B.1: Output and Consumption – Mexico
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Figure B.2: Interest and Exchange Rates – Mexico
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Figure B.3: Output and Consumption – South Africa
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Figure B.4: Interest and Exchange Rates – South Africa
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Figure B.5: Output and Consumption – Turkey
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Figure B.6: Interest and Exchange Rates – Turkey
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Figure B.7: Output and Consumption – Canada
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Figure B.8: Interest and Exchange Rates – Canada
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Figure B.9: Output and Consumption – Sweden
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Figure B.10: Interest and Exchange Rates – Sweden
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Figure B.11: Output and Consumption – Switzerland
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Figure B.12: Interest and Exchange Rates – Switzerland
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B.3.2 Parameter Distributions
Table B.1 complements Table 3.5 in the main text and presents a detailed sum-
mary of the posterior distributions of our estimated parameters including those
determining the off–model dynamics.
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B.3.3 Random Walk Component of the Solow Residual
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) assess the relative importance of trend shocks by
calculating the random walk component (RWC) of the Solow residual. Recall that
our production function is given by
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α.
Hence, we can define total factor productivity (TFP) as
TFPt = ztΓ1−αt ,
such that our production function reads
Yt = TFPtKαt l
1−α
t .
Log output in first differences is then
∆ log(Yt) = ∆ log(TFPt) + α∆ log(Kt) + (1 − α)∆ log(lt),
where
∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α)∆ log(Γt)
⇔ ∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α) (log(gt) + log(Γt−1) − log(Γt−1))
⇔ ∆ log(TFPt) = ∆ log(zt) + (1 − α) log(gt)
is the famous Solow residual.
The variance of the Solow residual is given by the sum of the variance of
∆ log(zt) and the variance of (1 − α) log(gt). Let us first compute the variance of
log(gt):
Var(log(gt)) = Var((1 − ρg)µg + ρg log(gt−1) + gt )
⇔ Var(log(gt)) = ρ2gVar(log(gt−1)) + σ2g
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⇔ Var(log(gt)) =
σ2g
(1 − ρ2g)
,
where we use the fact that log(gt) follows a stationary AR(1) process, such that
Var(log(gt)) = Var(log(gt−1)). Next, we calculate the variance of ∆ log(zt):
Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(log(zt) − log(zt−1))
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(ρz log(zt−1) + zt − log(zt−1))
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = Var(−(1 − ρz) log(zt−1) + zt )
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2Var(log(zt−1)) + σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2 σ
2
z
(1 − ρ2z)
+ σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz)2 σ
2
z
(1 + ρz)(1 − ρz) + σ
2
z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = (1 − ρz) σ
2
z
(1 + ρz)
+ σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) =
(
1 − ρz
1 + ρz
+ 1
)
σ2z
⇔ Var(∆ log(zt)) = 21 + ρzσ
2
z ,
where, again, we use the fact that log(zt) follows a stationary AR(1) process, such
that Var(log(zt)) = Var(log(zt−1)). Accordingly, the variance of the Solow residual
is given by
Var(∆ log(TFPt)) = Var(∆ log(zt)) + (1 − α)2Var(log(gt))
⇔ Var(∆ log(TFPt)) = 2σ
2
z
1 + ρz
+
(1 − α)2σ2g
(1 − ρ2g)
.
The random walk component of the Solow residual is then the portion of the
variance of ∆ log(TFPt) that can be attributed to the non–stationary productivity
component:
RWC =
(1−α)2σ2g
(1−ρ2g)
2σ2z
1+ρz
+
(1−α)2σ2g
(1−ρ2g)
.
Note that this equation is the counterpart of equation (14) in the paper by Aguiar
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and Gopinath (2007).
Table B.2 summarises the RWC of the Solow residual as well as the ratio of
standard deviations σgσz computed at the median of the posterior distribution. For
Mexico and Canada we also report the GMM estimates obtained by Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007).
Table B.2: Random Walk Component and Volatility Ratio
Benchmark Liability AG (2007)
Dollarisation
Random Walk Component
Emerging Markets
MEX 0.88 0.88 0.88
ZAF 0.92 0.89
TUR 0.79 0.85
Developed Economies
CAN 0.84 0.40
SWE 0.69
CHE 0.70
Ratio of Volatilities σgσz
Emerging Markets
MEX 1.09 0.90 4.02
ZAF 0.89 0.89
TUR 1.14 1.12
Developed Economies
CAN 0.83 0.75
SWE 0.90
CHE 0.93
Our calculations suggest that the RWC does not differ substantially across
models. It is somewhat higher in the model with liability dollarisation than
in the benchmark model for Turkey, whereas it is the reverse for South Africa.
Moreover, we find that the RWC is smaller in developed economies than in EMEs.
This finding corroborates the result of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and explains
why our analysis finds support for their hypothesis that “the cycle is the trend” in
emerging markets.
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B.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
This section presents forecast error variance decompositions for the three EMEs
and developed economies in our analysis. In each specification, we focus on the
respective model parametrised at the median of the posterior distributions. Fig-
ures B.13 to B.18 display the variance decompositions of the benchmark economy
as well as the model with liability dollarisation for Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey. Figures B.19 to B.21, show the variance decompositions of the benchmark
model for Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Figure B.13: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Mexico Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for Mexico.
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Figure B.14: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Mexico Liability Dollarisa-
tion
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarisation model estimated for Mexico.
Figure B.15: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – South Africa Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for South Africa.
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Figure B.16: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – South Africa Liability Dol-
larisation
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarisation model estimated for South Africa.
Figure B.17: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Turkey Benchmark
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the benchmark model estimated for Turkey.
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Figure B.18: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Turkey Liability Dollarisa-
tion
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution for the liability dollarisation model estimated for Turkey.
Figure B.19: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Canada
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Canada.
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Figure B.20: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Sweden
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Sweden.
Figure B.21: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Switzerland
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Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition based on median outcomes of the posterior
distribution estimated for Switzerland.
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B.5 Impulse Responses
This section contrasts the impulse responses of the model with liability dollarisa-
tion with those implied by the benchmark model. For this purpose, we choose
the same parametrisation for both models. In particular, we calibrate the debt–
elasticity of the interest rate ψ and the parameters governing the exogenous pro-
cesses at the median of the posterior distributions estimated for Mexico in the
liability dollarisation setup. That is, we set ψ = 0.216, ρz = 0.708, ρz = 0.790, and
ρz = 0.547.
Figures B.22, B.23, and B.24 show the impulse responses after a one percent
shock to the permanent productivity process, transitory productivity process, and
foreign consumption, respectively.
Figure B.22: Impulse Responses to a Permanent Shock
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Figure B.23: Impulse Responses to a Transitory Shock
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Figure B.24: Impulse Responses to a Foreign Demand Shock
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B.6 Business Cycle Moments
Table B.3 shows model implied business cycle moments and their empirical coun-
terparts. The table complements the table presented in Section 3.6.3 in the main
text. Here, we simulate the benchmark and the liability dollarisation model, each
evaluated at the median of the respective posterior distributions, for our three
EMEs. Again, we generate time series with 100 observations and subsequently
compute sample moments based on the detrended series of our variables. Table
B.3 reports the median of our calculated moments across all 5,000 simulations.
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Appendix C
Appendix to “Current Account
Dynamics in Emerging Markets: Is
the Cycle really the Trend?”
C.1 Stochastic Growth Model
This section outlines the stochastic growth model developed by Aguiar and Gop-
inath (2007), augmented with an exogenous world interest rate shock.
The theoretical economy is represented by:
• Production Function
Yt = ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α
• Transitory Technology Process
zt = z
ρz
t−1 exp(
z
t )
• Permanent Technology Process
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs, gt = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t−1 exp(
g
t )
• Aggregate Resource Constraint
Yt +
Bt+1
1 + rt
= Ct + It + Bt
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• Current Account and Net Exports
CAt = NXt = Yt − Ct − It = Bt − Bt+11 + rt
• Law of Motion of Capital
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It − φ2
(Kt+1
Kt
− µg
)2
Kt
• Interest Rate
1 + rt = R?t + ψ
(
exp (bt+1 − b) − 1)
• World Interest Rate Process
R?t = (R
?)1−ρR(R?t−1)
ρR exp(Rt )
Error terms have zero means and are normally distributed: zt ∼ N(0, σ2z), gt ∼
N(0, σ2g), and Rt ∼ N(0, σ2R). Preferences of the representative household are
represented by a CRRA utility function:
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = [C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ]1−σ
1 − σ .
There is no population growth and the mass of population is normalised to one.
C.1.1 Detrending the Variables
Variables Yt, Ct, It, Kt, CAt, and Bt exhibit a stochastic trend. Hence, we need
to detrend them in order to obtain a system of stationary variables. This can be
easily achieved through division by the realisation of the permanent productivity
component in the previous period:
xt ≡ Xt
Γt−1
,
where xt denotes the stationary counterpart of variable Xt.
Accordingly, the detrended versions of our equations can be derived as
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• Production Function
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
ztKαt (Γtlt)
1−α
Γt−1
= ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α
• Aggregate Resource Constraint
yt =
Yt
Γt−1
=
Ct + It + Bt
Γt−1
− ΓtBt+1
(1 + rt)Γt−1Γt
= ct + it + bt − gtbt+11 + rt
• Current Account and Net Exports
cat =
CAt
Γt−1
=
NXt
Γt−1
=
Yt − Ct − It
Γt−1
=
Bt
Γt−1
− ΓtBt+1
Γt−1Γt
1
1 + rt
cat = nxt = yt − ct − it = bt − gt bt+11 + rt
• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 =
ΓtKt+1
ΓtΓt−1
=
(1 − δ)Kt + It
Γt−1
− φ
2
(Kt+1Γt
ΓtΓt−1
Γt−1
Kt
− µg
)2 Kt
Γt−1
= (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
gtkt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt
• Utility Function
u(Ct, 1 − lt) = (C
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ =
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
(Cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ
= Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1
((
Ct
Γt−1
)γ
(1 − lt)1−γ
)1−σ
1 − σ
= Γ
γ(1−σ)
t−1︸︷︷︸
≡κt−1
(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
1 − σ︸              ︷︷              ︸
u(ct,1−lt)
= κt−1u(ct, 1 − lt)
C.1.2 Maximisation Problem of the Representative Household
We can combine the detrended versions of output, law of motion of capital, and
the aggregate resource constraint to write the period budget constraint of the
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representative agent as
ztk1−αt (gtlt)
α + (1 − δ)kt + gtbt+11 + rt = ct + gtkt+1 +
φ
2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt + bt.
Hence, the household’s optimisation problem at time t can then be stated as
max
{cτ,lτ,kτ+1,bτ+1}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ))
subject to
zτk1−ατ (gτlτ)
α + (1 − δ)kτ + gτbτ+11 + rτ = cτ + gτkτ+1 +
φ
2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ + bτ,
for given kt, bt, and the transversality condition lim
j→∞
Et
(
bt+1+ j∏ j
s=0(1+rs)
)
= 0.
The maximisation problem yields the following Lagrangian:
L =Et
 ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
(
κτ−1u(cτ, 1 − lτ) + λτ
(
zτk1−ατ (gτlτ)
α +
gτbτ+1
1 + rτ
+ (1 − δ)kτ
−cτ − gτkτ+1 − φ2
(
gτ
kτ+1
kτ
− µg
)2
kτ − bτ
)) .
We can then derive the first–order conditions as
(I)
∂L
∂ct
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
− λt = 0
⇔ κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂ct = λt
⇒ κtEt
[
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1
]
= Et [λt+1]
(II)
∂L
∂lt
= κt−1
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
+ λt
∂yt
∂lt
= 0
⇔ − κt−1∂u(ct, 1 − lt)∂lt = λt
∂yt
∂lt
(III)
∂L
∂kt+1
= −λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
+ Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
= 0
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⇔ λt
[
gt
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))]
= Et
[
βλt+1
(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)]
(IV)
∂L
∂bt+1
= λtgt
1
1 + rt
− βEt [λt+1] = 0
⇔ λtgt 11 + rt = βEt [λt+1]
(V)
∂L
∂λt
= yt +
gtbt+1
1 + rt
+ (1 − δ)kt − ct − gtkt+1 − φ2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt − bt = 0
⇔ yt + gtbt+11 + rt + (1 − δ)kt = ct + gtkt+1 +
φ
2
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt + bt
As a result, the stationary model is described by the following optimality and
necessary conditions:
• Production Function
yt = ztkαt (gtlt)
1−α (C.1)
• Period t Resource Constraint
yt = ct + it + bt − gtbt+11 + rt (C.2)
• Law of Motion of Capital
gtkt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − φ2
(
gtkt+1
kt
− µg
)2
kt (C.3)
• Investment Euler Equation
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
(
1 + φ
(
gt
kt+1
kt
− µg
))
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1(∂yt+1
∂kt+1
+ (1 − δ) + φ
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
gt+1
kt+2
kt+1
− µg
)2)] (C.4)
• Labour–Leisure Trade–off
−∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
=
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
∂yt
∂lt
(C.5)
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• Bond Euler Equation
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
= gγ(1−σ)−1t βEt
[
∂u(ct+1, 1 − lt+1)
∂ct+1
(1 + rt)
]
(C.6)
• Interest Rate
1 + rt = R?t + ψ
(
exp (bt+1 − b) − 1) (C.7)
• Current Account and Net Exports
ca = nx = y − c − i = bt − gt bt+11 + rt (C.8)
• Transitory Technology Process
zt+1 = z
ρz
t exp(
z
t+1) (C.9)
• Permanent Technology Process
gt+1 = µ
1−ρg
g g
ρg
t exp(
g
t+1) (C.10)
• World Interest Rate Process
R?t+1 = (R
?)1−ρR(R?t )
ρR exp(Rt+1) (C.11)
Moreover, note that
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂ct
=
γ(cγt (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
ct
∂u(ct, 1 − lt)
∂lt
= − (1 − γ)(c
γ
t (1 − lt)1−γ)1−σ
(1 − lt)
∂yt
∂kt
= α
yt
kt
∂yt
∂lt
= (1 − α) yt
lt
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C.1.3 Steady States
Steady state conditions are given by
z = 1
g = µg
r = µ1−γ(1−σ)g
1
β
− 1
R? = 1 + r
k
y
=
α
r + δ
c
y
= 1 + (1 − δ − µg) ky +
( µg
1 + r
− 1
) b
y
l =
(
1 +
1 − γ
γ(1 − α)
c
y
)−1
k =
(
k
y
) 1
1−α
lµg
y =
y
k
k
c =
c
y
y
b =
b
y
y
i = k(µg − 1 + δ)
ca = nx = y − c − i
C.1.4 Solving the Model
Finally, we end up with a stationary system of 11 non–linear difference equations
(C.1) – (C.11) in 11 variables. The model features 3 exogenous state variables, 2
endogenous state variables, and 6 control variables:
• Vector of exogenous state variables:
xx,t =
[
zt gt R?t
]′
• Vector of endogenous state variables:
xe,t = [kt bt]
′
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• Vector of control variables:
xc,t =
[
yt ct it lt rt cat
]′.
Unfortunately, the model does not have a closed form solution. Therefore, we
have to approximate its solution. We do so by log–linearising the system around
its deterministic steady state. Subsequently, we solve the resulting linear system
of expectational difference equations using the methodology suggested by Klein
(2000). Section A.1.6 of Appendix A describes this approach in detail.
Finally, we can express the model in state space form:
• Measurement Equation
x̂c,t = Z x̂s,t
• Transition Equation
x̂s,t = T x̂s,t−1 + Rt, t ∼ N(0,Σ)
with
R =

0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

t =

zt
gt
Rt

Σ =

σ2z 0 0
0 σ2g 0
0 0 σ2R
 .
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C.2 Global versus Country–Specific Shocks
This section shows how we use the QR decomposition to identify country–specific
productivity shocks and global interest rate shocks.
Reconsider matrix P = [Σα⊥Spi αSτ], which maps mutually orthogonal per-
manent and transitory shocks into reduced form shocks. In our trivariate system,
matrix P takes the general form
P =

p11 p12 p13
p21 p22 p23
p31 p32 p33
 .
Our ordering of shocks implies that impact responses to transitory shocks are
summarised in the last two columns of P, which is the (3 × 2) matrix αSτ. We
can distinguish global from country–specific temporary shocks by imposing a
restriction on αSτ, such that it takes the form
αSτ =

? 0
? ?
? ?
 .
Consider now the following partition of matrix αSτ. Define matrix A as the
upper (2 × 2) part of αSτ and B as the lower (1 × 2) part of αSτ. That is,
A =
p12 p13p22 p23
 and B = (p32 p33) ,
such thatαSτ = [A B]′. Since our transitory components are already orthogonal,
any orthogonal decomposition of (parts of) matrixαSτ preserves the orthogonality
of shocks. Recall, any square matrix can be decomposed into QR, where Q is an
orthogonal matrix and R is an upper triangular matrix. Hence, we can take a QR
decomposition of matrix A′, such that A = R′Q′, where R′ is a lower triangular
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matrix and Q′ is an orthogonal matrix. We can then rewrite αSτ as follows
αSτ =
R′Q′B
 =

r11 0r12 r22

q11 q21q12 q22

B

⇔ αSτQ =

r11 0r12 r22
 Q′Q
BQ
 =

r11 0r12 r22
 I2
BQ

⇔ αSτQ =

r11 0
r12 r22
p32q11 + p33q21 p32q12 + p33q22
 .
As a result, we obtain an adjusted matrix P˜ = [Σα⊥Spi αSτQ] of the form
P˜ =

? ? 0
? ? ?
? ? ?
 ,
which maps our structural shocks into reduced form disturbances:
P˜Θt = P˜

pit
τgt
τct
 = t.
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C.3 Impulse Responses
Empirical Impulse Responses
This section presents the impulse responses of the current account to output ratio
and income to the three identified shocks. Figures C.1 to C.5 show the impulse
responses of CAY and y to a positive permanent shock. Impulse responses of these
two variables to global and country–specific transitory shocks are displayed in
Figures C.6 to C.10 and C.11 to C.15, respectively.
Figure C.1: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock I
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Figure C.2: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock II
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Figure C.3: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock III
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Figure C.4: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock IV
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Figure C.5: Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock V
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Figure C.6: Impulse Responses – Global Transitory Shock I
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Figure C.7: Impulse Responses – Global Transitory Shock II
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Figure C.8: Impulse Responses – Global Transitory Shock III
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Figure C.9: Impulse Responses – Global Transitory Shock IV
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Figure C.10: Impulse Responses – Global Transitory Shock V
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Figure C.11: Impulse Responses – Country–Specific Transitory Shock I
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Figure C.12: Impulse Responses – Country–Specific Transitory Shock II
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Figure C.13: Impulse Responses – Country–Specific Transitory Shock III
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Figure C.14: Impulse Responses – Country–Specific Transitory Shock IV
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Figure C.15: Impulse Responses – Country–Specific Transitory Shock V
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Theoretical Impulse Responses
Figure C.16 shows the model implied impulse responses of the current account to
output ratio and income to a permanent productivity shock for different values
of ρg. To facilitate comparison with our baseline calibration, we use the same
parameter values as reported in Table 4.1 but vary the persistence of the non–
stationary technology process ρg.
The intuition for the impulse responses of CAY and y in Figure C.16 are described
in the main text of Chapter 4. Note that variable y in the DSGE model is not
equivalent to y in our VECM. As we know, variable y corresponds to detrended
output in the theoretical model, i.e. yt = YtΓt−1 , whereas it denotes the log of real
per capita GDP in the VECM. That is the reason why the effect of a permanent
shock on y will eventually die out in the DSGE model. By contrast, we observe a
long–run change of y in the empirical impulse responses above.
Figure C.16: Theoretical Impulse Responses – Permanent Shock with Different ρg
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Figure C.17 displays the impulse responses of CAY and y to a transitory pro-
ductivity shock in the model augmented with a country spread. We use the same
parametrisation as before, but let the parameter on the interest rate premium η
take on different values. Recall that the interest rate rule including the spread
term is given by
1 + rt = R?t + ψ
(
exp (bt+1 − b) − 1) − η (exp (Et [zt+1] − z) − 1) .
As a result, parameter η approximately shows by how many percentage points
the interest rate rt decreases if we expect tomorrow’s stationary TFP component
zt+1 to increase by 1 percent.1
As η increases, the impact of the transitory productivity shock on consumption
and investment becomes more and more amplified. Hence, for a sufficiently
large η, the response of the current account to output ratio is actually negative.
Interestingly, a higher value of η also implies a weaker increase in output. In
fact, if η is large enough, output actually decreases initially. The intuition behind
this prediction of the model is similar to the effect of a highly persistent trend
shock. The decline in the interest rate premium entails a positive income effect,
which creates an incentive to work less. If this income effect on labour supply
is large enough, the decrease in labour input outweighs the positive effect of the
productivity shock, such that output falls on impact.
1Take a look at the interest rate rule in log–linear form, which is given by
rr̂t = R?R̂?t + ψbb̂t+1 − ηzEt
[
ẑt+1
]
⇔ drt ≈ dR?t + ψdbt+1 − ηdEt [zt+1] .
Hence, since dR?t = 0 (world interest rate is exogenous) and for ψdbt+1 = 0 (which is basically
always fulfilled since ψ is close to zero), we have drt/dEt [zt+1] ≈ −η.
236
Figure C.17: Theoretical Impulse Responses – Transitory Shock with Different η
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C.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The table below shows the percentage share of the forecast error variance ex-
plained by permanent, global transitory, and country–specific transitory shocks
at forecast horizons of 0, 4, 8, 20, and 40 quarters for each country. Thus, it
complements Table 9 in the main text, which presents contemporaneous FEVD.
r? CAY y
Horizon pi τg τc pi τg τc pi τg τc
0 24.59 75.41 0.00 70.65 22.63 6.72 0.44 0.37 99.19
4 22.52 74.33 3.15 63.26 9.61 27.13 0.13 0.91 98.96
ARG 8 24.83 70.70 4.48 64.54 8.69 26.77 4.62 6.53 88.84
20 27.18 67.34 5.48 65.58 9.56 24.85 50.90 5.42 43.68
40 27.75 66.59 5.66 65.93 9.42 24.65 81.09 2.15 16.76
0 37.12 62.88 0.00 16.88 22.47 60.65 63.98 0.05 35.97
4 39.00 59.14 1.86 21.80 13.09 65.12 46.78 3.69 49.53
BRA 8 40.64 57.60 1.76 31.82 8.30 59.87 50.16 10.95 38.89
20 40.74 57.12 2.14 45.70 15.06 39.24 70.84 13.73 15.43
40 40.64 56.87 2.49 44.94 17.85 37.21 89.19 5.15 5.66
0 2.75 97.25 0.00 15.98 0.89 83.14 92.86 0.00 7.13
4 2.80 93.00 4.20 15.20 2.20 82.60 94.62 0.10 5.28
CZE 8 3.27 89.48 7.25 15.06 2.44 82.49 95.72 0.10 4.18
20 3.78 85.58 10.63 14.98 2.59 82.42 97.55 0.07 2.38
40 3.92 84.60 11.48 14.97 2.62 82.41 98.70 0.04 1.27
0 0.11 99.89 0.00 44.95 0.16 54.89 79.94 3.37 16.69
4 1.61 96.49 1.90 67.65 0.26 32.09 83.61 2.06 14.34
HUN 8 3.26 94.54 2.20 71.57 0.20 28.23 89.14 0.89 9.97
20 4.82 92.64 2.54 73.70 0.16 26.14 95.79 0.26 3.96
40 5.10 92.30 2.60 73.99 0.16 25.85 98.30 0.10 1.60
0 18.16 81.84 0.00 32.96 3.50 63.54 44.72 2.64 52.64
4 17.34 82.33 0.33 38.43 1.26 60.31 71.19 0.84 27.98
IDN 8 17.39 82.12 0.48 39.19 1.14 59.66 83.13 0.44 16.42
20 17.42 82.04 0.54 39.42 1.11 59.47 93.76 0.16 6.08
40 17.42 82.04 0.54 39.42 1.11 59.47 97.14 0.07 2.79
0 50.63 49.37 0.00 6.95 33.12 59.93 38.26 49.32 12.42
4 50.25 42.81 6.93 2.60 50.06 47.34 51.03 42.78 6.19
KOR 8 48.85 39.21 11.94 2.21 50.58 47.21 62.48 30.25 7.26
20 47.35 35.69 16.97 2.39 51.30 46.31 81.66 12.65 5.69
40 47.10 35.17 17.73 2.47 51.27 46.26 91.63 5.59 2.78
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0 5.41 94.59 0.00 19.05 7.90 73.05 98.41 1.50 0.10
4 8.47 91.22 0.31 36.32 6.86 56.82 99.08 0.68 0.24
MYS 8 8.48 90.51 1.01 42.13 4.93 52.94 99.43 0.37 0.20
20 9.61 88.06 2.33 46.49 3.49 50.02 99.72 0.15 0.13
40 10.00 87.34 2.66 47.20 3.27 49.53 99.85 0.07 0.07
0 21.19 78.81 0.00 5.49 1.21 93.30 97.13 2.48 0.39
4 24.70 73.35 1.94 22.95 6.11 70.94 98.78 0.35 0.88
MEX 8 24.08 72.00 3.92 25.65 15.26 59.09 99.30 0.23 0.47
20 23.69 70.31 6.01 24.92 23.75 51.33 99.68 0.12 0.20
40 23.62 69.94 6.44 24.74 25.38 49.89 99.83 0.06 0.10
0 71.37 28.63 0.00 24.74 54.21 21.05 4.38 10.90 84.73
4 70.96 26.76 2.27 16.50 41.32 42.19 22.60 11.18 66.22
PER 8 71.86 25.26 2.88 31.16 31.66 37.18 42.34 6.88 50.79
20 73.28 23.13 3.59 51.89 17.90 30.21 74.91 2.30 22.79
40 73.80 22.22 3.98 60.39 13.14 26.47 90.18 0.77 9.04
0 16.58 83.42 0.00 0.20 3.14 96.66 88.19 10.58 1.23
4 16.77 81.92 1.31 0.28 9.85 89.86 96.72 2.46 0.81
PHL 8 16.69 81.43 1.89 0.39 11.32 88.30 98.18 1.32 0.50
20 16.67 81.34 1.99 0.41 11.56 88.03 99.23 0.55 0.21
40 16.67 81.34 1.99 0.41 11.56 88.03 99.61 0.28 0.11
0 0.09 99.91 0.00 21.51 1.16 77.33 74.37 0.04 25.59
4 0.25 98.89 0.86 20.90 3.30 75.80 84.86 0.49 14.64
POL 8 0.36 98.38 1.26 20.80 3.68 75.52 90.21 0.38 9.41
20 0.41 98.16 1.43 20.76 3.81 75.43 95.84 0.17 3.99
40 0.41 98.15 1.44 20.76 3.81 75.43 97.97 0.08 1.94
0 0.42 99.58 0.00 87.44 2.58 9.98 31.24 4.71 64.05
4 10.18 88.88 0.94 69.31 0.85 29.84 74.81 0.86 24.33
RUS 8 10.33 88.66 1.00 67.84 0.76 31.40 87.43 0.39 12.18
20 10.34 88.66 1.01 67.61 0.74 31.64 95.79 0.13 4.08
40 10.34 88.66 1.01 67.61 0.74 31.64 98.06 0.06 1.88
0 49.53 50.47 0.00 4.79 0.10 95.11 65.11 30.82 4.06
4 49.74 49.47 0.79 8.32 2.36 89.33 75.03 16.44 8.53
ZAF 8 48.52 50.63 0.85 16.53 1.97 81.50 84.48 9.92 5.60
20 48.27 50.70 1.02 23.67 3.09 73.24 94.06 3.80 2.14
40 48.31 50.60 1.09 24.10 3.54 72.36 97.10 1.85 1.05
0 20.55 79.45 0.00 9.39 4.44 86.17 84.32 7.52 8.16
THA 4 19.37 78.77 1.85 19.97 6.08 73.95 94.20 2.29 3.51
8 19.45 78.00 2.56 21.20 7.32 71.48 96.72 1.25 2.03
20 19.47 77.79 2.73 21.46 7.60 70.95 98.68 0.50 0.82
40 19.47 77.79 2.73 21.46 7.60 70.94 99.35 0.25 0.40
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0 0.47 99.53 0.00 18.06 3.83 78.12 99.57 0.30 0.13
TUR 4 0.63 98.56 0.80 29.02 4.75 66.24 96.32 1.26 2.42
8 0.63 98.56 0.80 29.34 4.81 65.85 97.64 0.77 1.59
20 0.63 98.56 0.80 29.36 4.82 65.82 98.87 0.37 0.76
40 0.63 98.56 0.80 29.36 4.82 65.82 99.39 0.20 0.41
C.5 Estimated Cointegrating Matrix
This section presents the results of our analysis if we do not impose but estimate
the cointegrating matrix β. If the cointegrating matrix is not known we cannot
estimate our VECM using LS. In this case, we use Maximum Likelihood (ML) to
estimate the normalised cointegrating matrix β =
[
1 0 β1
0 1 β2
]′
. Country estimates of
the cointegrating matrix are reported in Table C.2. The table also presents the
results of the test of the joint hypothesis β1 = β2 = 0 in each country.
Table C.2: Cointegration Estimation
β1 β2 LR p–value
ARG 0.004 0.109 7.638 0.022**
BRA 0.041 0.014 13.721 0.001***
CZE 0.023 −0.248 31.151 0.000***
HUN 0.021 0.035 14.178 0.001***
IDN 0.007 −0.027 5.294 0.071*
KOR 0.003 −0.053 7.085 0.029**
MYS 0.017 −0.188 2.710 0.260
MEX 0.035 0.103 4.719 0.095*
PER 0.005 −0.148 0.722 0.670
PHL 0.019 0.025 7.308 0.026**
POL 0.020 −0.080 11.660 0.003***
RUS 0.014 −0.015 17.882 0.000***
ZAF 0.016 0.069 1.109 0.547
THA 0.022 0.128 10.622 0.005***
TUR 0.016 0.049 13.552 0.001***
Median 0.017 0.014
Mean 0.017 −0.015
Std Dev 0.011 0.111
Notes: LR denotes the Likelihood Ratio test statistic for the
joint null hypothesis H0 : β1 = β2 = 0. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.3 shows the impact responses of the net exports to GDP ratio as well
as income to the various shocks. If we compare these impact responses to our
results reported in the paper, we observe that the patterns of current account
dynamics do not change for most countries. Qualitatively, the reaction of the
current account to permanent and idiosyncratic transitory shocks changes only
in the Czech Republic and Korea. Our key finding that the countercyclicality is
either driven by trend shocks or country–specific transitory shocks survives, too.
Only Malaysia and, as before, Turkey exhibit a negative response of CAY to these
two types of shocks once we base our analysis on an estimated cointegrating
matrix.
Table C.3: Impact Impulse Responses – Estimated Cointegrating Relationship
Sample
Correlation CAY y
between
CA
Y and y pi τ
g τc pi τg τc
ARG −0.50 1.27 −0.55 −0.30 0.02 0.05 1.79
BRA −0.08 0.47 −0.31 −0.58 0.71 0.04 0.61
CZE −0.10 0.86 −0.27 −0.83 1.08 0.07 0.94
HUN −0.27 −1.04 0.11 0.89 0.74 0.06 0.44
IDN −0.08 −1.21 −0.30 1.36 1.52 0.30 1.94
KOR −0.32 0.80 0.18 −1.52 0.84 0.99 1.04
MYS −0.25 −0.58 −0.82 −2.79 1.40 0.48 0.24
MEX −0.35 −0.25 −0.14 0.92 1.32 0.34 0.15
PER −0.33 0.02 0.01 −1.22 1.42 1.78 0.21
PHL −0.33 0.11 0.41 −2.17 1.75 0.55 0.20
POL −0.50 0.50 0.02 −0.78 0.99 0.00 0.64
RUS 0.05 1.79 0.18 −0.61 1.08 0.34 1.49
ZAF −0.39 0.33 0.05 −1.37 0.61 0.41 0.16
THA −0.46 −1.11 −0.87 2.89 1.88 0.71 0.82
TUR −0.55 −0.75 −0.25 −1.45 2.76 0.06 0.04
Median −0.33 0.11 −0.14 −0.78 1.08 0.34 0.61
Mean −0.30 0.08 −0.17 −0.50 1.21 0.41 0.71
Std Dev 0.18 0.90 0.37 1.47 0.64 0.47 0.62
Notes: The table shows the impact responses of the net exports to GDP ratio and income following
the three structural shocks based on the estimated cointegrating matrix β. Responses have been
multiplied by 100 and corrected for the sign of the impact responses of output. The sample
correlation between CAY and y corresponds to the correlation between the net exports to GDP ratio
and the cyclical component of the log of output, which has been derived using the HP filter with
smoothing parameter 1,600.
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Table C.4: Contemporaneous Forecast Error Variance Decomposition – Estimated
Cointegrating Relationship
r? CAY y
pi τg pi τg τc pi τg τc
ARG 18.13 81.87 80.36 15.03 4.61 0.01 0.09 99.90
BRA 27.54 72.46 33.50 14.34 52.16 56.85 0.15 43.00
CZE 6.67 93.33 49.51 4.66 45.82 56.40 0.25 43.34
HUN 4.72 95.28 57.24 0.65 42.11 73.36 0.44 26.20
IDN 13.98 86.02 42.93 2.72 54.34 37.51 1.43 61.06
KOR 49.94 50.06 21.58 1.12 77.30 25.53 35.15 39.32
MYS 21.47 78.53 3.81 7.68 88.51 87.27 10.19 2.54
MEX 31.10 68.90 6.70 2.13 91.17 92.57 6.28 1.15
PER 62.43 37.57 0.03 0.01 99.97 38.38 60.76 0.87
PHL 15.49 84.51 0.23 3.45 96.32 89.92 8.86 1.22
POL 0.01 99.99 28.50 0.04 71.46 70.80 0.00 29.20
RUS 0.01 99.99 88.85 0.93 10.21 33.21 3.27 63.52
ZAF 48.10 51.90 5.38 0.13 94.49 66.14 29.15 4.71
THA 35.68 64.32 11.87 7.33 80.80 74.83 10.87 14.30
TUR 1.51 98.49 20.83 2.38 76.79 99.94 0.04 0.02
Median 18.13 81.87 21.58 2.38 76.79 66.14 3.27 26.20
Mean 22.45 77.55 30.09 4.17 65.74 60.18 11.13 28.69
Std Dev 19.71 19.71 28.54 4.90 30.12 28.47 17.47 29.81
Notes: Percentage share of the contemporaneous forecast error variance explained by permanent,
global transitory and country–specific transitory shocks, respectively, based on the estimated
cointegrating matrix β.
Moreover, Table C.4 presents the contemporaneous forecast error variance de-
composition of our three variables. Again, we do not observe enormous changes
in the outcome.
Hence, results reported in Tables C.3 and C.4 by and large corroborate the
findings based on the theoretically imposed cointegrating matrix β. Reassuringly,
our conclusions from the main text do not alter substantially once we estimate β.
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